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Langon v. Washoe County
993 P.2d 718 (Nev. Feb. 2, 2000)
Counties may set or adjust the maximum compensation for constables.
In 1996, the Washoe Board of County Commissioners (Washoe) issued an
order that set the base salary for constables at $10,000 and established a fee
sharing formula that required constables, once their base salary and net reve-
nues for services reached $55,000, to forward fifty percent of the net fees col-
lected to the county. The plaintiff constables refused to abide by the new fee-
splitting standards. Washoe brought suit to enforce the rules and the constables
counterclaimed, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 258 authorizes the legisla-
ture, but not counties, to cap constable compensation or to require constables to
share fees.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that a plain language reading of the stat-
ute allows county boards to change constable salaries only by increasing the
minimum. The court held that this would be an absurd result that the legisla-
ture would have specified had that been its intent. The court interpreted Nev.
Rev. Stat. 258.040 to allow counties to adjust or fix a constable's maximum
compensation, and found that Nev. Rev. Stat. 258.125 permits constables to
collect stated fees but does not allow them an absolute right to keep all fees
collected.
Karadanis v. Bond
993 P.2d 721 (Nev. Feb. 3, 2000)
Legislature may act to cure a defective city ordinance without violating
the judiciary's interest in the separation of powers if both the act and ordi-
nance are constitutional.
Business owners (Owners) moved for a preliminary injunction to chal-
lenge the county's enactment of a sales tax increase to finance a railroad grade
separation project. The plaintiffs alleged the Washoe Board of County Com-
missioners (Washoe) violated Nevada law, which required Washoe to secure
written financial commitments covering at least half the cost of the project prior
to enacting the tax. The district court granted the city and county's motion for
summary judgment, and the Owners appealed.
Washoe had five written funding commitments of money or property suf-
ficient to fulfill the statutory requirements, but the Owners challenged the City
of Reno's loan commitment, which was to be repaid from the creation of a
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special assessment district. The Owners alleged that the commitment was inva-
lid because the district was created illegally.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that a sub-
sequent act of the Nevada Legislature cured the defect in the creation of the
special assessment district. The Owners argued that the curative statute was an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers because it retrospectively
abrogated judicial pronouncements. The court held that the legislature was
within its rights to amend a statute to cure a defective ordinance, so long as
both the ordinance and statute were constitutional.
Salem v. Rio Casino & Hotel Suites, Inc.
2000 U.S. LEXIS 3288 (9th Cir. Mar. 1, 2000)
Nevada Gaming Control Board rulings are accorded the same preclusive
effect in federal court as they are given in state court.
Salem filed a disputed jackpot claim against the Rio Hotel and Casino
with the Nevada Gaming Control Board (GCB), which ruled against him. The
plaintiff did not pursue an appeal in Nevada state court. Instead, he filed a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim in federal dis-
trict court, which was dismissed.
The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Salem was
precluded from re-litigating the issue in federal court because it was the same
issue decided on the merits by the GCB between the same parties. Since the
GCB's ruling has the same preclusive effect in federal court as a state court
judgment would have, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the plaintiffs claim.
Kindred v. Second Judicial Dist. Court
996 P.2d 903 (Nev. Apr. 5, 2000)
Title VII and FMLA claims are not exempt from arbitration clauses con-
tained in an employment agreement, as Congress has never expressly pre-
cluded either from arbitration proceedings.
Upon being hired as an investment banker, Kindred was required to sign
two separate employment agreements, each containing an arbitration clause.
Three years later, she filed a complaint in Washoe County District Court alleg-
ing Title VII sexual harassment and/or discrimination and breach of the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA). When she refused to arbitrate her claims, the
district court ruled that all claims were subject to arbitration. Kindred subse-
quently filed a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the court's
mandatory arbitration order.
The Nevada Supreme Court denied Kindred's request, holding that Title
VII expressly approves utilizing alternative dispute resolutions, including arbi-
tration, to resolve claims. Further, of the eleven federal courts of appeal that
have addressed the issue, ten have affirmed that Title VII claims are subject to
arbitration. The eleventh - the Ninth Circuit - held that legislative history
showed congressional intent to preclude compulsory arbitration of such claims
in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). The
court followed the majority of federal circuits, holding that Congress did not
expressly preclude the arbitration of Title VII claims. The court also held that
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FMLA contains no specific reference or suggestion that claims may not be
arbitrated. Since Congress could have precluded arbitration of FMLA claims
but chose not to, FMLA claims are also proper for arbitration proceedings.
Lee v. Nevada
997 P.2d 138 (Nev. Apr. 6, 2000)
A road dedicated to the "public authority" is one over which state or local
authority has jurisdiction to enact traffic ordinances or regulations.
Lee killed a man and injured two others while driving his tractor-trailer
along a mining access road and was charged with reckless driving. Lee moved
to dismiss on the grounds that the road along which he was driving - a non-
exclusive right of way granted to a mining company by the Bureau of Land
Management - is not a public highway. The district court denied the motion
and he appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court determined that the case turned on the mean-
ing of the language in Nev. Rev. Stat. 484.065, which defines public highways
as roads open to public use where they are "dedicated to the public authority."
The court held that a road dedicated to the public authority is one over which
the state or local authority has the jurisdiction to enact traffic ordinances or
regulations, which was not the case here. The court further stated that broaden-
ing the definition of a public highway is the domain of the legislature and not
the courts.
Hooks v. Clark County School Dist.
228 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2000)
Rules allowing local school districts to set the definition of "qualifying
private school" does not violate the Individuals with Disabilities in Education
Act.
Appellants, the Hooks, requested and received an exemption from the
compulsory school attendance requirement and were allowed to educate their
child at home. In 1996, Clark County School District (CCSD) denied their son
speech therapy services because the CCSD's policy did not provide access to
ancillary services for non-enrolled students. The CCSD suggested the Hooks
request an exemption from the Board of Trustees or enroll their son in the
school district in order to gain access to the services.
The Hooks instead filed a complaint with the Nevada Department of Edu-
cation (NDOE). The NDOE rejected the complaint based on a policy letter
issued by the United States Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP),
which stated that each state has the discretion to determine if home education
qualified as a private school or facility. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 394.103, home
schooling does not qualify.
In 1998, the Nevada legislature amended state law to require each school
district to provide special education and ancillary services to children exempted
from compulsory attendance by reason of home education. Nev. Rev. Stat.
392.070(2). As a result, the CCSD conceded it was now required to provide
these services prospectively, but the issue of payment for the previously denied
service remained.
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The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) requires that
special services be offered to three categories of students: (1) students in public
schools; (2) children placed in private schools by a public agency; and (3) chil-
dren placed unilaterally in private schools by their parents. The Hooks argued
that their child fell into the third category. The CCSD argued that home school-
ing did not qualify as a private facility. Nothing in the IDEA, however, pro-
vides for services to children not enrolled in a school. Because this definition
was left to the state to define, the court reviewed various state statutes.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the Nev. Rev. Stat. 394.103 defini-
tion of private school does not include a home school. Based on this statute,
the court held that the Hooks' son did not qualify as a private school attendee
and was not eligible for ancillary services from the CCSD.
In the second prong of its holding, the court noted that the United States
Supreme Court has previously taken guidance from the OSEP's policy letters in
interpreting the IDEA. As such, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the policy letter,
leaving the definition of a private school to the discretion of the individual
state.
The third prong of the Ninth Circuit's analysis focused on Congress' rati-
fication of OSEP's view that the state must define "private schools" based on
the plain language in the amended statute. When Congress re-enacts a statute
adopting the administrative agency's interpretation, Congress is adopting that
interpretation. The court held there was nothing in the IDEA mandating
schools to provide services to children not enrolled in a school, as defined by
that state.
The court also held that the CCSD's actions did not violate 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Home-educated children are not a suspect class; therefore, the analysis
turns on whether or not the regulation infringes on a fundamental right or lacks
a rational basis. The court held that, since the Hooks had not been prohibited
from educating their son at home, the CCSD's policy did not violate the Due
Process Clause. The court further held that the CCSD's policy requiring enroll-
ment and attendance in a qualified school in order to receive ancillary services
constituted a reasonable government regulation that does not contravene the
requirements of the Constitution.
The Ninth Circuit noted that education is a traditional area of state sover-
eignty, and that IDEA's delegation to the state of the power to define "school"
was in keeping with that tradition. The court also held that CCSD's policy
against providing ancillary services to home schooled children was rationally
based.
Estate of Thomas v. Costello
998 P.2d 560 (Nev. May 4, 2000)
Administrative claims on an estate have higher priority than debts and
charges listed informer Nev. Rev. Stat. 150.220, because such interpretation is
consistent with other Nevada statutes and recent legislative amendments.
A judgment lien encumbered the estate of the deceased George Evan
Thomas. The home was the principal asset of the estate and the decedent died
testate. The executrix of the estate, with the approval of the district court, gave
payment of fees to the estate's attorney and the executrix priority over payment
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of the deceased's debts. The question before this court was whether or not
Nev. Rev. Stat. 147.220, which was later amended, allowed such distribution of
estate assets.
Nev. Rev. Stat. 147.220 allowed for the following priority in payment of
debts and charges of the estate: (1) funeral expenses; (2) expenses of the last
sickness; (3) family allowance; (4) debts having preference by laws of the
United States; (5) money owed to the Nevada Department of Human Resources
for medical assistance benefits; (6) wages due; (7) judgments rendered against
the deceased in his lifetime and mortgages; and (8) all other demands against
the estate. The appellants contended that, because the statute was silent as to
the issue of payment of administrative claims, these claims fell under the cate-
gory of "all other demands against the estate" and, therefore, were lower in
priority than judgments rendered against the deceased in his lifetime.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that, in Nevada, words in a statute should
be given their plain meaning unless doing so would violate the spirit of the act.
The court also stated that recent amendments to statutes should be treated as
persuasive evidence of the legislative intent behind the original statute. It con-
cluded that, although statutory change does not allow for retrospective applica-
tion, reading former Nev. Rev. Stat. 150.220 to give higher priority to estate
administrative expenses was consistent with other Nevada statutes. The court
went on to hold that if the appellant's interpretation of the statute were adopted,
it would render other Nevada statutes nugatory, since those statutes specifically
provided for an estate's payment of the administrative expenses at issue in this
case.
The court affirmed the district court's holding that because administrative
expenses and attorney fees were expressly required by statute to be paid from
the estate's assets, administrative claims have a higher priority than the debts
and charges of the estate listed in former Nev. Rev. Stat. 150.220.
Nunez v. City of North Las Vegas
1 P.3d 959 (Nev. June 9, 2000)
Municipal courts are separate from state courts in determining §1983
complaints and are, similar to a municipality, susceptible to §19 8 3 suits.
North Las Vegas Municipal Judge Gary Davis terminated Georgia Nunez
from her position as administrator of the City of North Las Vegas Municipal
Court. Nunez brought suit in federal court against both Judge Davis and the
City of North Las Vegas, claiming retaliatory discharge in violation of the First
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and gender and racial discrimination under
Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.). Nunez also filed pendent state claims for
wrongful discharge in violation of state public policy, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
These claims arose out of allegations by Nunez that, for a considerable
period of time, Judge Davis harassed and made illegal demands of her, and of
other female and minority employees. Ultimately, Judge Davis terminated
Nunez's position in what Nunez claims was retaliation for her refusal to block
female employees who had not assisted Judge Davis in his re-election cam-
paign from attending a seminar. Nunez also claimed that the termination was
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retaliation for her failure to obtain a raise for Judge Davis, her failure to replace
ceiling tiles in Judge Davis' chambers, and her refusal to require clerks in the
Marshall's office to work overtime.
The United States District Court dismissed all claims against the City of
North Las Vegas and several federal claims against Judge Davis. The court
also dismissed Nunez's civil rights claims against Judge Davis because, as a
member of the Judge's personal staff, she fell within the personal staff excep-
tion to Title VII claims against an elected public official.
Following the conclusion of this federal action, Nunez filed suit in state
district court, with claims that nearly mirrored her federal claims. Here again,
the court dismissed Nunez's claims. On appeal, Nunez argued that the state
abused its discretion in dismissing her complaint.
The Nevada Supreme Court found for Nunez and remanded for reinstate-
ment of the complaint. The court held that the municipal courts of Nevada are
separate branches of their respective municipal governments and not an exten-
sion of the state courts for purposes of §1983 suits. Consequently, they are
susceptible to §1983 suits in the same way that municipalities themselves are.
The decision overrules the court's previous holding in Pittman v. Lower Court
Counseling, 871 P.2d 953 (Nev. 1994).
Roger Falcke & Herbig Properties Ltd. v. County of Douglas
3 P.3d 661 (Nev. July 14, 2000)
Where a local municipal ordinance requiring a super-majority vote is in
conflict with state statute, the requirement is invalid and a simple-majority vote
suffices.
A property owner applied for approval of a master plan amendment and a
zoning change to real property. The Douglas County Planning Commission
(Commission) recommended approval with a majority vote of five-to-two. The
Douglas County Board of Commissioners (Board) voted three-to-two to
approve the amendment. However, the Douglas County Development Code
(DCDC) section 20.608.070 required a four-to-one vote to pass. Therefore,
while it received a simple majority, the petition was denied. After a new hear-
ing resulted in the same three-to-two split, the property owner filed a petition
for writ of mandamus to the Nevada Supreme Court challenging the Board's
decision.
Various portions of the Nevada Revised Statutes specify the required
majority in certain governmental proceedings. Both Nev. Rev. Stat. 278.210(2)
and the municipal code provide a two-thirds vote requirement for the Commis-
sion. DCDC section 20.608.070, however, required a super-majority of four-
to-one. The decision and vote were governed by Nev. Rev. Stat. 278.070,
which provides no specific majority requirement. Therefore, the Board erred in
requiring a super-majority where, as the court determined, by the very absence
of a majority requirement, the legislature intended a simple majority to approve
the master plan amendment. The court issued a writ requiring the Board to
approve the master plan amendment in accordance with Chapter 278 of the
Nevada Revised Statutes as a simple majority was reached during both
hearings.
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DR Partners v. Board of County Commissioners of Clark County
6 P.3d 465 (Nev. Aug. 18, 2000)
Purely factual material that is severable from the opinion or advice in a
document of public record is generally not protected by a deliberative privi-
lege, including the private phone numbers of individuals called by or calling
public officials on the officials' publicly-owned cellular phones.
The Las Vegas Review Journal (LVRJ) requested cellular phone records
from the defendant for a study on governmental waste. The defendant pro-
duced edited records, excluding the last four digits of each phone number
listed. Plaintiff sued for a writ of mandamus in state court to compel full dis-
closure under the Nevada Public Records Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. 239.010, and
defendant argued a violation of privileges and privacy rights. The district court
denied plaintiffs motion, and plaintiff appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that a public official or agency bears the
burden of establishing the existence of privilege based upon confidentiality,
and that privileges should be interpreted and applied narrowly, balancing the
citizen's fundamental right to access the public record with the incidental right
of the agency to be free from unreasonable interference. To ascertain whether
documents are protected because they relate to a pre-decisional matter, the
agency must pinpoint a decision or policy to which the documents contributed.
The agency bears the burden of establishing the character of the decision, the
deliberative process involved, and the role played by the documents in the
course of that process. Following a showing that the documents play a role in
an agency decision-making process, the documents must be shown to be "delib-
erative" in order to be protected under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA). Purely factual material that is severable from the opinion or
advice in a document is generally not protected and must be disclosed in a
FOIA suit.
The court repudiated the "California" approach, holding that a particular-
ized evidentiary showing is necessary to establish application of the delibera-
tive process and that the names of persons with whom government officials
have consulted are not protected from disclosure. Identification of persons,
retained or otherwise, who participate in policy formation does not implicate
the disclosure of factual information intertwined with the decision or policy-
making processes of government. Records kept with regard to the use of cellu-
lar phones by county officials do not reveal anything that would interfere with
the deliberative process of government. In addition, a deliberative process
privilege is conditional and qualified; once the court determines that a docu-
ment is privileged, it must still determine whether the document should be
withheld. Once the agency demonstrates that documents fit within the privi-
lege, the burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure. It must demonstrate that
its need for the information outweighs the regulatory interest in preventing
disclosure.
As for the privacy rights of those whose numbers would be released in a
full record, the Nevada Supreme Court held that generally, there is no expecta-
tion of privacy in cellular phone billings. First, public officials who make calls
to unlisted numbers or provide their cellular numbers to members of the public
know that the billings are public record; thus, the act of placing cellular phone
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calls to private citizens places the number called within the public domain.
Second, members of the public who knowingly place calls to government-
issued cellular phones knowingly place their numbers in the public domain.
Third, where exigent circumstances are shown to justify non-disclosure, the
trial court must apply the Bradshaw test, weighing the public's need to know
with the concerns of the telephone number's owner.
LFC Marketing Group, Inc. v. Loomis
8 P.3d 841 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2000)
Courts may secure a corporation's property to satisfy a corporate
officer's debt where the officer is the ultimate authority for the corporation's
dealings.
Loomis sought to recover a three-year old judgment from William, LFC
Marketing's (LFC) vice president, with a writ of attachment on commissions
payable to the LFC. LFC filed a third-party claim, asserting sole ownership of
the attached monies. The district court held that LFC was William's alter ego,
granted the writ of attachment, and ordered that the funds be paid to Loomis.
LFC appealed.
LFC argued that the district court erred by allowing the respondents to
utilize the alter ego doctrine and pierce the corporate veil in reverse, in an
attempt to satisfy their judgment against the corporation's vice president. LFC
claimed that the alter ego doctrine could not apply because the vice president
did not own any shares in the company. In addition, LFC argued that the writ
of attachment post-judgment was procedurally improper.
The Nevada Supreme Court rejected these arguments and held that the
vice president was the ultimate authority for all of LFC's dealings, thereby
constituting a "unity of interest and ownership." The court further held that the
district court properly applied the alter ego doctrine in reverse in order to reach
LFC's assets and satisfy the vice president's debt. The court also held that the
plain language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 31.010 allows attachment procedures post-
judgment.
United States v. Nevada
123 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2000)
Federal government's appeal of the State Engineer's order denying appli-
cations for water appropriation should be heard in state court.
In 1997, the Department of Energy (DOE) applied to the state of Nevada
for appropriations of water to be used in connection with the development of a
high-level nuclear waste storage facility at Yucca Mountain. The permits were
designed to replace permits that were due to expire at the end of 2002. The
State Engineer of Nevada held hearings and turned down the permits on the
grounds that they were not in Nevada's best economic interest and that Nev.
Rev. Stat. 533.370(3) prohibited him from approving such permits.
DOE argued that the state statute on which the State Engineer relied is
unconstitutional and that jurisdiction should lie with a federal court. The state
moved to dismiss arguing that the action was an appeal of a state administrative
order regarding water law, an action involving state law that should be decided
by a state court.
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The court held that, although the federal court could exercise jurisdiction
in an action commenced by the federal government, historically, federal courts
deferred jurisdiction to state courts in matters of water law. Further, by apply-
ing for water appropriations through the state agency and participating in hear-
ings before the State Engineer, plaintiff acknowledged this deference. Thus,
the federal district court abstained, granting the motions to dismiss so that the
matters could be adjudicated in the state courts.
Reed v. United States Dep't of the Interior
231 F.3d 501 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2000)
BLM is afforded broad operational discretion under the Federal Tort
Claim Act's discretionary function exemption as a protection in negligence
suits brought against BLM under the act.
Appellant Daniel Reed was severely injured when a car ran over his tent
while he was attending the "Burning Man Festival," an event held on Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) land in Nevada. Reed sued the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2679-2680 (FTCA), but the district
court ruled that the government was shielded by the discretionary function
exception, which limits the government's tort liability.
Reed appealed. He argued that BLM's failure to warn event goers and to
monitor the event was not discretionary and could not render the BLM
immune.
The Ninth Circuit held that BLM's actions were discretionary and that
none of these actions were negligent. The court noted that Reed's arguments
demonstrate the need for BLM discretion, and that Reed simply disagreed with
how BLM exercised that discretion. The court determined that the discretion-
ary exception to the FTCA therefore applied, and affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States.
BUSINESS LAW
Phillips v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co.
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3212 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2000)
An unreasonable delay in forwarding paperwork or failure to provide
notice of pending suit with another driver results in the forfeiture of an under-
insured motorist claim.
Appellant, Phillips, filed an underinsured motorist claim with Colonial
Penn, but failed to provide paperwork, including notice of his suit against the
other driver until nineteen months after the appellant filed the claim. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to Colonial Penn.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed because the appellant breached the notice pro-
vision in his motor vehicle insurance policy. In addition, the court rejected
Phillips' arguments that the policy required "condition precedent" language for
forfeiture, that the insurance company acted in bad faith, and that the forfeiture
of an underinsured motorist claim under these circumstances offended
Nevada's public policy. The court held that all of these claims were under-
mined by Phillips' failure to comply with the express timely filing requirements
of his policy.
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Chen v. Nevada State Gaming Control Bd.
994 P.2d 1151 (Nev. Mar. 9, 2000)
A card counter did not commit fraud because the casino did not detrimen-
tally rely on his misrepresentation and the misrepresentation was not the proxi-
mate cause for the casino's damages.
Chen exchanged a total of $44,000 in cash for casino chips at the Monte
Carlo Resort & Casino. Chen gave a fictitious Burma passport. After amas-
sing $84,400, a pit boss recognized Chen as a "card counter" (a player who
achieves an advantage over the house by tracking previously played cards) and
discovered that Chen's passport was bogus. The casino notified the Gaming
Control Board (GCB) and successfully petitioned GCB to deny Chen his win-
nings. The casino returned only the $44,000 Chen had exchanged for chips.
Chen appealed, arguing that his actions did not constitute a fraud on the
casino, as the casino did not allow him to play based on his presentation of the
false passport.
The Nevada Supreme Court held for Chen on two grounds. First, the
casino did not detrimentally rely on Chen's misrepresentation to allow him to
play blackjack, since the misrepresentation was not made until after Chen
played. Second, Chen's skill in playing blackjack, rather than his misrepresen-
tation, was the proximate cause of his winnings. The court awarded Chen his
$40,400 in blackjack winnings.
In dissent, Justice Maupin argued the misrepresentation was fraudulent,
because it allowed Chen access to high stakes play despite legitimate attempts
by the casino to prevent this from occurring.
Comm'r of Ins. v. State Farm Mut.
995 P.2d 482 (Nev. Mar. 9, 2000)
Nevada Administrative Code section that defines chargeable accident as
one in which the insured is fifty percent or more at fault is void because it
conflicts with Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.385.
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (State Farm) had company poli-
cies that defined a chargeable accident as one where the insured was fifty-
percent or more at fault. Subsequent to State Farm's enactment of this policy,
the Division of Insurance (Division) promulgated Nev. Admin. Code ch. 690B,
§ 230(2) that defines a chargeable accident as one where the insured is more
than fifty-percent at fault. An insurance company can cancel, refuse to renew,
or increase the rates of an insured that is involved in a "chargeable accident."
The Division enacted this regulation to enforce Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.385,
which states that an insurance company cannot cancel, refuse to renew, or
increase the rates of an insured for claims where the insured was "not at fault."
The legislature did not define the phrase "not at fault" in the statute.
State Farm filed an action for declaratory relief contending that the defini-
tion of a chargeable accident in the regulation was in conflict with Nev. Rev.
Stat. 687B.385. The district court held the regulation and the statute were in
conflict, entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the regulation,
and the Division appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the injunction, citing its holding in
State Farm Mut. v. Comm'r of Ins., 958 P.2d 733 (Nev. 1998), in which the
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court determined that Nev. Rev. Stat. 687B.385 should be read "in pari mate-
rial" with Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.141, the comparative negligence statute. Under
Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.141 an insurer is required to pay a judgment when the
insured is fifty-percent or more at fault. Therefore, "not at fault" is interpreted
by the court to be when the insured is determined to be less than fifty-percent at
fault, and "at fault" is when the insured is fifty-percent or more at fault.
Moreland v. Morsani
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7226 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2000)
An option agreement with the right to first refusal to purchase a car deal-
ership was held unambiguous and assignable.
Plaintiff was assigned a right of first refusal on an option agreement to
purchase a car dealership from the owner. The term of the right included no
premature expiration upon termination or any requirement to maintain an
equity interest in the dealership. Assignor ceased to be an employee and share-
holder in the dealership and later executed a redemption agreement to purchase
and assign the right to Moreland. Morisani refused to allow Moreland to match
another party's price to purchase.
The district court found the option agreement to be ambiguous, and then
relied on parol evidence to determine that the right of first refusal expired when
assignor's employment was terminated. Moreland could not enforce the right
of first refusal because the assignment was invalid, and assignor waived his
rights under the option agreement when he entered into the redemption agree-
ment, accepted the termination of his employment, and sold back his share of
stock pursuant to the terms of the sale agreement and his employment
agreement.
The Ninth Circuit held that the option agreement was not ambiguous and
assignor's right was not prohibited in the contract. The court also held that
assignor did not waive his rights since the redemption agreement was consis-
tent with the option agreement and his execution of the redemption agreement
did not manifest any intent to lead defendant in believing that the right of first
refusal had been relinquished, thus assignor was not equitably estopped from
asserting the right of first refusal.
Sengel v. IGT
2 P.3d 258 (Nev. June 14, 2000)
Nevada Gaming Control Board decisions will be examined under the
"any" evidence standard and if not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise con-
trary to law, will be treated with great deference by Nevada courts.
Appellant, Sengel, was playing a slot machine and a malfunction stopped
the reels in an uneven line across the pay line. A Nevada Gaming Control
Board (GCB) agent sent to the scene concluded the win was not valid. The
GCB affirmed the agent's decision. Appellant petitioned the district court and
the district court also upheld the GCB's decision.
Appellant argued the decision was not supported by adequate evidence
and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. Appellant
claimed the slot machine did not malfunction. However, the Nevada Supreme
Court found evidence supporting the malfunction occurrence. Moreover, the
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court clarified that in cases with less than substantial evidence, the "any" evi-
dence standard is to be applied.
The court further held the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or con-
trary to law. It ruled the public has constructive knowledge of the state law
requiring all gaming devices to use a random selection process to determine
each game outcome. Further, the court found the GCB's decision, that the even
alignment of the game's symbols did not constitute a jackpot, was not an arbi-
trary decision. Finally, the "Malfunction voids all pays and plays" disclosure
on the face of the machine was adequate to include the type of malfunction that
occurred in this case.
The court refused to consider public policy arguments made by both par-
ties, noting that the Nevada Legislature empowered the GCB to make policy
decision based upon Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.3666
Vitale v. Jefferson Ins.
5 P.3d 1054 (Nev. Aug. 18, 2000)
The designation of a named insured in a general liability policy is not
ambiguous if the named insured can be determined by implication through
other provisions in the policy.
In 1992, while conducting business for a day care center he owned with
his wife, Mr. Moor caused an automobile accident, in which the motorist and
two passengers were injured. The Moors reached a settlement agreement in the
amount of $717,500, and their automobile insurer paid the policy limit of
$100,000 to the injured parties. The Moors also agreed to assign all of their
causes of action against Jefferson, the day care business insurer, to the injured
appellants in exchange for their promise not to execute the judgment against the
Moors and their business, thereby shielding themselves from direct liability and
creating a right to sue for the plaintiffs.
Jefferson insured Mrs. Moor and the business under a general liability
policy in the amount of $300,000 but denied coverage for the accident, due to
an automobile exclusion provision, in a letter sent to the Moors in 1993. The
appellants filed a complaint against Jefferson and later sought partial summary
judgment, alleging the exclusion was inapplicable because Mr. Moor was not
insured under the policy, due to Jefferson's failure to designate the business as
a sole proprietorship or to list Mrs. Moor on the declaration sheet. They argued
that this failure rendered Mr. Moor a non-insured, because he was not the
spouse of an insured specifically designated as an individual or sole
proprietorship.
Jefferson filed a counterclaim for summary judgment, arguing that Mrs.
Moor was a declared "person insured" under the policy, and she owned the
automobile driven by Mr. Moor. Furthermore, Jefferson argued that Mr. Moor,
as a spouse, was also insured, despite the fact that neither Mrs. Moor, nor the
business, were designated as an individual or sole proprietorship respectively.
The district court entered a judgment for Jefferson, and the Moors appealed,
arguing that Mr. Moor was not a "person insured," or alternatively, that Jeffer-
son waived its right to assert exclusion.
The Nevada Supreme Court construed the policy in plain language and
construed any ambiguity in favor of the insured. Thus, the court concluded that
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the exclusion clearly limited the policy. Since the plain language in another
section of the policy clearly encompassed Mr. Moor as an insured, Jefferson's
failure to check the designation box on the declaration sheet was not determina-
tive of coverage. The court noted the absurdity of the appellants' reasoning
which would result in no one being covered under the policy.
The court also held waiver would apply only if the insurer engaged in
misconduct or behaved in such a way as to induce the insured to rely on an
insurer's misrepresentation. Because Jefferson promptly notified the Moors
that it was denying coverage based upon a standard, unambiguous exclusion
common to general liability policies, and because the application of the exclu-
sion could be readily determined from a layman's reading of the policy, the
Moors were clearly on notice that Jefferson was relying on the exclusion and
did not waive its right to do so.
In re Estate of Friedman
6 P.3d 473 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2000)
The signature of a notary public may constitute the signature of an attest-
ing witness to a will, if the notary signed the self-proving affidavit in the pres-
ence of the testator.
Margaret Friedman executed her last will and testament in the presence of
a witness and a notary public. The notary was present when Friedman signed
the will and declared it to be her last will and testament. Thereafter, the notary
signed a sworn affidavit during probate stating that the testator appeared to be
of full age and sound mind at the time she executed the will.
The district court denied admission of the will to probate for failure to
have the will attested to by at least two competent witnesses. The court held
that the notary's signature was made as a notary and, as such, the notary did not
qualify as a witness. The executor appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that an affidavit signed by a notary in the
presence of the testator constitutes a signature of a witness attesting the will.
The court remanded the case so the district court could determine whether the
notary signed the affidavit in the testator's presence.
Rubin v. State Farm Mut.
222 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2000)
Question of whether insurance policy that excludes coverage for expenses
payable by workman's compensation applies to expenses recovered from a
third-party torifeasor certified to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Rubin was injured in an automobile accident, in the course of her employ-
ment. Nevada's State Industrial Insurance System (SIS) paid her medical
expenses, lost wages, and other costs, but Rubin was instructed to reimburse
SUS if she recovered from the individual tortfeasors. She settled the matter and
submitted a claim with State Farm under her automobile insurance. State Farm
denied the claim because the company excludes coverage when worker's com-
pensation is available. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of
State Farm.
On appeal, Rubin argued that even if the exclusion existed in her policy,
such exclusion violated Nevada public policy; when a third-party is involved,
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worker's compensation payments are only advancements of expenses to be
repaid. She also claimed that enforcing such provisions would deny full
compensation.
Rubin's appeal questioned whether State Farm could exclude coverage in
auto accidents for medical expenses to avoid double recovery when worker's
compensation paid for the expenses, but a third-party re-paid the costs. Rubin
also claimed that allowing such an exclusionary clause to apply to those
expenses would violate Nevada public policy. The Ninth Circuit declared these
issues to be matters of first impression in Nevada and certified the questions to
the Nevada Supreme Court for consideration.
Nguyen v. Nevada
14 P.3d 515 (Nev. Dec. 15, 2000)
Gaming markers are the equivalent of checks for purposes of the Nevada
"bad check" statute.
Nguyen obtained "markers" (written instruments that allow for credit play
in a casino) from three Las Vegas casinos based on an existing bank account
with a Texas bank. Each of the markers was converted to casino chips and/or
cash. Nguyen left the markers outstanding and the casino submitted the mark-
ers to the bank for collection. The bank returned all the markers with the nota-
tion "Account Closed."
Nguyen contended that the markers were lines of credit, which the casinos
agreed to hold for future disposition, not "checks or drafts" (the language used
in Nevada's bad check statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.130(1)), payable upon
presentation.
The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed, holding that there was no evidence
that the parties mutually understood the markers to be lines of credit since the
face of the document demonstrated that they were payable on demand. In addi-
tion, the court held that the statute applies to markers since the instruments are
drawn upon a bank, payable on demand, and signed by the payor (Nguyen),
regardless of the agreed disposition date.
Nguyen also contended that his conduct lacked the criminal intent required
by the statute. The court disagreed, citing Nguyen's closed bank account and
failure to pay the full amount of the markers within the statutory period.
Salas v. Allstate Rent-A-Car
14 P.3d 511 (Nev. Dec. 15, 2000)
Short-term vehicle lessors may be required to pay damages to persons
injured by lessees of its motor vehicles when a lessee's personal insurance has
already paid the Nevada minimum.
Appellants, a husband and wife, along with another couple, were injured
when a rental car owned by Allstate and leased by Stephen Romeo rear-ended
their vehicle. Romeo, who was covered by his own vehicle insurance, declined
to purchase additional insurance from Allstate. Following the accident,
Romeo's insurance paid out the policy limit of $30,000, the Nevada minimum,
divided among the four injured persons. Pedro Salas received $6,000 for his
injuries, while Mrs. Salas received $11,000 for her injuries. After settling with
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Romeo's insurance company, the Salases filed suit against Allstate alleging that
the injuries they sustained were greater than $30,000.
The district court granted summary judgment for Allstate, stating that the
legislature did not intend for lessors to have to pay in accidents where the
damages allegedly exceed the limits provided by the driver's insurance
company.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature enacted
a scheme that contemplates dual coverage. Nev. Rev. Stat. 485.185 and
485.186 require that every vehicle owner provide insurance in the minimum
amounts set forth therein, and that a lessee may provide an "operators policy"
which insures the driver while operating the motor vehicle in the same mini-
mum amounts. The court concluded that these two statutes, in light of Nev.
Rev. Stat. 482.305 (1), which creates a limited safe harbor protecting short-
term lessors from being held jointly and severally liable for damages caused by
a negligent lessee, show that the legislature intended both policies be required
to pay up to the statutory minimums. The court also held that there is a general
question of material fact regarding the actual damages sustained by the Salases.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Baby Tam & Co., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas
199 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2000)
Licensing ordinance for adult bookstores overturned for failure to provide
for timely city action.
Baby Tam applied for a business license to operate an adult bookstore.
When the city denied the application, the plaintiff sought a permanent injunc-
tion to prevent the city from enforcing the licensing ordinance as an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint on speech. In a previous case, Baby Tam v. City of Las
Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit agreed with Baby Tam
on narrow grounds and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter
the injunction. Though the city cured the problems identified by the Ninth
Circuit, the court held for Baby Tam again, concluding that their previous rul-
ing had identified only some of the problems with the ordinance, and that
others existed.
The court cited FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), in
which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a Dallas ordinance allowing the city
to withhold licensing until after the completion of health and safety inspections,
including those with no set time limits. The court followed FW/PBS in holding
that an ordinance that sets no limited time period in which the licensor must
make a decision risked an indefinite suppression of permissible speech.
Judge Thompson dissented, arguing that, unlike the Dallas ordinance, the
Las Vegas ordinance mandated a thirty day period in which the city had to act
upon completion of all safety and health inspections.
Morrison v. Beach City L.L.C.
991 P.2d 982 (Nev. Jan. 26, 2000)
The legal certainty test is the proper test for determining the jurisdictional
amount in controversy for subject matter jurisdiction, and an offer in compro-
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mise cannot be used as evidence of a failure to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount.
Morrison filed a complaint in district court, alleging that he received inju-
ries while a patron of the nightclub, The Beach. Morrison alleged general and
specific damages in excess of $10,000.00. After a pre-arbitration conference,
Morrison's attorney sent a letter to The Beach's attorney seeking to settle the
case for $2,000. In the letter, Morrison's attorney expressed his belief that
$2,000 reflected the amount that his client would recover were the matter to
proceed to arbitration.
Subsequently, The Beach filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, alleging that based upon the offer to settle, the case did not
meet the jurisdictional damage requirement for the district court. The court
dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Morrison appealed, asserting that the court erred in granting the motion to
dismiss based upon the offer to compromise.
To resolve this issue, the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the federal court
"legal certainty test" for determining the jurisdictional amount in controversy in
Nevada district courts. Under the test, it must appear to a legal certainty that
the claim is worth less than the jurisdictional amount in order to be dismissed
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Applying the test, the court
declared the letter from Morrison's attorney as nothing more than an offer in
compromise. An offer in compromise cannot be used as evidence of a failure
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Accordingly, the court remanded the case
to allow the district court to determine if the potential damages fell below the
jurisdictional threshold, disregarding any information relating to settlement
negotiations.
Diaz v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
993 P.2d 50 (Nev. Jan. 27, 2000)
Nevada's liberal news shield statute provides journalists an absolute priv-
ilege from disclosure of sources or information in any proceeding.
Prior to being involved in a fatal motor vehicle incident, the driver of one
of the vehicles had earlier that day been escorted home by police when he was
found on the interstate, outside of his vehicle. Discovery regarding officers
transporting the driver to his home revealed they believed him to be intoxi-
cated, but were unable to charge him with drunk driving, as he did not have the
keys to the vehicle and there were no witnesses to place him behind the wheel.
Petitioners, relatives of victims of the collision, deposed a news reporter that
had covered the story. The reporter refused to answer pertinent questions under
the Nevada news shield statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.275. Consequently, a
motion to compel was filed by the petitioners.
A discovery commissioner denied the motion to compel under Nevada's
news shield statute and the First Amendment. The district court also denied the
petitioners motion to compel and a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibi-
tion followed.
Previously, the Nevada Supreme Court held the news shield statute was
only applicable to confidential information and could be waived by voluntary
disclosure. The Diaz court, however, held that Nevada's waiver statute does
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not apply with respect to the news shield statute. Moreover, the statute is not
limited to confidential sources, but rather is all-inclusive, covering any source.
Additionally, it applies to both published and unpublished information and
includes the information obtained itself, as well as the source of the
information.
Campbell v. Maestro
996 P.2d 412 (Nev. Mar. 24, 2000)
An insurance company's perpetuation of litigation and refusal to pay
plaintiff's damages constitutes bad faith in arbitration proceedings when the
insured has previously admitted liability for the accident.
Robert Campbell was sued for negligence as a result of a motor vehicle
accident. Campbell was represented by counsel retained by his insurance com-
pany, Nevada General Insurance (NGI). At Campbell's deposition, he admitted
liability for the accident, yet his insurance company denied liability for a year
and a half after the accident and refused to pay for the plaintiffs property
damage. The arbitrator awarded medical expenses and other damages to the
plaintiffs and found that NGI arbitrated in bad faith. Campbell filed a request
for trial de novo and a demand for a jury trial. The district court determined
that Campbell, through his insurer, failed to arbitrate in good faith and granted
plaintiff's motion to strike. Campbell appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court appropriately con-
sidered NGI's litigation conduct for purposes of determining good faith partici-
pation in the arbitration process. The court also held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that Campbell's request for trial de novo on
all issues, including liability, was evidence of bad faith. However, the court
concluded that because Campbell had a valid request for a re-determination of
damages, the district court's severe sanction of striking his request for trial de
novo was unwarranted. The record below did not justify the complete elimina-
tion of the right to proceed to trial.
Gittings v. Hartz
996 P.2d 898 (Nev. Mar. 24, 2000)
Failure to appear at an arbitration hearing does not in and of itself
amount to bad faith under Nevada Arbitration Rule 22.
Amy Hartz filed a complaint against Angela Gittings resulting from an
automobile accident. An arbitrator ruled in favor of Hartz, and Gittings filed a
request for a trial de novo. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County,
granted Hartz's motion to strike the request on the grounds that Gittings' bad
faith in the arbitration process constituted a waiver of her right to trial de novo
pursuant to Nevada Arbitration Rule 22. Gittings appealed.
The district court cited six reasons for its determination that Gittings acted
in bad faith during the arbitration process: (1) Gittings did not attend the arbi-
tration hearing; (2) no witnesses were called to testify for Gittings; (3) the arbi-
tration meeting lasted less than one hour; (4) Gittings did not contest liability;
(5) Gittings did not request an independent medical examination; and (6) Git-
tings' insurer, Allstate, had a high percentage of prior trial de novo requests.
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The Nevada Supreme Court held the evidence did not prove bad faith in
arbitration sufficient to constitute a waiver of the right to trial de novo. The
court held that failure of a party to attend or call witnesses in an arbitration
hearing does not in itself amount to bad faith or a lack of meaningful participa-
tion. The court also held that since the arbitration proceeding was not recorded,
the district court did not have a record by which to examine what actually
occurred. The court further held it is the substance of the proceeding that must
be considered rather than the length of the arbitration hearing when judging
good faith. Finally, the court held that regardless of the number of trial de novo
filings by Allstate, the actions of an insurance company cannot be imputed to
its insured when reviewing an arbitration proceeding.
Lee v. GNLV Corp.
996 P.2d 416 (Nev. Apr. 5, 2000)
A final judgment does not include post-judgment issues such as attorney's
fees.
Plaintiff, Lee, filed a wrongful death action against Golden Nugget Las
Vegas (GNLV). GNLV moved for summary judgment, which was granted.
Lee filed an appeal prior to the rendering of a formal judgment in which fees
and costs were awarded to GNLV. GNLV moved to have the appeal dismissed
on the grounds that the appeal was initiated prior to the issuance of a formal
judgment in the case and, therefore, was premature.
The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the standard definition of a final
judgment as one that disposes of all matters in a case, including the awarding of
costs, was inconsistent with the rules of civil procedure. The rules specify that
the entry of a judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs. The court
clarified that a final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in
the case, but does not include post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and
costs.
The court held that the finality of a court's order is not based on whether it
is called a judgment or an order, but rather by what the action accomplishes.
The court then held that the summary judgment order was appealable, because
its effect was to dispose of all the issues presented in the case.
Laforge v. Nevada
997 P.2d 130 (Nev. Apr. 5, 2000)
Issue preclusion is proper regardless of the way one titles a claim, as long
as it arises out of the same facts as the issue already adjudicated on the merits.
Plaintiff, LaForge, filed suit in both federal and state court based on his
termination from the University of Nevada, Reno (UNR). The federal court
dismissed the federal action, because UNR was under no obligation to provide
anything more than notice of termination to Laforge. The state court then
granted summary judgment based on issue preclusion, because the federal and
state claims were based on the same set of facts.
Laforge argued that issue preclusion was inapplicable to his state claims,
because the issues were not identical to those in the federal claim. The court
found that the issue in both cases was whether UNR was required to do any
more than what it did; the claims were different, but the issues were the same.
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The court held that because that issue had already been litigated in federal
court, the district court was correct to dismiss the state action for issue
preclusion.
Simon v. Hatcher
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7243 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2000)
Ninth Circuit reverses and remands two habeas corpus claims that were
raised in district court but denied in error.
Appellant raised twenty-one claims from the lower court's dismissal of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's bar of ten of the claims on
procedural grounds, for failure to make a timely appeal, and for failure to show
good cause for late filing. The court also affirmed the district court's rejection
of nine other claims. The court held that Simon's failure to raise them in any
prior state proceeding meant that the claims had not been exhausted at the state
level and could not be pursued in a federal court until state remedies were
exhausted.
The court reversed on two claims, holding that the evidence at trial did not
support a finding of malice and that Simon had received ineffective assistance
of counsel. The court held that both claims were properly raised at district
court and were improperly denied. The court remanded to district court for
consideration of those issues.
Menken v. Emm
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8872 (9th Cir. May 1, 2000)
Attorney's fees may be awarded to a defendant when the plaintiff dis-
misses a case with prejudice.
The plaintiff filed suit in federal district court on a variety of state-law
claims against several defendants for a real estate transaction gone wrong. The
plaintiff moved for voluntary dismissal with prejudice because he lacked the
necessary funds to continue the litigation. The district court granted plaintiff's
motion and awarded attorney's fees to the defendant. Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.010
allows the trial court to award reasonable attorney's fees in a lawsuit when the
parties have entered a written agreement with a fee-shifting provision. The
parties entered such an agreement, but the plaintiff argued that no prevailing
party exists when a claim is dismissed with prejudice.
The Ninth Circuit held that a dismissal with prejudice is a judgment and,
therefore, a prevailing party exists. The court held that, since attorney's fees
could be awarded for a dismissal with prejudice, the district court properly
awarded attorney's fees to the defendants.
Scrimer v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
998 P.2d 1190 (Nev. May 8, 2000)
A flexible multi-factor approach should be used in assessing what consti-
tutes good cause for failure of timely service prior to dismissal under Nev. R.
Civ. P. 4(i), and such an analysis includes good-faith settlement discussions.
Plaintiff served an initial complaint on defendant after the 120-day statu-
tory limit. On motion by the plaintiff, the court granted additional time to effec-
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tuate service. Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(i) requires plaintiff to serve summons and
complaint within 120 days of filing the complaint unless plaintiff can show
good cause why the complaint was not timely served. The defendant challenged
plaintiffs showing of good cause for untimely service in a motion to dismiss,
and the trial court ordered the original service quashed. The Nevada Supreme
Court reversed, holding that a balanced and multi-faceted analysis is warranted
in the trial court's determination whether or not to dismiss a complaint pursuant
to Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(i).
The court clarified the seeming contradictions in the case law by declaring
that a number of considerations may govern a district court's analysis of good
cause under the statute, no one of which is controlling. The trial court should
consider: (1) difficulties in locating the defendant; (2) the defendant's efforts at
evading service or concealment of improper service until after the 120-day
period has lapsed; (3) the plaintiffs diligence in attempting to serve the defen-
dant; (4) difficulties encountered by counsel; (5) the running of the applicable
statute of limitations (for example, if dismissal after the statute of limitations
has run results in constructive dismissal with prejudice); (6) the parties' good
faith attempts to settle the litigation during the 120-day period and the actual
service of process on the defendant; (7) the prejudice to the defendant caused
by the plaintiff's delay in serving process; (8) the defendant's knowledge of the
existence of the lawsuit; and (9) any extensions of time for service granted by
the district court.
The court held that a flexible approach should be used in assessing
motions to dismiss, and that settlement negotiations undertaken in good faith in
a serious effort to settle the litigation may constitute good cause for untimely
service under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4(i). This explicitly overrules the holding in
Lacey v. Wen-Neva, Inc., 849 P.2d 260 (Nev. 1993), and rejects dicta from
Dougan v. Gustaveson, 835 P.2d 795 (Nev. 1992).
Baker v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
999 P.2d 1020 (Nev. June 5, 2000)
An individual's status as a non-practicing member of the state bar is not a
systematic and continuous contact with the state sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of general jurisdiction; however, a single-night's hotel stay is
sufficient to meet the requirements of specific personal jurisdiction.
The dispute in this case arose from petitioner Robert Baker's one-night
stay at the Rio Suite Hotel Casino (Rio). Baker challenged the designation of
his room as a suite and threatened legal action if the Rio did not cease their
allegedly false and deceptive advertising. The Rio filed for declaratory relief in
federal court, but later voluntarily dismissed this action and brought a declara-
tory relief action in Nevada District Court. Baker filed a writ of prohibition on
the grounds that the district court should have quashed service due to a lack of
personal jurisdiction. Baker was a California resident and contended the district
court did not have personal jurisdiction over him since he was not a resident of
Nevada and did not have substantial, systematic, and continuing contacts with
the state. Baker further argued that his injury did not occur as a result of his
one-night stay at the Rio, but from the Rio's false and deceptive advertising in
California. Baker was also a non-practicing member of the Nevada bar.
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The court held Baker's bar membership status did not, in and of itself,
meet the systematic and continuous requirement since he had not, at the time,
or in the past, practiced law within the state. The court rejected Baker's argu-
ment that his injury occurred in California because of the Rio's advertising. It
stated Baker's real injury occurred in Nevada when he checked into the Rio and
discovered his room was not a two-room suite. The court also rejected Baker's
argument that Nevada had no forum interest in the matter. The court held
Nevada has an interest in resolving matters arising from injuries that occur
while nonresidents are staying in its hotels. The court also found that hearing
the matter in Nevada would promote judicial efficiency because the hotel
"suite," the alleged false marketing information, and many of the witnesses,
with the exception of Baker, were located in Nevada. For these reasons, the
court held that Nevada courts had specific jurisdiction over Baker.
Freeman v. Second Judicial Dist. Court
1 P.3d 963 (Nev. June 9, 2000)
Appointment of an agent to receive service of process does not subject a
non-resident corporation to personal jurisdiction in Nevada.
Mark Freeman filed an action against West American Insurance Company
(West American) and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty) for
malicious prosecution. At the time of his malicious prosecution action, Free-
man was a Nevada resident. West American, a subsidiary of Ohio Casualty, is
an Indiana corporation licensed to do business in Nevada. Ohio Casualty is an
Ohio corporation licensed to do business in Nevada. Freeman's claim stemmed
from previous litigation against West American in California. The underlying
dispute did not involve Nevada in any way.
After Freeman filed an action in Nevada, West American and Ohio Casu-
alty moved to quash service of process, claiming that Nevada lacked personal
jurisdiction over them. The Nevada Supreme Court held that West American
and Ohio Casualty did not have sufficient contacts with Nevada to subject them
to personal jurisdiction, and that the appointment of an agent to receive service
of process as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 680A.250 did not in itself subject a
non-resident insurance company to personal jurisdiction in Nevada.
Evans v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
5 P.3d 1043 (Nev. Aug. 18, 2000)
District court erred in admitting evidence of the restitution of property in
a conversion suit because the restitution did nothing to mitigate consequential
damages; such restitution may not reduce compensatory damages against
torifeasor, and may not prevent punitive damages; Bader v. Cerri overruled.
The estate of Elfreda Gardner won a jury verdict against Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., (Dean Witter) and Warren House, a stockbroker and senior
vice-president of Dean Witter, for conspiracy to commit conversion of securi-
ties. The jury returned compensatory damages of $2,600,000 against the
defendants, and separate punitive damages of $6,000,000 against Dean Witter,
and $50,000 against House. At trial, defendants were able to admit evidence
relating to restitution by third parties, and the court applied post-verdict equita-
ble offsets based on the increased property value. The district court reduced the
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compensatory damages to zero, based on the offsets, but let the punitive dam-
ages stand. Plaintiff appealed claiming improper limitation of the conversion
claim, and improper use of equitable offsets. Dean Witter cross-appealed argu-
ing there was no evidence of malice to justify punitive damages.
Evidence of restitution is admissible for the purpose of showing mitigation
of damages when a defendant, charged with a civil conversion, restored the
property to the alleged victim. Such evidence is not admissible when the resti-
tution is made by a third party. Similarly, it is admissible when such restitution
would mitigate consequential damages attendant to the loss of the use of the
converted property, but is not admissible when no claim for consequential dam-
ages is made. Evidence of the returned property's value may not be considered
as an offset to the value of the property taken. Consequently, the Nevada
Supreme Court held that the district court erred in admitting the restitution
evidence.
The court held that intentional tortfeasors, including persons found liable
in conversion and persons in conspiracy with them, may not apply credit from
settlements by their joint tortfeasors in reduction of judgments against them
arising from the intentional misconduct. One may not as a matter of policy
seek equity with unclean hands, and Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.225 provides that no
right of contribution exists in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally
caused or contributed to the injury sustained. The court held the district court
erred in its admission of mitigation evidence and in the imposition of post-
verdict equitable setoffs. Insofar as the precedent of Bader v. Cerri, 609 P.2d
314 (Nev. 1980), implies that a non-settling defendant in a conversion case may
seek credit for third-party settlements post-verdict, it is expressly overruled.
Restitution made by a third party is also irrelevant to whether a defen-
dant's conduct merits punishment. Thus, such restitution should not be consid-
ered in determining whether the compensatory damages, which are a necessary
precondition to punitive damages, were awarded.
Washoe County Dist. Attorney v. Second Judicial Dist. Court
5 P.3d 562 (Nev. Aug. 18, 2000)
Rule 11 sanctions against district attorney vacated because the district
court abused its discretion and misinterpreted statutes.
The state of Washington sent a child support transmittal to the district
attorney for enforcement after the obligor moved to Nevada. In a hearing to
determine payments, it was recommended that Washington determine the issue
of arrearage amounts because of its continuing exclusive jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate. The obligor objected to initiating an action in Washington, and the rec-
ommendation was rejected.
Obligor was then allowed to file a written motion for sanctions against the
district attorney. The court imposed sanctions under Nev. R. Civ. P. 11 for
failing to discontinue the enforcement of a Washington child support arrears
case.
The Nevada Supreme Court vacated the sanctions because the district
court misconstrued the out-of-state child support law, Nev. Rev. Stat.
125B.140(l)(a), which provides that a child support order from any state is
considered a judgment that can be enforced.
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Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
6 P.3d 982 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2000)
Distinction between special and general appearance abolished for pur-
poses of establishing personal jurisdiction.
Petitioner sought to answer a complaint to avoid a default judgment, but
feared that doing so would constitute a general appearance under Nevada law
and that he would thereby waive the right to challenge personal jurisdiction. In
federal court, the special/general appearance doctrine was abolished with the
1938 adoption of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12, which allows every defense to be made
either in the responsive pleading or by motion, and states that no defense or
objection is waived by being joined with any other defense or objection in a
responsive pleading or motion. Though Nevada has recently recognized the
special/general appearance distinction, Nev. R. Civ. P. 12 was revised in 1998
to mirror the federal rule.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that this revision renders the special/
general appearance distinction obsolete. Objections to personal jurisdiction,
process, or service of process may now be raised by motion or responsive
pleading, and are not waived when joined with one or more other defenses.
They may be waived, however, if not filed in a timely manner or included in a
responsive pleading.
DeJesus v. Flick
7 P.2d 459 (Nev. Aug. 24, 2000)
When an attorney's closing arguments are so inflammatory and improper
that they might reasonably prejudice a jury, a mistrial may be declared even
when opposing counsel raises no objections during the proceedings.
The defendant, in a fit of road rage, forced the plaintiffs vehicle off the
road, causing lasting neurological damage to the plaintiff. At trial, the plain-
tiff's attorney made a provocative closing argument, in which he personally
attacked the defendant's medical expert and accused him of perjury, told the
jury how much he disliked the defendant, asked the jury to "send a message" to
local law firms that might defend similar cases in the future, and asked the jury
to place themselves in the position of the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict
in excess of what the plaintiff sought.
Although the defendant's attorney raised no objections during trial, the
Nevada Supreme Court held that a court has the power to consider an attor-
ney's actions on its own. Further, that court may find that a closing argument is
so improper that its effect permeates the entire proceeding, and a new trial can
be ordered. Impropriety includes an attorney injecting his personal opinions,
and asking the jury members to place themselves in the position of the victim
(making a "golden rule" argument that interferes with jury objectivity).
Justice Rose, joined by Justices Shearing and Leavitt, dissented stating
that it was entirely possible that the jury was influenced by the defendant's
egregious conduct, and that the award was a natural response to the growing
number of instances of road rage in this country. The dissent also argued that it
was up to the defendant's counsel to raise any objections at trial.
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Med. Device Alliance, Inc. v. Ahr
8 P.3d 135 (Nev. Aug. 25, 2000)
Nevada shareholders met the statutory requirement to apply for a receiver
after the district court granted them leave to amend their complaint twice to
include more shareholders.
Medical Device Alliance (MDA) entered into an agreement with Misonix,
Inc. to sell and market its liposuction device worldwide. Two hundred and
seventy investors, including Nevada shareholders, invested $41,313,750.00 in
MDA. After allegations of fraud and mismanagement and a failed attempt to
pursue appointment of a receiver in California, the Nevada shareholders sought
appointment of a receiver in the Nevada district court. Nev. Rev. Stat.
78.650(1) mandates that any holder or holders of one-tenth of the issued and
outstanding stock may apply to the district court for an order appointing a
receiver.
In order to meet the requirement, the shareholders moved to amend their
complaint to include more shareholder names. On June 28, 1999, the district
court granted the shareholder motions to amend and to appoint a temporary
receiver. On August 27, 1999, the receiver's first report confirmed most, if not
all, of the shareholders' original allegations of fraud and waste. Due to a cleri-
cal error, which was discovered on October 1, 1999, the shareholders filed for
leave to amend their complaint a second time. The district court, once again,
granted the plaintiffs leave to amend.
As a result of the plaintiffs' ability to add additional shareholders to the
second amended complaint, the shareholders met the requisite ten percent. The
Nevada Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision to grant the share-
holders leave to amend their complaint and to appoint a receiver for MDA
because the court found that the Nevada shareholders had complied with Nev.
Rev. Stat. 78.650(1).
Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe
5 P.3d 569 (Nev. Aug. 28, 2000)
Nevada Supreme Court rules it has no jurisdiction over an appeal from a
contempt order unless a rule or a statute authorizes it or if it is brought by a
writ petition.
After a district court found an insurance company and its counsel in con-
tempt for not honoring a settlement agreement in a construction defect case, the
counsel appealed the contempt order to the Nevada Supreme Court. The court
noted there was no rule for the proper way to appeal contempt orders and that,
in the past, the court had reviewed both direct appeals and writ petitions.
The court found that, while the common law assumed there was no right
of review, most states had modified this by statute or constitutional provision.
Other states varied on the proper form of review, and Nevada had reviewed
contempt orders by appeal and by writ petition explicitly finding which was
correct. The court held that, given its practice of confining its jurisdiction to
appeals authorized by rule or statute, the court could only review contempt
orders by writ petition. Since Pengilly's direct appeal was peripheral to the
case, not authorized by rule or statute, and not brought by a writ petition, the
court refused to review it.
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Nevada v. Second Judicial Dist. Court
11 P.3d 1209 (Nev. Nov. 2, 2000)
The Nevada Supreme Court has the authority to promulgate rules of pro-
cedure that the state must abide by unless the state can show good cause for its
failure to do so.
The state did not file notice to seek the death penalty within the thirty day
window required by Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(c) for two defendants charged
with robbery and murder. The district court denied leave to file notice late and
the state appealed. The state argued that Sup. Ct. R. 250 conflicted with Nev.
Rev. Stat. 175.552(3), and that only the legislature could promulgate rules of
criminal procedure. In the alternative, the state argued that it had good cause
for filing late.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that simply because the Nevada Revised
Statutes are silent on any time frame in which the state must give notice to seek
the death penalty, this does not preclude the court from imposing a time limit
that ensures due process. Further, if there were a conflict with the statutes, the
court's rule would prevail. The court stated that Article 4 of the Nevada Consti-
tution makes it clear that as a coequal branch of government, the court has the
power to make rules necessary to carry out its duties. This is true even if such
rulemaking overlaps powers granted to the other branches of government, such
as the Legislature's ability to create laws governing criminal procedure.
Finally, the court held that even if the defendant's due process rights would not
be substantially violated by late filing, the state still must show good cause for
missing the deadline. Prosecutors cannot use an excessive workload as an
excuse to miss the filing deadline.
Williams v. Lakeview Co.
13 P.3d 280 (Ariz. Nov. 9, 2000)
Arizona courts could not exercise general or specific jurisdiction over a
Nevada casino in a case involving a motor vehicle accident that occurred in
Arizona because the plaintiffs failed to establish a nexus between their cause of
action and the casino's activities in Arizona.
Plaintiffs, Michelyn Williams and Kelly Williams, traveled to Boulder
City, Nevada, from Arizona, with a friend, Patrick Kelsey. They visited the
Gold Strike Inn & Casino, which was owned by Lakeview Co. (Lakeview). At
the casino, Kelsey consumed a large amount of alcohol. On the return trip to
Arizona, Kelsey drove the vehicle with the Williams as passengers. In Ari-
zona, Kelsey lost control of the car and the plaintiffs were injured. The plain-
tiffs filed suit in Arizona against Lakeview and its partners. The trial court
dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Lakeview.
The Gold Strike Inn & Casino is located a few miles from the Nevada/
Arizona border. Lakeview is a Nevada company, which does not conduct busi-
ness in Arizona and does not own property in Arizona. The casino does adver-
tise in Arizona newspapers. Additionally, the casino sent a one-time offer to
Arizona bus companies, offering them an incentive to stop at the casino on their
way into Nevada. The casino employed some Arizona residents and a large
part of the casino's overnight guests were from Arizona. Plaintiffs conceded
that their visit was not related to any of the casino's contacts with Arizona.
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Nevertheless, plaintiffs appealed, claiming that Arizona courts have personal
jurisdiction over Lakeview.
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that its courts could not exercise spe-
cific jurisdiction over Lakeview since the plaintiffs failed to establish a nexus
between their cause of action and Lakeview's activities in Arizona. Addition-
ally, Lakeview's activities in Arizona were not sufficient to establish general
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated that a causal relationship
must exist between the defendant's forum activities and the plaintiffs' claim.
In this case, the relationship between Lakeview's activities in the forum state
and the plaintiffs' claim was not sufficient to meet the proximate cause test or
the "but for" test to establish causation.
In dissent, Justice Zlaket argued that the majority approach was too strict
and invited absurd and unjust results. He argued that the focus of jurisdictional
questions should be on the defendant's conduct, and not on the plaintiff. Addi-
tionally, he opined that section 37 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws justified the exercise of jurisdiction over Lakeview, since Lakeview
caused "effects" to occur in Arizona.
Kay v. Summers
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18023 (D. Nev. Nov. 13, 2000)
A claim of improper withholding offederal income taxes must comply with
civil procedures, administrative procedures, and jurisdictional requirements.
Plaintiffs claimed exemption from income taxation, but the IRS instructed
plaintiffs' employer, the City of Las Vegas, to withhold part of their income.
Plaintiffs sought a return of past income withholdings, an injunction against
future withholdings, and monetary damages.
The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as frivolous. It
held that its jurisdiction derived from the United States Constitution and statu-
tory enactments, rather than, as plaintiffs claimed, from gold fringe on the
courtroom flag. In addition, the court held that plaintiffs were really suing the
federal government. The court noted that the federal government has sovereign
immunity, and that plaintiffs could not avoid that immunity simply by naming
IRS employees as individuals, rather than in their official capacities.
Am. Bonding Co. v. Barnard, Vogler & Co.
13 P.3d 758 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2000)
Where accounting firm performed audit in Nevada and directed no activity
towards Arizona, personal jurisdiction cannot be exercised by Arizona courts.
Defendant accounting firm, Barnard Vogler (Barnard), performed an audit
in Nevada for a Nevada client. All work was performed in Nevada and all
reports were delivered to the client in Nevada. During the audit, however, the
firm uncovered information regarding possible wrongs committed by the
Nevada client against an Arizona corporation, American Bonding Company
(ABC). ABC claimed Barnard's report aided in the Nevada client's wrongdo-
ing and attempted to sue Barnard in Arizona for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation.
Under traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, the Arizona Court of
Appeals determined that ABC failed to prove the constitutional requirements of
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minimal contacts. The court rejected ABC's argument that Barnard had estab-
lished a basis for personal jurisdiction by directing its allegedly tortious activity
to Arizona. The court held that Barnard's conduct was not specifically targeted
at ABC and that, as such, Arizona was not the "focal point" of Barnard's
actions.
The court also cited Barnard's engagement letter to its Nevada client,
which did not mention ABC, as further evidence of Barnard's lack of directed
activity towards Arizona. Finally, the court rejected ABC's attempted use of
Arizona and Nevada insurance regulations as a means to establish personal
jurisdiction. The court held that Nevada insurance regulations pertained to
Nevada insurers and did not support finding jurisdiction in Arizona.
Turnipseed v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist.
13 P.3d 395 (Nev. Nov. 30, 2000)
A litigant is entitled to a peremptory challenge of a judge if the litigation
involves an administrative agency's decision, even if the judge has ruled on
closely related, yet separate and distinct actions.
In 1994, the state engineer undertook the appropriation of water from a
river that had been previously unappropriated. Two parties desiring the water
rights sought judicial review of the engineer's decisions in the district court
presided over by Judge Blake. Subsequent to the engineer announcing his final
decision, the previous litigants again sought judicial review. At this time, the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe entered the litigation for the first time as a real party
in interest. The tribe filed a peremptory challenge to Judge Blake.
Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 48.1 permits each side to issue one peremptory challenge
to a judge if the action has not been appealed from a district court, and if the
judge had not made any ruling on a contested issue, or commenced hearing a
contested matter in the action. The previous litigants argued the peremptory
challenge was not permitted as this review was an appeal, and Judge Blake had
already made rulings in the case.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that administrative agency decisions,
such as those from the engineer's office, are distinct from lower court deci-
sions. The court ruled that only the decisions of lower courts trigger the type of
appeal where peremptory challenges are disallowed. Judicial review of an
agency's decision is the initiation of the case into the formal court system as
statutorily defined.
Further, the court held that a judge's previous rulings on closely related
issues brought by other parties to the action does not prevent the new party
from utilizing their peremptory challenge. The court found the prior decisions
for review of related instances form separate and distinct actions from the
review sought when the tribe intervened.
Thus, the court held the tribe's peremptory challenge to Judge Blake was
valid, vacated the order striking the peremptory challenge, and ordered the dis-
trict court to assign a new judge.
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Blackjack Bonding v. City of Las Vegas
14 P.3d 1275 (Nev. Dec. 29, 2000)
Municipal courts have the inherent judicial power to charge and collect
reasonable fees without statutory authorization.
Appellant, Blackjack Bonding (Blackjack), sought to recoup $185,960 in
bail bond filing fees paid between 1991 and May 12, 1997. Blackjack con-
tended that the $40 filing fee for bail bonds imposed by the municipal courts
was not authorized by statute and constituted unjust enrichment. The district
court granted the city's motion to dismiss because the municipal courts had
specific statutory authority to charge the fee.
Blackjack appealed, arguing that the statutory authority was granted in
1997, making all fees collected between 1991 and the enactment of the statute
unjust enrichment. Blackjack based its argument on an Attorney General
opinion.
The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the district court action as a motion
to dismiss, rather than as a grant of summary judgment. The court held that
municipal courts are statutorily created, but, once established become part of
the constitutional judicial system of Nevada. Moreover, the court held that the
municipal courts enjoy inherent judicial powers under the separation of powers
doctrine and when the state legislature granted the power over bail and property
bonds, the legislature also granted, by implication, the power necessary to exer-
cise that authority. In reaching this decision, the court relied on a different
premise than the district court in that the district court relied on specific statu-
tory sanction rather than inherent powers.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Nicholas v. Nevada
992 P.2d 262 (Nev. Jan. 27, 2000)
Reduction in absolute vested benefit amounts for eligible public employees
is unconstitutional under both the United States and Nevada Constitutions
because it impairs the obligation of contracts.
Assembly Bill 820 (AB 820) quadrupled retirement benefits for eligible
members under the Legislator's Retirement Law, Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 218. AB
820 passed on June 23, 1989 by legislative override of the governor's veto and
was repealed by special session on November 21, 1989. Two former legislators
sued as a result of the reduction in their retirement benefits claiming they had a
vested right to the increase. The plaintiffs, David 0. Nicholas and Robert
Craddock, left office in November 1988 and received retirement benefits effec-
tive November 1, 1989.
Vested pension benefits can be limited or absolute. A limited vested right
occurs when the benefit is part of the total compensation package for the public
employee. An absolute vested right occurs when the employee retires. The
vested amount as authorized by law cannot be changed, even if the law is later
repealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the repeal of AB 820 impaired the
obligation of Nevada to pay the increased benefits in violation of the United
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States Constitution, Article 1, Section 10 and the Nevada Constitution, Article
1, Section 15. The court reasoned that any other holding would allow the legis-
lature to negatively affect the absolute vested pension benefits and undermine
the validity of the contractual benefits of all public employees.
In dissent, Justice Young stated that public employees' retirement benefits
are deferred compensation for services rendered. To be eligible for the
increase, the appellants had to perform services after AB 820 became law and
retire prior to the repeal of AB 820. Further, he argued that an employee does
not have a vested right to additional benefits conferred after his or her service
ends. Since neither appellant was a public employee on June 23, 1989 when
AB 820 passed, they are not entitled to the increase.
Justice Maupin, in a separate dissent, argued that, as a matter of law, the
appellants cannot establish a reliance on the increased benefits as a condition of
their public service, especially since the bill was not law until after they left
public employment.
Nevada v. Connors
994 P.2d 44 (Nev. Feb. 4, 2000)
Police must terminate Terry stop search immediately upon determining
that no weapon is present.
A Nye County Deputy Sheriff stopped Connors for running a stop sign
and conducted a Terry stop pat-down search. During the search, the officer felt
an unidentifiable object, and subsequently changed his grip in order to deter-
mine what the object was. The officer then retrieved the item and discovered a
vial containing methamphetamines. The state charged Connors with possession
of a controlled substance. Connors challenged the seizure of the drugs. The
district court suppressed the evidence.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. The court
cited Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), which held a Terry stop is
unconstitutional if it goes beyond what is necessary to secure the officer's
safety. The court held that, when the officer felt the hard object in Connors'
pocket, he knew immediately that it was not a weapon, yet continued to manip-
ulate the object until he could identify the object as a vial of the size and shape
commonly used to contain contraband. The court reasoned that by continuing
the search on Connors' pocket, which the officer knew did not contain a
weapon, the officer exceeded the scope of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), as
interpreted in Dickerson. Therefore, the subsequent seizure was the result of an
unconstitutional search because the officer lacked probable cause to retrieve the
object from Connors' pocket.
United States v. Osborn
203 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2000)
It is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to briefly
detain an individual if he has reasonable suspicion, which is determined based
upon the totality of the circumstances.
Defendant Osborn, a convicted felon, went to visit his friend Joey Pagtul-
ingan at his home, but instead was confronted by two officers who were inves-
tigating the death threat that Pagtulingan had made to his mother a short time
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earlier (in which he threatened that he or his friends could kill her). Because of
Osborn's nervous demeanor, the officers questioned and then arrested him for
failure to notify the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department of his change
of address within forty-eight hours, as convicted felons are required to do.
Osborn moved to suppress evidence seized from his person following the
arrest, maintaining that this was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to search him. He argued that
his mere friendship with Pagtulingan was insufficient for reasonable suspicion
to search him.
The Ninth Circuit found that the police searched Osborn because he
showed up at Pagtulingan's mother's house while the police were in the process
of investigating Pagtulingan's threat that he or his friends could kill her. The
combination of his friendship with Pagtulingan and the death threat were suffi-
cient for reasonable suspicion.
Furbay v. Nevada
998 P.2d 553 (Nev. May 4, 2000)
Delay of more than five years between defendant's arrest and trial does
not implicate right to speedy trial where the majority of the delays are the
result of continuances sought by the defendant and negotiations between the
parties.
Defendant, Harold Furbay, was convicted of first-degree murder and rob-
bery and was sentenced to life without possibility of parole for murder and a
consecutive term of fifteen years for robbery. Furbay appealed on numerous
grounds, among them that his right to a speedy trial was violated, his motion
for self-representation was improperly denied, and his right to a fair penalty
hearing was denied.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that Furbay waived his right to a speedy
trial at his arraignment. During the five and one-half years between Furbay's
arrest and his jury trial, his trial was continued nine times. Five of the continu-
ances were instigated by defense counsel, two were the result of the parties
entering plea negotiations, and one was for good cause by the prosecution. The
final continuance was the result of the prosecutor's attendance at a seminar.
The court held that except for the two-month delay for the prosecutor's semi-
nar, all of the other continuances were for good cause and Furbay's constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial was not violated.
The court also held the defendant's right to self-representation was
waived. The district court's decision to deny Furbay's motion to represent
himself was based on the court's determination that Furbay was not aware that
the state was seeking the death penalty. In March 1997, the district court gave
Furbay an opportunity to reconsider the previous decision by the court regard-
ing his motion for self-representation. At that time he waived his right to self-
representation.
Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court held the prosecutor's office was not
required to provide the defendant with inculpatory evidence prior to the penalty
hearing. At his penalty hearing, Furbay contended that the prosecution failed to
reveal evidence prior to the hearing regarding a murder charge against him in
Alabama, and an altercation Furbay had with his previous employer. The court
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held that, while a prosecutor who promises to provide all inculpatory evidence
in his control may not withhold the evidence for later use, the prosecution is
under no general duty to provide inculpatory evidence to the defense. The
court found that the prosecutor did not promise to provide all inculpatory evi-
dence in his possession to Furbay and upheld Furbay's conviction and sentence.
United States v. Morales
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12593 (9th Cir. June 5, 2000)
After a routine traffic stop, an officer may detain the suspect and conduct
a search of the vehicle if the totality of circumstances surrounding the detain-
ment creates a reasonable suspicion and the search is supported by probable
cause.
A police officer performed a routine traffic stop, after observing the defen-
dant's car swerve across the lane markers three times. The officer detained the
defendant for an extended period of time due to the presence of certain indicia
of illegal narcotics involvement: a large supply of gasoline, strong smell of air
freshener, nervous behavior in response to narcotics questioning, and large
amounts of cash in the vehicle.
Morales contended that the evidence from the stop should have been sup-
pressed because none of the indicia were sufficient to form the probable cause
necessary to search the vehicle, thus making the stop pretextual.
The court held that, while any of these circumstances viewed separately
may not sufficiently create reasonable suspicion, it is the totality of the circum-
stances that must be considered, not individual contributing factors. The
numerous indicia of illegal narcotic activity, when considered in the aggregate,
created sufficient suspicion to permit the detainment and the search of the
vehicle.
Herrera v. Russo
106 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2000)
Clark County School District is not an arm of the state for purposes of
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff, Herrera, sued a school police officer and his supervisor for inju-
ries suffered during a shooting on school grounds. Although the complaint
alleged the defendants were acting within the scope of their employment and
under the color of law, it named them in their individual rather than their offi-
cial capacities.
At issue was whether the defendants were acting in their official or indi-
vidual capacity and whether Clark County School District was an arm of the
State of Nevada.
The court found that because the defendants were named individually, the
Eleventh Amendment did not apply, making defendants subject to personal lia-
bility. The court applied the Mitchell factors, derived from Mitchell v. Los
Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1988), to determine whether
the school district was an arm of the state. The court held that for the following
reasons Clark County was not an arm of the state: (1) any funds used to satisfy
a judgment would not be paid out of state funds; (2) public schools were under
local control and did not perform statewide governmental functions; (3) each
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school district had the ability to sue or be sued; (4) school districts had the
power to take property as well as own property and school property was held as
a corporation.
S. Fork Band of the Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians v.
Sixth Judicial Dist. Court
7 P.3d 455 (Nev. Aug. 24, 2000)
An Indian tribe may waive sovereign immunity by its actions, without
express congressional authority.
In 1913, the state engineer initiated water rights adjudication procedures
for the Humboldt River. As part of the adjudication, the Sixth Judicial District
Court decreed water rights to five ranches, and by 1935, all water rights had
been adjudicated. Between 1937 and 1942, the United States purchased the
five ranches to form the reservation for the tribe.
For approximately forty-five years, the tribe cooperated with the state
engineer and water commissioners by allowing them access to the reservation.
The United States paid the water assessment fees in the 1970s and early 1980s,
but the tribe paid the fees from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s. Subse-
quently, the tribe adopted two resolutions on March 8, 1988, decreeing that
water commissioners would not be allowed to enter the reservation, and the
tribe would not pay assessment fees for water rights.
On September 13, 1999, three water commissioners entered the reserva-
tion to reach diversions on an adjacent private ranch for the purpose of regulat-
ing the river pursuant to the decree. The commissioners were followed by a
tribal peace officer, escorted back to the tribal office on the reservation, and the
supervisor was handcuffed and charged with trespass and then escorted off the
reservation. The state engineer and water commissioners of the Sixth Judicial
District Court petitioned the district court for an order to show cause why the
tribe should not be held in contempt for interfering with the commissioners'
authority to regulate. The tribe filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied,
and a subsequent petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the court from
preceding with a contempt hearing, on the basis that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion over the tribe, and that the United States was an indispensable party to the
proceedings.
While the Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged that Indian tribes possess
sovereign immunity from suit, the immunity can be waived. The court noted:
(1) the tribe was the successor in interest to owners of the decreed water rights;
(2) the tribe enjoyed the benefits of the decree; and (3) for fifty-five years, the
tribe allowed commissioners to travel onto the reservation, while voluntarily
paying assessment fees for a period of years. This, coupled with deeds to the
property mentioning the appurtenant water rights, constituted an express waiver
of sovereign immunity, ratified by decades of abiding by the decree.
Furthermore, while the United States was the legal owner of both the
property and accompanying water rights, the actions giving rise to the contempt
proceedings were those of the tribe and not the United States. Because the
United States would not be affected by the contempt proceedings, it was not an
indispensable party whose failure to be joined would result in unjust adjudica-
tion. Thus, the tribe's motion for a writ of prohibition was denied.
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Citizens for Honest & Responsible Gov't v. Heller
11 P.3d 121 (Nev. Oct. 26, 2000)
Various provisions of Nevada's recall petition statutes held constitutional
under both the federal and the state constitutions.
Citizens for Honest & Responsible Government (Citizens) initiated two
recall petition drives against Clark County Commissioner Yvonne Atkinson
Gates in 1998. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 306, petition drives are deemed suc-
cessful, resulting in a special election, when at least twenty-five percent of vot-
ers from the election in which the official had been elected sign the petition.
The statutes require such drives to be completed within sixty days and allow
petition signers to remove their names from the petition prior to the sixty-day
deadline. The statutes also require the Secretary of State to conduct a random
sampling of five hundred names on the petition to determine their validity.
After each of the two drives, the Secretary determined the petitions had
failed because the random samplings had invalidated too many signatures.
Consequently, Citizens appealed to the Eighth Judicial District Court, challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the recall petition statutes. The court, using the
Nevada Administrative Procedure Act (APA), determined that the statutes were
indeed constitutional and upheld the Secretary's invalidation of the petition
drives. On appeal, Citizens challenged the district court's constitutional hold-
ings as well as its use of the APA.
First, Citizens challenged the statute's sixty-day limitation on First
Amendment freedom of speech grounds. Citizens argued that the limitation
unreasonably restricted their ability to conduct the petition drive, thus depriving
them of their constitutional rights. They also argued that the court must utilize
a strict scrutiny analysis to determine constitutionality, which in turn would
require the state to prove a compelling state interest. The Nevada Supreme
Court, however, disagreed and rejected the necessity of strict scrutiny. Citing
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), the court instead adopted a more
flexible test, which balances the constitutional rights of the petitioner with the
interests of the state. The court determined that the free speech implications
were relatively minor and were certainly outweighed by the state's need to
effectuate an efficient and effective recall petition process.
Next, Citizens challenged the statute's sixty-day limitation, the provision
allowing signatories to remove their names from the petition, and the provision
requiring the Secretary's statistical sampling. The court relied on Nevada's
Constitution art. II, § 9, however, which allows the legislature to provide "such
additional legislation as may aid the operation" of its political recall laws, to
overcome Citizens' constitutional objections. The court then determined that
each of the challenged provisions aids the state in safeguarding the efficiency,
accuracy, and effectiveness of the recall process, thus affirming the district
court's determination of constitutionality.
Finally, the court ruled that the district court's use of the APA in determin-
ing that certain evidence proffered by Citizens was inadmissible at trial was
erroneous, but harmless error.
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Hughes v. Nevada
12 P.3d 948 (Nev. Nov. 22, 2000)
Warrantless search of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger
was not in error because it was supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances.
Defendant, Brian Hughes, was one of four passengers in a car that was
stopped on State Route 160 for suspicion of involvement in a shots fired inci-
dent at the Saddle West Hotel & Casino in Pahrump, Nevada. A security guard
flagged down a Nevada state trooper, Cobel, and-gave him a license plate num-
ber and description of the vehicle. Cobel caught up with the vehicle and pulled
it over, conducting a felony traffic stop. After patting down and handcuffing
all the vehicle occupants, he searched the vehicle for weapons. He found a
semiautomatic handgun, marijuana, methamphetamines, and a second hand-
gun. A third handgun, that was thrown from the car, was discovered as well.
Hughes was charged with three counts of being an ex-felon in possession of a
firearm and two counts of possession of a controlled substance.
The district court denied the defense motion to suppress the evidence of
the warrantless search. Hughes appealed, arguing that the search was improper.
The state argued that the search was admissible under the "automobile excep-
tion rule." Under the exception, there must be probable cause to believe that
there is criminal evidence in the automobile, and exigent circumstances must
exist that are sufficient to dispense with the need for a warrant.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that the first prong
of probable cause was met because it was reasonable to assume, based on the
description by the security guard and the type of crime committed, that criminal
evidence would be found in the car. The court also held that the roadside stop
following the pursuit made waiting for a warrant impracticable, thus creating
the necessary exigent circumstances.
Nevada v. Combs
14 P.3d 520 (Nev. Dec. 15, 2000)
Although the district court made an obvious error in granting defendant's
motion to dismiss, it would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause to permit a
second trial after the mistaken acquittal.
The state charged Combs with four counts of sexual assault. After the
prosecution presented its case, Combs moved for dismissal of all counts. The
state and Combs stipulated to the dismissal of Count IV; however, the state
opposed dismissal of the remaining counts. The district court found there was
insufficient evidence to support Count III and dismissed that count in addition
to the stipulated dismissal of Count IV. The state appealed, planning to retry
Combs on Count III, if successful on appeal. Combs argued that the appeal
was moot because the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court erred in granting
Combs' motion to dismiss, ruling that the proper course of action would have
been for the court to direct a verdict, or, alternatively, to set aside the verdict if
the jury had convicted Combs on Count III.
Nonetheless, the court agreed with Combs that a judgment of acquittal,
whether based on a not guilty verdict or a court ruling of insufficient evidence,
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may not be appealed. The court held that no matter how mistaken an acquittal
may be, to permit a second trial would be double jeopardy. Consequently, the
court dismissed the state's appeal.
CRIMINAL LAW
United States v. Blair
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1549 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2000)
Public authority defense and assertions of estoppel relating to violation of
federal child pornography laws available only when reasonably relying on
authorized federal agent's representation.
Appellant, Blair, pled guilty in district court to eleven counts of transport-
ing and one count of possessing child pornography, both in violation of federal
law. On appeal, Blair argued that the district court erred in excluding appel-
lant's affirmative defenses of public authority and equitable estoppel. He
argued that he relied on an officer's stated belief that child pornography "pop-
ping up" on appellant's computer was not illegal. He also argued that he was
sentenced incorrectly. He asserted that the court erred in finding that an image
of sodomy between an adult man and a minor female deserved a four-level
sentence enhancement and that distribution of pornography, when there was no
showing of pecuniary gain, deserved a five-level sentence enhancement.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the availability of the public authority
defense when a defendant reasonably relies upon a representation of a govern-
ment agent acting with authority to allow the commission of the illegal act.
The court, however, held that the officer's statement did not constitute an
authorization to carry or distribute child pornography because there was no
evidence that the appellant relied on the officer's statement, and because the
officer had no authority to authorize violating child pornography laws. The
court also held that equitable estoppel only applies when a defendant relies on
advice or authority of authorized federal agents. Because the officer making
the statement allegedly relied on was not a federal agent, the court held that the
district court did not err in excluding appellant's defense of entrapment by
estoppel.
The court reviewed appellant's second argument on a "clear error" stan-
dard. Federal law provides for a four-level sentence enhancement where por-
nographic material reveals sadistic or masochistic conduct, or other acts of
violence. The court held that the image - depicting an adult male anally pene-
trating a minor female - was an act of violence, thus warranting the four-level
enhancement.
Finally, the court recognized that federal law requires a showing of pecu-
niary gain in distributing child pornography in order to enhance a sentence by
five levels. Accordingly, the court reversed on this issue and remanded to dis-
trict court to determine whether appellant received pecuniary gain in relation to
his distribution of child pornography.
[Vol. 2:196
Spring/Summer 2002] ANNUAL SURVEY OF NEVADA LAW
Doyle v. Nevada
995 P.2d 465 (Nev. Feb. 3, 2000)
The "could" test renders a stop/arrest valid and may be applied retroac-
tively to cases not yet taken to final judgment.
Appellant, Doyle, was sentenced to death for first-degree murder, conspir-
acy to commit murder, first-degree kidnapping, and sexual assault. On appeal,
the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the conviction for sexual assault but
affirmed the other convictions and the death sentence. Consequently, appellant
petitioned the district court for post-conviction relief on numerous grounds of
ineffective counsel. The petition was denied and an appeal followed.
Doyle contended trial counsel was ineffective based upon numerous
grounds. He argued that counsel failed to challenge the admissibility of a state-
ment he made to police, as it was based upon a pre-textual arrest. Doyle argued
that the district court should have utilized the "would" standard (would a rea-
sonable officer have made the stop/arrest) in the determination of whether his
trial counsel was indeed ineffective in the failure to seek suppression of his
statement. Doyle argued that the "could test" (could the officer have legally
made the stop) was adopted prospectively. Consequently, he claimed that the
court's use of the "could" standard was error.
The court, citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), held that new
standards of conduct for criminal prosecutions are adopted retroactively to any
cases not yet final at the time the rule is changed. For this reason, the "could"
test adopted in Gama v. Nevada, 920 P.2d 1010 (Nev. 1996), applied and the
district court acted properly in allowing it.
The court held that the standard Doyle wished to apply was not the law at
the time of his trial. As such, appellant's counsel could not be deemed ineffec-
tive for his failure to predict a change in the law.
Knight v. Nevada
993 P.2d 67 (Nev. Feb. 3, 2000)
Determination of whether a steak knife may be considered a "dangerous
or deadly weapon" is a question of fact for the jury.
In a dispute over his car, defendant, Knight, pursued and eventually
injured his victim with a common steak knife. At trial, the jury was given an
instruction regarding the illegality of "carrying a dirk, dagger, or dangerous
knife." Knight was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, a gross
misdemeanor.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court first explored the implications of
the term "dangerous knife." The court had already determined that the term
was too vague to withstand constitutional scrutiny, and, thus, found the instruc-
tion improper. The court, nonetheless, found use of the term in the jury instruc-
tion to be harmless error, because the steak knife in question could be found by
a reasonable jury to be a "dangerous or deadly weapon." In so doing, the court
adopted several factors for determining whether an otherwise benign imple-
ment may be regarded as a dangerous or deadly weapon in certain circum-
stances including: the nature of the instrument itself; the circumstances under
which it is carried; the manner in which it is carried; the particular person
carrying it; and other factors such as possible peaceful uses.
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As a preliminary matter, the court rejected the state's motion to dismiss
the appeal as moot, because Knight had already completed his sentence for the
crime. The court held that, due to the collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction, the completion of the sentence would not render the appeal moot.
The court's decision overruled its earlier decisions in Bryan v. State, 368 P.2d
672 (Nev. 1962), State v. Cohen, 201 P. 1027 (Nev. 1921), and State v. Pray,
94 P. 218 (Nev. 1908).
Desimone v. Nevada
996 P.2d 405 (Nev. Feb. 23, 2000)
Civil tax conviction on drug charge is a penalty, making subsequent crimi-
nal prosecution exposure to double jeopardy.
Desimone was charged with possession and sale of methamphetamines.
The district court entered civil judgment against him, in the amount of
$166,000, for failure to pay taxes on the drugs pursuant to Nevada's Tax on
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The district court convicted Desimone of
one count of possession of a trafficking quantity of a controlled substance, and
sentenced him to a term of fifteen years with a $100,000 fine. Desimone
appealed on the grounds that this was impermissible exposure to double jeop-
ardy. The Nevada Supreme Court threw out the conviction on those grounds,
but the United States Supreme Court vacated the court's decision and
remanded.
The Nevada Supreme Court reconsidered the case using a two-part test
outlined in two U.S. Supreme Court decisions: United States v. Ursery, 518
U.S. 267 (1996), and Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997). The test
determines whether a civil penalty is really a disguised criminal penalty by
examining whether the law in question is civil or criminal in nature and
whether the statutory scheme is so punitive as to transform a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty.
Based on this analysis, the court again vacated Desimone's criminal con-
viction. The court concluded that, even though the Nevada legislature intended
the CSA to be essentially civil in nature, the tax was the functional equivalent
of a criminal prosecution. Therefore, since the tax judgment occurred prior to
Desimone's criminal conviction for engaging in the same unlawful conduct, the
conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Breault v. Nevada
996 P.2d 888 (Nev. Mar. 10, 2000)
A sentence in which the minimum term exceeds forty percent of the maxi-
mum term may be imposed if pursuant to a freely bargained for plea
agreement.
Defendant, Robert Breault, pled guilty to mayhem and assault with a
deadly weapon, and was sentenced to serve a maximum term of seventy
months. His sentence included a minimum parole eligibility of forty-two
months on the mayhem conviction, and a maximum term of twenty months
with a minimum parole eligibility of twelve months on the assault conviction.
The sentences were to be served consecutively.
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The defendant filed a proper person motion to correct an illegal sentence
that did not comply with a statute requiring that the minimum term of imprison-
ment must not exceed forty percent of the maximum term imposed. The dis-
trict court denied the motion and the defendant appealed.
While the Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged the sentences imposed
on the defendant violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.130 (1), the court pointed out that
the defendant entered into a plea agreement for the sentence, thereby waiving
his rights to any defect associated with the terms of his sentence. The court
held that, because the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily and the
defendant expressly waived all defects associated with the minimum and maxi-
mum terms, the court would not permit the defendant to subsequently challenge
the sentences under the statute. That the minimum terms exceeded forty per-
cent of the maximum terms imposed merely affected the appellant's parole eli-
gibility and not the actual length of his sentences.
The court concluded that it would invalidate sentences not complying with
the forty percent provision of Nev. Rev. Stat. 193.130 (1), except where the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily agrees to the sentence and expressly
waives the defect impacting only parole eligibility.
Hughes v. Nevada
996 P.2d 890 (Nev. Mar. 10, 2000)
In Nevada, a court must exercise discretion beyond simple consideration
of the number of felonies committed in finding a defendant to be a habitual
criminal, but need not make particularized findings.
The state charged Hughes in three separate cases with three counts of rob-
bery with the use of a deadly weapon and one count of second degree kidnap-
ping of a person sixty-five years of age or older. In each case, the state also
alleged that Hughes was a habitual criminal under the Nevada "three strikes"
law, Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.010(l)(b). The defendant's prior convictions included
a 1980 conviction for false imprisonment, a 1981 conviction for attempted rob-
bery, a 1982 conviction for robbery, and a 1989 conviction for robbery. The
district court sentenced Hughes to three consecutive life terms without the pos-
sibility of parole for the robbery with the use of a deadly weapon conviction
and to a concurrent term totaling twelve to thirty years for the second degree
kidnapping of an elderly person conviction. Hughes appealed, arguing that the
state violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution by failing to make a specific finding regarding
whether it was "just and proper" to adjudicate him as a habitual criminal.
Hughes argued that the sentencing court did not specifically address the nature
and gravity of his prior convictions.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that while Nevada law requires a sen-
tencing court to exercise its discretion and weigh the appropriate factors for and
against adjudicating a person as a habitual criminal, there is no strict require-
ment that the sentencing court must make particularized findings. The sentenc-
ing court need only show that it is exercising its discretion; failure to
specifically consider the gravity and nature of the prior crimes is not determina-
tive as to whether the sentencing court used its discretion.
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Moore v. Nevada
997 P.2d 793 (Nev. Mar. 10, 2000)
Courts may use commission of a felony and premeditation as alternative
means of establishing the single mens rea element of first-degree murder,
rather than constituting independent elements of the crime.
Defendant, Moore, shot and killed a bartender in the commission of a rob-
bery. Moore claimed that the shooting was an accident, and, as proof, noted
that after fleeing he returned to check on the bartender's condition. The state
prosecuted the case using the alternative theories of premeditation/deliberation
and felony-murder to prove the elements of first-degree murder. Moore was
found guilty of first-degree murder and robbery with use of a deadly weapon.
Moore appealed claiming that the linkage of theories was improper and
that the state was obligated to choose only one theory for prosecution of the
case. Moore also asserted that the criminal information was insufficient for
vagueness, and alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat.
200.030 did not require the state to prosecute the case under a single theory,
thus allowing the state to use alternative theories in proving the elements of
first-degree murder.
In addition, the court found that the information not only included the
premeditation/deliberation theory, but specifically included language that
alleged the crime was committed in the course of committing robbery. The
court held that this language put the appellant on sufficient notice that the state
was seeking a felony-murder conviction.
With regard to prosecutorial misconduct, the court found improper a state-
ment by the prosecutor that he personally believed in the defendant's guilt.
However, the court held that the error did not affect the fairness of the trial and
allowed the conviction to stand.
Gaines v. Nevada
998 P.2d 166 (Nev. Mar. 13, 2000)
Genetic marker testing may be performed on violent and repeat offenders,
and is therefore not limited to sex offenders.
Appellant, Gaines, faced felony charges arising from three separate inci-
dents. On April 7, 1998, Gaines pled guilty to the felony of unlawful use of
coins in a gaming machine and was sentenced to twelve to forty-eight months
(Case A). The district court suspended the sentence and placed Gaines on pro-
bation for no longer than four years.
Several months later, while on probation from Case A, Gaines was
arrested for burglary and forgery from a failed attempt to cash three fake one
hundred dollar Visa traveler's checks at a casino (Case B). Gaines' probation
in connection with Case A was revoked because of the arrest in Case B. Prior
to his probation revocation hearing on Case A, Gaines was rebooked on a sepa-
rate burglary charge stemming from a check forgery in June 1998 (Case C).
As part of Gaines' plea agreement, he pled guilty to two counts of bur-
glary from Cases B and C, and one count of forgery from Case A. Addition-
ally, the plea stated that the state retained the right to argue at sentencing, but
would not oppose concurrent time between the burglary counts. Gaines was
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sentenced in December 1998, at which time he had been in custody for 217
days. The district court awarded 217 days time served in Case A, but gave no
credit for Cases B and C. Gaines requested credit on all three cases, but the
court denied Gaines' request.
Gaines appealed, arguing that the district court erred in sentencing. He
contended that the court abused its discretion by not applying credit for time
served on all the cases. He argued that the court could not apply Nev. Rev.
Stat. 176.055 (prohibiting the court from applying credit for the other cases)
because it conflicted with Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.035(2). In addition, Gaines
argued that genetic marker testing, which the district court required him to
undergo, should not have been performed on him as the legislature only
intended it to be used for sexual offenders. Gaines also raised constitutional
claims under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Gaines' first argument that the stat-
utes were in conflict, and that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.035(2) only authorized the
district court to run sentences concurrently, not that the concurrent sentences be
identical with regards to time served.
The court also held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.0913 clearly does not limit
genetic marker testing to sex offenders. In addressing the constitutional claims,
the court held that, under the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement, the involuntary testing was reasonable and a com-
pelling governmental interest outweighing the privacy issues of a convicted
criminal. The court also held the statute requiring genetic testing was rationally
related to legitimate governmental interest in apprehension of repeat and vio-
lent offenders and did not violate substantive due process rights.
Finally, the court rejected Gaines' contention that the testing violated the
Eighth Amendment by inflicting barbarous physical punishment and inflicting
pain without justification. The court held that the extraction of blood from
certain enumerated offenders was not barbarous.
Nevada v. Freese
997 P.2d 122 (Nev. Mar. 13, 2000)
An oral canvass is sufficient without specific questioning if the totality of
the circumstances demonstrates that the defendant is making a voluntary and
knowing plea (overruling Nevada case law).
Defendant Bryan Freese brought a post-conviction petition for writ of
habeas corpus, alleging inadequacy of the oral canvass before he pled guilty to
sexual assault upon a minor under age sixteen. During Freese's oral canvass,
the court asked Freese whether he understood the nature of the offense, the
elements of the offense, the possible sentence, the content of the plea, and his
voluntariness and adequacy of representation. Freese argued that this canvass
was insufficient. He asserted that the court is required to engage in ritualistic
questioning and to make specific inquiries, and that the sentencing court did
neither. The state disagreed, arguing that Freese's guilty plea was the result of
a voluntary and informed choice. The state claimed that an oral canvass need
not be ritualistic. Instead, the state asserted the court should look at the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether the plea was voluntary and whether
the defendant understood the plea he was making.
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The district court disagreed with the state's reasoning and granted Freese's
petition. In their ruling, the court relied on Koerschner v. State, 892 P.2d 942
(Nev. 1995), and Kidder v. State, 934 P.2d 254 (Nev. 1977), which require the
district court judge to ask a defendant specifically if he understands the rights
he is waiving as a result of a guilty plea and to review the elements of the crime
with the defendant.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court overruled both Koerschner and
Kidder, finding that it need only consider the totality of the circumstances and
not the inclusion of specific questions in determining whether the defendant has
entered a plea freely, voluntarily, and knowingly. In overruling both cases, the
court noted that Koerschner was based upon a version of Nev. Rev. Stat.
174.035 that was since amended. The statute no longer requires the court to
personally address a defendant regarding his plea agreement unless the agree-
ment was oral. The court expressly overruled both cases to the extent that they
stood for the requirement of a ritualistic oral canvass containing specific inquir-
ies. The court held that it would not throw out a plea if the record demon-
strated that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and that the defendant
understood the nature of the offense and the consequences of his plea.
Although the court specifically rejected the requirement that the canvass
must include a specific review of the elements of the crime and specific inquir-
ies about whether the defendant understood the rights he was waiving, it con-
sidered these factors in determining that Freese's canvass was sufficient. They
noted that at the time Freese entered the plea, the court questioned him about
whether he read and understood the agreement and he answered affirmatively.
Furthermore, Freese never indicated any inability to read or understand the
agreement. The court found that all correspondence with the district court
proved Freese to be competent, intelligent, and able to understand his agree-
ment. Thus, the court held that Freese was aware of the rights he was waiving.
Fullerton v. Nevada
997 P.2d 807 (Nev. Apr. 6, 2000)
Sale of unregistered securities held to be a general intent crime.
The state charged appellants Fullerton, the secretary/treasurer and founder
of First Phoenix, Inc., and Bennett, the company's president, with numerous
violations of Nevada's Uniform Securities Act. At trial, the state presented
evidence of checks signed by appellants to Joel McVickers. These checks were
purportedly commission checks for McVickers' sale of First Phoenix stock.
McVickers testified that he orally agreed to sell the stock for a five percent
commission but was not licensed to sell securities in Nevada. The jury found
Fullerton and Bennett guilty on all counts. The district court imposed two
years in prison for counts I through VII, to run consecutively, and two years in
prison for the remaining counts, to run concurrently. The district court sus-
pended all prison time and placed appellants on probation for a total of thirty-
five years each, with probation ending sooner if the appellants paid restitution.
Fullerton and Bennett appealed, alleging that the court erroneously defined
"willfully," making sale of unregistered securities a general intent crime. The
appellants also argued that there was insufficient evidence to support their con-
viction, and that the court erred by imposing prison sentences, excessive proba-
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tion, and restitution. The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the district court on
the general intent, prison time, and restitution issues, and reversed on the evi-
dence and probation claims.
The court concluded that the district court did not err in giving a jury
instruction which defined sale of unregistered securities as a general intent
crime. The court reasoned that they had previously approved the same defini-
tion of "willfully" in the context of other general intent crimes and such a
conclusion conforms with the majority of federal and state courts that have
considered the issue under the Uniform Securities Act.
The court also rejected the appellants' claim that a prison sentence was not
an option. The court held that, while Nevada statutory law does not allow for a
prison sentence, it applies only to those who have violated a regulation or
order. In this case, the court noted that appellants violated a provision of Chap-
ter 90 of the Nevada Revised Statutes and that violation of Chapter 90 is a
Class C felony. Thus, the district court did not err in sentencing the appellants
to a suspended prison sentence.
Furthermore, it held that sales for which the state accused them of paying
improper commissions were exempt from registration, and the trial court's res-
titution order was proper.
The court agreed with the appellants on the insufficient evidence claims,
reasoning that the payment of a commission is a material element of the
exemptions under Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.460. Since the state did not prove that
there had been any commission payments in the other seventeen counts, the
state could not convict the appellants on those counts.
The court also agreed with appellants' claim the trial court erred in sen-
tencing them to more than five years probation. The court cited the plain statu-
tory language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.500, which allows a five-year maximum
probation.
Fullerton v. Nevada
8 P.3d 848 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2000)
A defendant claiming exemption from registration for certain transactions
must provide evidence showing entitlement to such exemption; the opposing
party must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the exemption does not
apply.
Appellants were convicted of twenty-one counts of sale of an unregistered
security in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.460. The appellants claimed an
exemption for nonpayment of commissions for seventeen of the twenty-one
sales. Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.530 provides that an exemption may be claimed in an
offer to sell, or in a sale of, unregistered securities only if "no commission or
other similar compensation is paid or given, directly or indirectly, to a person,
other than a broker-dealer licensed or not required to be licensed under Nev.
Rev. Stat. ch. 90, for soliciting a prospective purchaser in this state."
Witness testimony only linked four commissions paid out of the twenty-
one counts. The appellant then confirmed in testimony that he did pay commis-
sions on the four sales of securities identified by the witness.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed four counts of sale of an
unregistered security and reversed the remaining seventeen counts for lack of
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evidence. The state petitioned for a rehearing. The state argued that the court
improperly applied the law with respect to the burdens of production and proof
in relation to the exemption of Nev. Rev. Stat. 90.530.
The court held that the appellants' testimony was sufficient to show com-
petent evidence that commissions were not paid on the seventeen disputed
sales. The court concluded that the state then had the burden to prove other-
wise, which it failed to do. The court affirmed the previous reversal of the
convictions on the remaining seventeen counts.
Parrish v. Nevada
12 P.3d 953 (Nev. Nov. 22, 2000)
Trafficking sentence vacated and remanded with instructions to consider
substantial assistance in sentencing.
Parrish was arrested and found guilty of trafficking controlled substances
and resisting and obstructing an officer. He moved for a suspended sentence
based on the assertion he provided substantial information.
Parrish was cooperative with detectives, giving detailed information about
fourteen other traffickers. He provided names, telephone numbers, maps, and
surveillance information. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.3405(2), the court has dis-
cretion to reduce or suspend sentences if substantial assistance is given in the
"identification, arrest or conviction" of other drug traffickers. The police never
investigated the information. Officers claimed arrests must result to constitute
substantial assistance and reduce a sentence. When Parrish was sentenced, the
court made no finding regarding substantial assistance.
The record was found ambiguous regarding substantial assistance, so a
new sentencing hearing was ordered.
Bridges v. Nevada
6 P.3d 1000 (Nev. Aug. 23, 2000)
Conviction upheld despite prejudicial remarks from prosecutor and reli-
ance on jury instructions that have subsequently been clarified.
Sebastian Bridges' wife Laurie left him and eventually moved in with
Hunter Blatchford. Bridges found her and asked to meet with both Laurie and
Blatchford in order to gain closure. Bridges then drove them to a remote loca-
tion, shot and killed Blatchford, buried him in the desert, and took Laurie back
with him. While he was pulled over on the side of the road, a police officer
came to investigate, became suspicious when he saw the blood and dirt in the
car and eventually arrested Bridges, who admitted to burying the body.
Bridges was convicted of various counts of kidnapping, burglary, and murder
and was sentenced to death.
On appeal, Bridges alleged improper comments by the state. Bridges
claimed that the prosecutor misled the jury by repeatedly using terms such as
"aggravating" and "aggravation" to refer to evidence that was not relevant to
the statutory aggravating circumstance, and by improperly drawing inferences
from Bridges' choice not to testify. He also argued that the jury instructions
improperly blurred the distinction between the first-degree murder elements of
premeditation and malice.
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The Nevada Supreme Court found that, since Bridges did not properly
preserve the issues for appeal, he was only entitled to relief if there was plain or
constitutional error. The court found that Bridges did not demonstrate plain or
constitutional error on any of the three alleged errors.
The court agreed with Bridges that the prosecution's remarks were
improper, and strongly criticized the prosecutor's performance, warning prose-
cutors against using such misleading references in the future, but determined
that the error was harmless under the facts of the case.
The court then held that the preferred instructions on premeditation had
been clarified in a recent case, Byford v. State, 994 P.2d 700 (Nev. 2000), but
that Bridges' case had been decided before Byford and that the evidence on
premeditation in Bridges' case was overwhelming.
Dechant v. Nevada
10 P.3d 108 (Nev. Oct. 19, 2000)
District courts may require a private investigator to disclose work product
relevant to trial that is not protected by any other privilege.
Dechant was accused of murdering her boyfriend, Weinstein. In the
course of the investigation, Weinstein's mother hired a private investigator,
who quickly identified Dechant as his prime suspect. At trial, Dechant subpoe-
naed the private investigator's notes, but the district court quashed the sub-
poena. Dechant was convicted of first-degree murder and appealed.
Dechant argued on appeal that the district court improperly held that it did
not have discretion to require disclosure of the notes. Dechant also contended
the court erred in allowing a former police officer's testimony to impermissibly
question the veracity of her testimony.
The Nevada Supreme Court found for Dechant, holding the district court
does have discretion to require discovery of documents in the private investiga-
tor's possession that are not protected by other privileges. The court also held
that a lay witness's opinion concerning the credibility of statements of another
is inadmissible and the district court erred by permitting the police officer to
attack the appellant's credibility. The court held that the district court's cumu-
lative errors mandated a new trial.
Romero v. Nevada
996 P.2d 894 (Nev. Mar. 13, 2000)
To determine whether malicious destruction of property is a felony or mis-
demeanor, the value of the property affected, or the loss sustained, should be
measured by the fair market value, when property is completely destroyed, and
by the cost to repair, when the property is partially destroyed.
The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County convicted Romero on
charges of burglary, aggravated stalking, and felony malicious destruction of
private property, because Romero threw human excrement at a former
coworker in the retail store where he was formerly employed. His actions
resulted in damage to the coworker's clothing, store furnishings and merchan-
dise, and a computer. Romero contended the state failed to establish that the
value of the damaged property or loss sustained exceeded the felony threshold.
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The state argued that the valuation of property damages, as referenced in
Nev. Rev. Stat. 206.310 and 193.155 (Destruction Statutes), was broader than
the valuation of damages referred to in the larceny statutes. The appellant cited
Bryant v. State, 959 P.2d 964, 966 (Nev. 1998), in contending that the measure
of damages sustained should be ascertained by the fair market value.
The state admitted an expense list into evidence, which outlined replace-
ment figures for damaged items totaling $5,010, as well as ancillary costs
resulting from an increase in security personnel. This amount exceeded the stat-
utory threshold to convict the appellant of a felony. The state argued that the
language, "loss resulting from the offense," as contained in the Destruction
Statutes, provided for a broader interpretation than the language in the larceny
statutes, thereby allowing valuation of damages at replacement cost.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the intent of the Destruction Statutes
was to make criminal penalties proportionate to the value of the property
affected, making fair market value the appropriate valuation when property is
completely destroyed and cost to repair the appropriate valuation when prop-
erty is partially destroyed. Furthermore, the court held that ancillary conse-
quences accompanying a crime may not be included in the calculation for
determining when the statutory threshold is met.
The court concluded the district court erred by allowing the security costs
and replacement value of the property to be introduced into evidence. The
conviction was reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction
for gross misdemeanor malicious destruction of private property.
English v. Nevada
9 P.3d 60 (Nev. Aug. 24, 2000)
Sentences for domestic violence battery occurring after January 1, 1998,
may be enhanced by convictions that occurred before January 1, 1998.
Appellant, English, was charged with domestic violence battery in connec-
tion with an assault on his live-in girlfriend on May 13, 1998. The offense was
enhanced to a felony, due to two prior domestic violence battery convictions on
September 28, 1995 and February 11, 1998.
On appeal, English argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.485 does not permit
convictions that occurred before January 1, 1998 to be used for enhancement.
Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.485 provides, in part, that a person who is convicted of
domestic violence, for the third time in seven years, is guilty of a category C
felony. English argued that statutory language stating that it does not apply to
offenses that are committed before January 1, 1998, could be interpreted to
mean that convictions prior to this date cannot be used for enhancement
purposes.
A divided Nevada Supreme Court held, in an opinion joined only by Jus-
tices Agosti and Shearing, that convictions occurring prior to January 1, 1998
may be used to enhance the penalty of the appellant's present conviction. The
court recognized the potential ambiguity, but reasoned that the language of the
statute meant that a conviction prior to January 1, 1998 could not be enhanced,
but that such a conviction could be used to enhance a conviction after January
1, 1998. The court held that the domestic violence statute was modeled after
[Vol. 2:196
Spring/Summer 2002] ANNUAL SURVEY OF NEVADA LAW
the DUI enhancement law that allowed offenses prior to the bill's enactment to
be used for enhancement purposes.
Justices Maupin and Becker concurred, disagreeing with the court's find-
ing that there was an ambiguity in the statute that required statutory construc-
tion. They agreed with the affirmance, but argued that no statutory
construction was needed.
Justice Leavitt dissented, joined by Justices Rose and Young. The dissent
agreed with the majority that the statute is ambiguous. The dissent, however,
argued that when a penal statute is ambiguous, a strict, narrow construction
which is liberal in favor of the defendant is necessary.
White v. Grigas
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27227 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2000)
Under Nevada law, the courts may sentence defendants as habitual
criminals by weighing the appropriate factors before they make their decision.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant's 1986 conviction for burglary and
his sentence as a habitual criminal. The court found that although it may have
been error to force a defense witness to testify in shackles, the error had no
injurious effect on the verdict. Additionally, the sentencing of the defendant as
a habitual criminal complied with Nevada law, since courts in this state are
only required to weigh the appropriate factors rather than to find that the sen-
tence is "just and proper."
Additionally, the defendant missed the deadline for appealing the denial of
certification for his other claims. The court refused to hear his other claims due
to his failure to show good cause for granting an extension.
Dennis v. Nevada
13 P.3d 434 (Nev. Dec. 4, 2000)
In determining the possible excessiveness of a death sentence, an appel-
late court need only consider the crime and defendant at hand.
In 1999, appellant, Dennis, pled guilty to first-degree murder after stran-
gling a woman to death. Subsequently, a three-judge panel held a penalty hear-
ing in which it was determined that three prior felony convictions had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel also found that Dennis' mental
illness and intoxication at the time of the killing were mitigating circumstances.
The panel held that the prior convictions outweighed the mitigating circum-
stances and returned a verdict of death. Dennis appealed, arguing that the ver-
dict was excessive and that the appellate court should compare the background
and circumstances surrounding other death sentence cases to determine
excessiveness.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the panel proved aggravating cir-
cumstances when it showed that Dennis had been convicted three previous
times of felonies involving the use or threat of violence. The court also deter-
mined the sentence was rendered without the influence of passion, prejudice, or
any arbitrary factor, because it considered evidence and circumstances sur-
rounding the crime and Dennis' background.
Finally, the court affirmed the death sentence, holding that it was not
excessive and stating that in determining the excessiveness of a verdict of
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death, it is only required to consider the crime and defendant at hand. The
court held that it would consider whether the crime committed and the defen-
dant were of the type that warrants the death sentence, but held that the court
would not perform a proportionality comparison to other individuals. The court
held that Dennis' crime, a cold-blooded and calculated killing, was the sort of
crime to which the death penalty has been applied, and that Dennis, shown to
be a dangerous and violent man, was the sort of defendant to whom the sen-
tence had been given.
United States v. Rojas-Millan
234 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 2000)
When determining whether a defendant is entitled to a sentence adjust-
ment based on minor participation in the criminal act, the court should con-
sider the role the defendant played in the overall scheme of the criminal
activity, not just the roles played by those convicted or charged in the criminal
act.
Defendant, Rojas-Millan, was arrested in a routine traffic stop based on an
officer's belief that the vehicle the defendant was driving had fictitious Califor-
nia license plates. During the stop, but prior to the arrest, the officer obtained
consent to search the vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of four kilograms
of methamphetamines. Rojas-Millan was convicted of possession with intent
to distribute and sentenced to 188 months in prison.
Rojas-Millan appealed the stop, search, detention, and sentencing. He
claimed that he was stopped without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
and that he was detained and searched improperly. In addition, he challenged
the length of his sentence.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction, holding that the officer's reasons
for conducting a stop were grounded in specific and articulable facts, that
vague and contradictory answers to the officer's questions justified his search,
and that the district court's reliance on Rojas-Millan's signing of a Spanish
language search consent form was not clear error.
The court did, however, find error in the sentencing. Rojas-Millan argued
that he should have been given a downward adjustment based on his role as a
minor participant in a larger drug distribution scheme. The district court con-
cluded that a downward adjustment should be made based solely on whether
the defendant was a minor participant in comparison to other charged defend-
ants. The appeals court held that consideration should be given to all partici-
pants in the scheme and not just to the defendants in the given case. To not
account for such individuals, the court held, would produce arbitrary results,
subjecting less culpable defendants to longer sentences simply because their
more involved co-conspirators managed to escape arrest or were tried
separately.
The court also addressed whether the district court considered a downward
adjustment based on aberrant behavior but declined to rule. The court was
unclear whether the district court concluded it lacked the authority to depart
downward, or, instead, exercised its discretion and declined to do so. On
remand, the district court was instructed to clarify its ruling.
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Dissenting to this part of the decision, Justice Graber believed that the
district court appropriately addressed aberrant behavior by the statement "I
reject the aberrant behavior request for a downward departure," concluding that
the wording "rejecting a request" means that the court considered but denied
the request.
CRIMINAL LAW: JURY SELECTION AND
INSTRUCTIONS
Graham v. Nevada
992 P.2d 255 (Nev. Jan. 26, 2000)
A court is under no obligation to offer jury instructions for an offense that
the facts of the case will not support.
Appellant, Graham, was charged with the first-degree murder of Chelsey
Hachez, the eight-month-old daughter of his live-in companion. He was found
guilty of first-degree murder based on the theory that he subjected the victim to
child abuse. The trial court gave jury instructions on first-degree murder, but
refused to give instructions on second-degree murder. Graham appealed,
claiming that he was entitled to a new trial because the district court refused to
offer instructions and verdict forms on second-degree murder.
The Nevada Supreme Court found that the trial court was only required to
give jury instructions that could be supported by the proofs of the case. In this
case, the refusal to give jury instructions on second-degree murder was proper
since the proofs of the case could only support a theory of first-degree murder.
Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(1) specifically enumerates murder by means of child
abuse as a first-degree murder, while Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(2) defines second
degree murder as all other kinds of murder not enumerated in the definition of
first-degree murder. Since murder by acts of child abuse is specifically enu-
merated in the definition of first-degree murder, the court held the facts of this
case could not support a second-degree murder charge. Therefore, the court
held that the trial court acted properly in refusing to give jury instructions on
second-degree murder and affirmed the conviction.
Boykins v. Nevada
995 P.2d 474 (Nev. Feb. 4, 2000)
Murder conviction reversed due to district court's failure to give proper
jury instruction regarding battered woman syndrome.
Appellant, Boykins, was charged with involuntary manslaughter with use
of a deadly weapon for shooting her live-in lover. At trial, Boykins argued that
she shot Calvin Swazya in self-defense. Boykins originally told police that the
shooting was accidental, but evidence at trial proved this to be untrue. Boykins
then alleged that she suffered from battered woman syndrome and presented
evidence that women who suffer from battered woman syndrome often claim
that they accidentally kill their batterer.
Boykins asked that the jury be instructed that it could consider battered
woman syndrome evidence to determine whether the defendant actually
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believed that she needed to use deadly force, whether her belief was reasonable,
and to assist in determining the credibility of her testimony.
The district court declined to give Boykins' jury instructions, instead find-
ing that the court's instructions adequately advised the jury on the relevance of
domestic violence to a claim of self-defense. Boykins was convicted and
appealed.
Boykins argued that the district court erred in refusing to give the jury
instruction she requested regarding battered woman syndrome. She alleged
that the instruction was necessary to avoid confusion. Furthermore, Boykins
argued that the court's instruction was insufficient in making clear that the jury
could consider evidence regarding battered woman syndrome in evaluating
whether a person under the circumstances would believe that she was in immi-
nent fear of her life or great bodily injury. Finally, Boykins argued that the
court's instruction failed to address the effect of the syndrome on her state of
mind at the time of the shooting, or her claim that the shooting was accidental
despite contrary evidence.
The court agreed, holding that the district court's instructions lacked con-
sistency and failed to give a necessary instruction regarding the relationship
between a person's state of mind and the battered woman syndrome. The court
noted that the district court had offered only one instruction discussing the rela-
tionship between domestic violence and battered woman syndrome. The court
was particularly troubled by the fact that the wording of the other eleven
instructions encompassing the law of self-defense did not contain any language
that provided that the jury must consider the reasonableness of a person's belief
as it existed when that belief formed. Accordingly, the court remanded the case
for a new trial with specific jury instructions regarding battered woman
syndrome.
Justice Young dissented, arguing that self-defense only arises to legally
justify a killing. Since Boykins had claimed for over a year that the shooting
was accidental, Justice Young argued that battered woman syndrome was
unnecessary as a defense.
Justice Young also argued that, even if testimony concerning battered
woman syndrome was relevant, Boykins' proffered instruction overstated the
admissibility of evidence concerning domestic violence. The court may allow
evidence of domestic violence and expert witness testimony on the effects of
domestic violence only to show the defendant's perception of imminent danger
and the defendant's perceived need to use deadly force. Justice Young argued
that Boykins' instruction did not include the imminency element. Further,
Boykins' instruction, in Justice Young's view, improperly included the applica-
bility of domestic violence to a witness's credibility. Justice Young wrote that
using Boykins' instruction would require the jury to disregard Boykins' sworn
testimony that the shooting was accidental.
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Byford v. Nevada
994 P.2d 700 (Nev. Feb. 28, 2000)
Kazalyn instruction abandoned, and a new jury instruction established to
clarify that first-degree murder requires showing premeditation, deliberation,
and willfulness
Byford, and a co-defendant Williams, were originally convicted of murder
in 1994. Their convictions were overturned and the case remanded for a new
trial in 1997. Neither defendant testified at the new trial, but Williams intro-
duced Byford's testimony from the original trial which included an admission
of a prior felony conviction for attempted theft of a stolen vehicle. The trial
court found both defendants guilty. Williams was sentenced to life in prison
without parole, and Byford was sentenced to death.
Byford appealed on numerous grounds. Byford asserted the joinder of his
case with Williams' was prejudicial and damaged his defense. The Nevada
Supreme Court agreed, but found the error harmless because the result would
not have changed. The court found that severance of the cases would not have
prevented the admission of his prior testimony and that Byford was not
prejudiced in this regard.
Byford argued that the jury instruction on premeditation was improper
because it allowed a jury to find willful, deliberate murder solely on the basis
of premeditation.
The court found that the evidence in the case was sufficient to establish
premeditation and deliberation, but expressed concern over the instruction,
which the court referred to as the Kazalyn instruction after the case in which it
was first used, Kazalyn v. State, 825 P.2d 578 (Nev. 1992). The court noted
that the Kazalyn instruction blurred the distinction between premeditation and
deliberation, and that many courts have come to consider the terms to be redun-
dant. The court decried that trend, finding that it blurs the distinction between
first and second-degree murder, and held that the court should abandon that line
of authority. The court directed district courts to cease treating premeditation
alone as proof of willful murder. The court established a new instruction that
stresses that willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation must all be proven to
convict for first-degree murder.
Justice Maupin concurred with the result, but recommended that the
Kazalyn instruction be modified to eliminate premeditation and deliberation as
distinct concepts, and to allow premeditation to suffice as proof of deliberation
and vice versa.
King v. Nevada
98 P.2d 1172 (Nev. Mar. 13, 2000)
State's peremptory challenge to the only African-American venireperson
was not improper because the reasons given for the state's objection were race
neutral and were not merely a pretext for racial discrimination.
Undercover police officers bought drugs from King as part of a sting oper-
ation involving a police informant. When the police later returned to arrest the
appellant, shots were fired between police and appellant. King was convicted
on charges of trafficking in a controlled substance, three counts of attempted
murder, and discharging a firearm into a structure. King appealed.
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King argued that the state's peremptory challenge to the only African-
American venireperson violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution. He also alleged that the court erred in failing to give a jury
instruction regarding the unreliability of an informant's testimony. In addition,
King argued improper execution of a search warrant, improper statements by
the prosecutor, and failure of the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence.
The Nevada Supreme Court found the state's challenge to an African-
American venireperson was not merely a pretext because no other juror was
admitted who exhibited the same characteristics, youth and inexperience, for
which the potential juror was dismissed. The court also held that the court was
not required to issue a jury instruction warning on the unreliability of an
addict's testimony because, unlike Champion v. Nevada, 490 P.2d 1056 (Nev.
1971), cited by King, the addict in this case was not known to be unreliable.
The court rejected King's other challenges. It held that the overwhelming
evidence of King's guilt overrode the impropriety of the police and prosecu-
tion's behavior.
Cordova v. Nevada
6 P.3d 481 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2000)
Statutory jury instructions defining implied malice do not create a
mandatory presumption of malice.
Cordova, who had been drinking, borrowed a gun and shot and killed Har-
ding at his apartment as he was opening the door. Cordova was found guilty of
second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and sentenced to two
consecutive terms of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
On appeal, Cordova argued that a jury instruction that allowed the jury to
imply malice when there was no provocation, or when a killing shows an aban-
doned heart, was improper because it created a mandatory presumption, and
relieved the state of its burden of proof. He also argued that the sentence
enhancement to felony murder for use of a deadly weapon was improperly
applied because use of a deadly weapon was already taken into account as part
of the crime. Cordova also claimed that a police witness was improperly
allowed to testify regarding Cordova's veracity.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the jury instruction defining implied
malice was proper. The jury was also instructed on the presumption of inno-
cence and that the state's burden was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
court clarified that using the word "may" in the implied malice instruction,
rather than "shall," would be preferable. The court held that the district court
did not err when enhancing the sentence because enhancement was only
improper if the use of a weapon was an integral part of the crime. The court
held it was not. Finally, the court held that the police witness was not giving
expert testimony, and thus did not violate the rule against expert witnesses tes-
tifying as to the veracity of the defendant.
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Collman v. Nevada
7 P.3d 426 (Nev. Aug. 23, 2000)
A jury instruction that murder by child abuse automatically establishes
malice aforethought is erroneous.
Appellant, Collman, was convicted of murdering the son of his live-in
girlfriend by child abuse. At trial, the jury was instructed that if the three-year-
old victim had died through child abuse the crime was murder in the first
degree, because the element of malice aforethought was automatically present.
On appeal, Collman challenged numerous evidentiary rulings, but did not
challenge the jury instruction. Nonetheless, the Nevada Supreme Court asked
for supplemental briefs in order to address the subject. The state supported the
instruction with three alternative arguments: (1) killing by any of the means
mentioned in Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(1)(a) is premeditated as a matter of law
and this proves malice aforethought; (2) a specific intent to kill is not a neces-
sary element of murder; or (3) murder by child abuse is analogous to felony
murder and, just as malice is supplied by the intent to commit a felony, malice
is supplied by the intent to commit child abuse.
The court rejected all of the state's arguments. First, although premedita-
tion is usually consistent with the other means described in Nev. Rev. Stat.
200.030, poison, lying in wait, and torture, the court held that, because child
abuse can be an impulsive act, murder by child abuse is not always premedi-
tated. In addition, premeditation does not prove malice, since a justified kill-
ing, like one done in self-defense, is premeditated but not done with malice.
Second, whether specific intent to kill is a necessary element of murder is irrel-
evant since malice aforethought and specific intent to kill are not the same
thing; thus, even if the state did not have to prove the former it still had to
prove the latter. Finally, the state's attempt to analogize felony murder to mur-
der by the means enumerated in Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(1)(a) was not consis-
tent with most of the holdings of the Nevada Supreme Court and other state
courts, which attempt to restrict the application of the felony murder rule.
Additionally, the cases supporting the state's position dealt with murder by
torture and held that torture, like felony murder, does not require proof of mal-
ice. The court rejected that analysis, holding that torture can result in death
without the presence of legal malice.
Even though the state did not prevail in its arguments regarding the cor-
rectness of the jury instruction, the court did not overturn the verdict. Applying
a harmless error analysis, the court found the jury had other proper instructions
negating the erroneous one and would have believed the defendant committed
his crime with malice aforethought even without it.
The court departed from the traditional rule that an erroneous jury instruc-
tion regarding an element of the offense is grounds for automatic reversal and
found the analysis is appropriate when an inaccurate jury instruction is not
"structural" in form and effect, but omits, misdescribes or presumes an element
of the offense. Collman argued that in the past an inaccurate jury instruction
regarding essential elements of the offense was not subject to harmless error
analysis but instead required automatic reversal. The court noted it had created
exceptions to that rule in the case Collman cited, Thompson v. Nevada, 838
P.2d 452 (Nev. 1992). Also, in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
United States Supreme Court held that harmless error analysis was proper if the
erroneous instruction concerned an element of the offense but did not negate
the jury's findings. By applying harmless error analysis, the court chose to
follow Neder and overrule Thompson to the extent that it was inconsistent.
Proceeding with the harmless error analysis, the court found that the jury
had received other proper instructions that correctly stated the relationship
between malice and murder. The court also held the jury's finding that the
victim's death involved torture necessarily proved that the defendant had a state
of mind that implied malice. Finally, the court concluded the verdict would
have been the same even without the erroneous instruction; therefore, the error
was harmless and the verdict should be upheld.
Chief Justice Rose disagreed with the court's application of harmless error
analysis, preferring the traditional rule that a verdict obtained with incorrect
instructions regarding an essential element of the offense should be reversed.
He noted that Neder was not binding and that it encroached on the power of the
jury to determine guilt or innocence.
Additionally, the Chief Justice found fault with the court's harmless error
analysis. He noted there was nothing to indicate which instructions the jury
relied on to come to their verdict. He also argued that the finding that the
child's death resulted from torture, which occurred during the penalty phase,
could not be used to prove what the jury believed during the guilt phase.
Peck v. Nevada
7 P.3d 470 (Nev. Aug. 24, 2000)
Courts need not give jury instructions for a related offense that is a lesser
offense than the crime charged.
Following a University of Nevada football game in Reno, a woman was
urinating under some trees when Peck grabbed her from behind and threatened
to kill her if she screamed. He dragged her backwards, causing her to fall,
digitally assaulted her, and forcibly raped her. Peck denied that his victim fell
to the ground and insisted that they had consensual intercourse while standing
up. While on the ground, the woman felt a set of keys, which she took prior to
running to a friend's house. The police subsequently located the automobile
and determined it was registered to Peck and his wife.
Upon arriving at Peck's home, officers were greeted by Peck's wife, who
invited them into their apartment. Peck's wife claimed officers barged into
their home and that she signed a consent to search only after they threatened to
return with a warrant and tear up the apartment. Officers found Peck attempt-
ing to hide in a closet, and they found evidence that Peck had recently shaved
his beard, evidence Peck unsuccessfully attempted to suppress.
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on two charges of sexual assault,
and a mistrial was declared. Prior to the declaration, however, the foreman
signed jury verdict forms indicating both "guilty" and "not guilty," although the
trial judge accepted neither. In a second trial, Peck was found guilty on both
counts. On appeal, Peck asserts the district court erred by: (1) failing to instruct
the jury on the lesser-included offense of battery with intent to commit sexual
assault and the lesser-related offenses of indecent exposure and open or gross
lewdness; (2) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search
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of his apartment; and (3) allowing his wife to testify against him. Additionally,
Peck claims his conviction is barred by double jeopardy and the principle of
merger of offenses.
Regarding the failure to provide jury instructions on the lesser-included
offense, the Nevada Supreme Court held there was no error, because a jury
instruction for the crime of battery with intent to commit sexual assault was
contrary to Peck's testimony that the encounter was consensual. In regards to
failing to provide jury instructions on lesser-related offenses, the court over-
ruled its holding in Moore v, Nevada, 776 P.2d 1235 (Nev. 1989), which pro-
vided that instructions should be given when: (1) the lesser offense is closely
related to the offense charged; (2) the defendant's theory of defense is consis-
tent with a conviction for the lesser offense; and (3) evidence of the lesser
offense exists. The court reasoned that the Moore decision was inappropriate
because it affords the defense greater rights by permitting conviction for a
crime that the state never attempted to prove or disprove.
The court also rejected Peck's contention that the district court erred in
failing to suppress the evidence found at Peck's apartment on an alleged
coerced consent to search. The court held that the district court's finding that
there was consent was supported by substantial evidence, which could not be
disturbed on appeal. Likewise, although Peck's wife has a statutory privilege
to refuse to testify under a spousal immunity provided by Nev. Rev. Stat.
49.295(1)(a), her failure to invoke her right, and Peck's failure to object to her
testimony, resulted in waiver.
Finally, because Peck was not acquitted at his first trial, because a verdict
was not accepted or recorded, and because a jury was not polled, no double
jeopardy resulted, and Peck could be retried without implication. Similarly,
Peck's act of forcible digital penetration and coercive sexual intercourse were
of a different type of sexual assault, both separate and distinct, such that the
two acts did not merge. Thus, both counts of sexual assault were upheld and
the judgment of conviction was affirmed.
Runion v. Nevada
12 P.3d 52 (Nev. Dec. 4, 2000)
Combination of improper jury instruction on self defense and prejudicial
comments made by prosecutor result in overturned murder conviction.
Runion was driving his vehicle when another vehicle driven by Goldman
pulled along side. A confrontation ensued, in which Runion claims that the
passengers in the other vehicle were flashing gang signs. Runion stated that
Goldman was the aggressor and that he thought Pendergraft, a passenger in the
other vehicle, had pulled and fired a gun. To protect himself and his passenger,
Runion fired his gun and killed Pendergraft. Runion claimed self-defense.
There was no gun found in the passenger compartment of Goldman's vehicle,
only a gun in the engine compartment, which had not been fired. Runion was
convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and attempted
murder with the use of a deadly weapon.
Runion argued on appeal that the jury instruction on self-defense was con-
fusing and misleading, and that the prosecutor's closing arguments prejudiced
the jury.
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The Nevada Supreme Court agreed that the jury instructions were
improper. The district court issued jury instructions based on the 1993 version
of Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.200, rather than the amended instruction of the 1996
version, the time in which the offense took place. The court held that actual
danger was not necessary to justify self-defense. Rather, the appearance of
danger that one is about to suffer great bodily injury would be justified in acts
of self-defense. Since the trial court limited the defense to actual danger and
precluded the defense counsel from arguing apparent danger, the court held that
these actions might have misled the jury to conclude that Runion's actions were
not justified when he mistakenly thought Pendergraft brandished a gun.
Finally, the court held that the prosecutor's comments during closing argu-
ment regarding Runion's failure to present corroborating testimony, which the
district court ruled as hearsay, resulted in improper and prejudicial advantage to
the state. The court remanded the case to the district court for a new trial.
Wegner v. Nevada
14 P.3d 25 (Nev. Dec. 5, 2000)
When a defense theory is supported by evidence, the failure to instruct the
jury on that theory constitutes reversible error.
Wegner, a licensed day care operator, was accused of first-degree murder
in the death of a fourteen-month-old child. She was convicted despite conflict-
ing expert testimony on whether the child suffered the head injury on the same
day she was in the supervision of the defendant. The only evidence used to
convict her was from expert testimony.
Wegner appealed the decision, alleging flawed and omitted jury instruc-
tions. She argued that the instructions created a mandatory presumption of
malice aforethought. The instructions told the jury that murder by child abuse is
deemed to be first-degree murder whether intentional or not. She also chal-
lenged the trial court's refusal to give an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the instruction improperly created an
unconstitutional mandatory presumption of malice aforethought, because there
was evidence that the injury to the child could have happened several days
prior to the alleged child abuse. The court held this to be harmful error,
because the jury could have found the defendant did commit child abuse, but
only aggravated -n existing injury, which would not constitute malice
aforethought.
The court also agreed with Wegner that the court erred in refusing to give
the involuntary manslaughter instruction. The court held that if a defense the-
ory is supported by evidence that could support a corresponding jury verdict,
the court must offer a jury instruction on that theory. The court reversed and
remanded the case for a new trial.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Morales v. Nevada
992 P.2d 252 (Nev. Jan. 26, 2000)
Defendant is entitled to eight peremptory jury challenges in any case in
which life imprisonment is an option, not just in cases where it is the minimum
possible sentence.
Las Vegas police officers observed appellant Morales engaging in a hand-
to-hand drug sale. They followed and stopped him after he ran a red traffic
light. As he exited the car, Morales dropped a cigarette package on the ground
that was found to contain 28.3 grams of cocaine. At the time of the offense,
carrying over twenty-eight grams of cocaine carried a possible life sentence,
but at the time of the trial the cocaine only weighed 27.9 grams.
Morales' attorney requested eight peremptory challenges rather than four,
since the offense could be punished by life imprisonment. The district court
held that eight challenges were allowed only in cases where life imprisonment
is the minimum sentence, and allowed Morales only four. Morales was con-
victed in the Eighth Judicial District Court on one count of trafficking in a
controlled substance. Morales appealed on the peremptory challenge issue, and
also alleged there was insufficient evidence for a conviction due to the lower
weight of the cocaine.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.051
entitles a defendant to eight peremptory challenges whenever a life sentence is
possible. The district court relied on Nootenboom v. Nevada, 418 P.2d 490
(Nev. 1966), which the Nevada Supreme Court held was no longer good law
due to substantial statutory changes.
However, the court also denied Morales' insufficient evidence claim
because a reasonable jury could find that the cocaine weighed 28.3 grams at the
time of the offense as well as reasonably determine that a weight loss due to
moisture loss is expected over time.
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Marcus
995 P.2d 1016 (Nev. Feb. 23, 2000)
Prosecutors may dismiss a complaint without prejudice and re-file it once
without violating the Equal Protection Clause.
Richard Marcus was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol
and pled not guilty. Prior to trial, the state moved for a continuance because the
arresting officer was unable to make the scheduled court date. Marcus opposed
the continuance, pointing to the good cause requirement of Nev. Rev. Stat.
174.515. The Justice of the Peace agreed with the defense that the prosecutor
failed to show diligence in obtaining the presence of the witness. The state then
invoked Nev. Rev. Stat. 174.085(5), which allows the prosecutor to success-
fully dismiss a charge without prejudice in order to amend.
When the state later re-filed the same charges, Marcus moved to dismiss.
He claimed the justice court had no authority to dismiss the original case with-
out prejudice. The court ruled that the statute clearly authorized "two bites at
the apple." In response, the defense filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in the district court, which was granted at a brief hearing. The state appealed,
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arguing the validity of Nev. Rev. Stat. 174.085(5), while Marcus asserted the
statute's unconstitutionality.
The Nevada Supreme Court held the statute to be constitutional. The
court rejected Marcus' claim that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution, holding the right to have a complaint dismissed only for
cause is not a fundamental trial right. The court held that Nev. Rev. Stat.
174.085(5) is rationally related to the governmental interests in allowing dis-
missal to avoid burdensome grand jury process before the reinstatement of
charges.
Gallimort v. Nevada
997 P.2d 796 (Nev. Mar. 10, 2000)
Guidelines established for district courts to determine when a defendant
waives the right to a jury trial.
Gallimort, wielding both a gun and a kitchen knife, kidnapped his former
girlfriend, Cynthia, from her apartment. Cynthia escaped, but not before Gal-
limort inflicted a number of knife wounds. The state charged Gallimort with
first-degree kidnapping with use of a deadly weapon and battery with use of a
deadly weapon. After a bench trial, Gallimort was convicted.
Gallimort appealed, alleging that interpreters were not provided for him at
all stages of trial and that those interpreters that were provided were not quali-
fied, that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial,
and that police failed to collect the knife Gallimort allegedly used to stab
Cynthia, causing the loss of important evidence.
The Nevada Supreme Court found that an interpreter was present through-
out Gallimort's trial, Gallimort made no objections during trial about transla-
tion difficulties or inaccuracies, and Gallimort was able to assist his counsel,
through an interpreter, in his defense.
Next, the court concluded that Gallimort was aware of his right to trial by
jury and that he waived that right knowingly and intelligently. The record
showed that Gallimort and the trial judge discussed Gallimort's wish to waive
his right to a jury trial, Gallimort signed the written waiver before the judge
pronounced his verdict, and that Gallimort spoke to his attorney about the
option of a jury trial versus a bench trial.
The court recommended that district court judges inform defendants of the
number of members of the community composing a jury, the defendant's abil-
ity to take part in jury selections, the requirement that jury verdicts must be
unanimous, and that the court alone decides guilt or innocence if the defendant
waives a jury trial. While the court did not make these instructions mandatory,
it urged district courts to adopt these instructions to ensure that the defendant is
fully informed and to avoid any misunderstandings by defendants.
Finally, the court held that in order to determine if the trial court erred in
failing to collect the knife, the defendant must show that the evidence was
material, and, if so, whether the police investigator's actions were negligent,
grossly negligent, or in bad faith. The court concluded that the evidence
against Gallimort, the testimony of the victim, eyewitnesses, and medical evi-
dence proved the charges, rendering evidence of which knife was used immate-
rial to the outcome of the case. Further, the court found the police investigator
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was merely negligent in not securing the knife from Cynthia because she could
not positively identify the knife as the one that Gallimort used to stab her.
Krauss v. Nevada
998 P.2d 163 (Nev. Mar. 10, 2000)
Defendant may stipulate to prior DUI convictions and may waive presen-
tation of proof of the convictions.
Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), and evi-
dence of two prior convictions was admitted for sentence enhancement pur-
poses. At trial, Krauss conceded that he did not challenge the previous
convictions and affirmed that counsel had represented him during those convic-
tions. Krauss filed a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the prior conviction's validity.
The Nevada Supreme Court unanimously held that even though it was
unclear whether the state produced sufficient evidence of prior convictions at
the hearing, a defendant may stipulate to the validity of those convictions. The
court noted that counsel's failure to challenge those convictions may be reason-
able when based on information and strategic choices provided by the client.
This holding overrules Robertson v. Nevada, 863 P.2d 1040 (Nev. 1993),
which held that a defendant may not stipulate to or waive proof of prior DUI
convictions.
Nevada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court
997 P.2d 126 (Nev. Mar. 13, 2000)
An information may be amended any time prior to trial with additional
theories of the charges, provided it contains no new, additional charges.
After preliminary hearing, the defendant, Darris Taylor, was bound over to
district court on a murder charge. The state filed a criminal information identi-
cal to the original criminal complaint. Subsequent to the filing of the informa-
tion, the state filed an amended information severing an ex-felon in possession
of a firearm count and adding an additional witness. On the morning the trial
was to begin, the state filed a second amended information, adding alternative
theories of liability with respect to the murder charge.
Taylor argued the second amended information should be dismissed
because Nev. Rev. Stat. 173.075(1) required the state to provide a clear and
definite statement of the offense, which it failed to do. Further, he challenged
the second amended information on the basis that additional offenses were
charged thereby prejudicing defendant's rights. The district court granted Tay-
lor's motion to strike the second information and the state subsequently sought
a writ of mandamus.
The Nevada Supreme Court held the district court abused its discretion in
striking a theory of felony murder, as the defendant had previous notice of the
theory in the initial information and that the second amended information
merely provided additional theories with respect to that charge. As such, the
court granted the state's petition for a writ of mandamus in part, and instructed
the district court to vacate its order granting the defendant's motion to strike the
second amended information with respect to the felony murder theory.
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The court further held the addition of the aiding and abetting theory to the
second information was prejudicial to the defendant's rights. The court held
the documents failed to provide the defendant with adequate notice of this the-
ory prior to trial and would not interfere with the district court's ruling regard-
ing this portion of the amended information.
Cabanilla v. Bates
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29212 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2000)
Mentally retarded defendant's first "incomprehensible" petition for writ
of habeas corpus treated as non-existent, allowing consideration of her claims
of unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ruth Cabanilla was convicted of first-degree murder after she shot her ex-
husband in the head during a dispute. Petitioner Cabanilla had an IQ of 61, and
at the time of her hearing on a petition for a psychiatric evaluation she told the
judge she was guilty and wanted to go to prison. Two court-appointed psychol-
ogists evaluated her competency to stand trial. One found she understood the
nature of the charges and had sufficient mental capacity to aid and assist coun-
sel in her defense. The second report was not a part of the record. After a series
of yes and no questions the court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced
Cabanilla to two consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole.
At this brief hearing, counsel did not present evidence showing that
Cabanilla had been taking medication for psychotic hallucinations, in steadily
increasing dosages while in the Washoe County Detention Center. These medi-
cations had side effects including lethargy, confusion, and drowsiness. While
in prison, Cabanilla voluntarily dismissed a notice of appeal, and just before a
voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal, she filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Post-Conviction). She filed the form without assistance of counsel and
the court determined it was "incomprehensible," and dismissed the petition.
Later, with the assistance of an inmate, she filed another Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, this time alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, compelled
medication, and that she did not knowingly and intelligently enter her plea.
The necessary documents showing the use of medications were attached. This
second petition was dismissed because it failed to allege new or different
grounds for relief. Cabanilla appealed and the Nevada Supreme Court dis-
missed, holding that a petitioner must show good cause and actual prejudice to
file a successive state habeas petition.
The defense then filed in federal court and the state argued that the federal
court was precluded from hearing the case because the claims were defaulted in
state court, and that the compelled medication claim had not been exhausted in
the state system. The court affirmed the denial of relief on the claim of com-
pelled medication because there was no record of the medications in the court
documents and therefore the appeals court could not renew the claim. How-
ever, the claims of unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance
of counsel were vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The Ninth
Circuit construed the language of the district court literally in finding the first
petition "incomprehensible," determining that an incomprehensible petition
should be treated as if it never existed. Consequently, the second petition was
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not barred. Because the petition stated a claim that entitled Cabanilla to relief,
an evidentiary hearing was warranted.
Alvarado Ochoa-Lopez v. Warden, Lovelock Correctional Center
997 P.2d 136 (Nev. Apr. 6, 2000)
Failure to complete a written plea agreement is not per se reversible
error.
Appellant Lopez pled guilty to a lesser charge of drug trafficking with
both parties free to argue what type of sentencing would be given. At sentenc-
ing, Lopez moved to withdraw his previously entered guilty plea, but was sen-
tenced to fifteen years in prison and a fine of $100,000.
Lopez did not appeal, but filed a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the
guilty plea was not willingly and knowingly entered. Following the court's
denial of the petition, this appeal was entered. Lopez argued that the guilty
plea was not valid because the court accepted his plea without a written plea
agreement as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 174.035(6), and that the violation was
a per se reversible error.
The court held that failure to complete a written plea agreement is not a
per se reversible error. The court stated that although Nev. Rev. Stat. 174.035
requires a written plea agreement, it may determine whether or not a plea is
valid by looking at the totality of the circumstances. The two factors consid-
ered by the court were that Lopez was extensively canvassed to ensure that he
knew that sentencing was left to the court, and that the court ensured Lopez
completely understood the elements of the charge to which he was pleading.
Valerio v. Bayer
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7271 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2000)
Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied because there was no error in
lower courts' rulings.
Appellant, Valerio, was sentenced to death for murder with two aggravat-
ing circumstances, prior felony conviction involving violence, and murder
involving torture, depravity of mind, or mutilation. The Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Valerio then made two petitions
for post-conviction relief; each was denied. Valerio then filed another petition
in federal court, asserting numerous grounds for relief. Valerio contended that
the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) was
inapplicable because this petition was a renewal, not a new appeal. The court
held that unless the lower court retained jurisdiction over the first petition,
which it did not because of a failure to exhaust state remedies, the current
petition was the first petition, because the original petition was filed prema-
turely. For purposes of the AEDPA, the current petition was filed after the
AEDPA became law.
Valerio claimed that the jury relied on a constitutionally vague aggravator
("that the murder involved torture, depravity of mind, or mutilation"). On
direct appeal of his conviction, the Nevada Supreme Court cured this defect by
applying a narrow construction that required a showing of "some form of tor-
ture or serious physical abuse." Valerio claimed the Nevada Supreme Court
did not have the authority to re-examine evidence of the aggravated circum-
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stance when the jury had an invalid instruction and that the Nevada Supreme
Court did not apply its limiting instruction correctly.
Evidence in the record showed that the victim had been stabbed forty-five
times (in groupings of eight) and had defensive wounds on her hands and arms,
indicating the stabbings were done prior to the victim's death. The Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected these arguments on the ground that Valerio failed to argue that the
aggravator remained unconstitutionally vague, thereby waiving the right to
bring it up at this appeal. The court explained that the failure to consistently
apply the narrow construction to the facts of different cases is not a basis for a
federal habeas corpus remedy.
The court held that the Nevada Supreme Court's finding that the victim
had been tortured and/or received serious physical abuse was a finding that a
"rational fact finder could have made" based on the evidence in the record.
Since the standard of review for the application of the narrow construction rule
is the "rational factfinder," the court held the decision by the Nevada Supreme
Court was appropriate.
Jennings v. Nevada
998 P.2d 557 (Nev. May 4, 2000)
Amendment of criminal information after defendant testifies is a violation
of Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Charles Edward Jennings was convicted of first-degree murder of a former
co-worker with the use of a deadly weapon. After the case had proceeded to
trial and Jennings had testified on his own behalf, the state amended its infor-
mation to add a felony-murder theory alleging Jennings kidnapped the victim
prior to shooting him. Jennings was convicted and sentenced to two consecu-
tive life sentences without the possibility of parole.
Jennings appealed on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial was violated by the state's amendment of the information after he had
testified. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. 173.095, the state may amend a criminal infor-
mation any time prior to verdict as long as no additional or different offense is
charged and no substantive rights of the defendant are prejudiced.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that amendment of the information to
include an alternative theory of the mental state required for first-degree mur-
der does not charge an additional or different offense. Amendment of the infor-
mation after Jennings testified did, however, violate his fundamental right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him in order to permit
him adequate preparation of a defense.
Woerner v. Justice Court
1 P.3d 377 (Nev. June 5, 2000)
The justice court does not have proper authority to order a competency
evaluation of a mentally ill individual accused of first-degree murder in lieu of
a preliminary hearing.
Petitioner Woerner was charged with first-degree murder. The district
court found Woerner incompetent to stand trial, ordered involuntary commit-
ment, and dismissed the case. Two years later, the district attorney filed a
petition in family court seeking Woerner's continued involuntary commitment.
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The family court discharged Woerner as an outpatient, finding that she was
mentally ill, but that the hospital commitment was not the least restrictive
acceptable environment for her. The family court did not address the issue of
Woerner's competence to stand trial for first-degree murder. The district attor-
ney then re-filed the murder charge in family court and Woerner was arrested
after the court ordered Woemer be released as an outpatient.
Woemer moved to dismiss in justice court. The court denied Woemer's
motion. Instead, the justice court ordered Woerner to undergo a competency
evaluation. The justice court conducted no preliminary hearing, concluding
that such a proceeding would be useless, since Woerner's incompetence ren-
dered her unable to understand the nature of the charges against her or to assist
counsel in her defense. Woemer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
requesting that the Nevada Supreme Court: (1) direct the justice court to dis-
miss her criminal case because the district court had already found her incom-
petent to stand trial and no contrary finding had been made; and (2) direct the
district attorney to refrain from seeking incarceration or further criminal pro-
ceedings against her until first establishing her competency.
The court held that incompetence only prevents a criminal defendant from
being tried or punished; it has no bearing on whether a defendant can be
charged with a crime. Furthermore, the court found that Nev. Rev. Stat.
178.425(5) specifically contemplates re-filing of criminal charges after a prior
dismissal, with the statute of limitations being the only restriction imposed on
the re-filing.
In ruling on whether the justice court exceeded its jurisdiction, the court
held that the justice court was not empowered to consider the issue of
Woemer's competence because Nev. Rev. Stat. 178.405 gives the authority to
decide that question to the trial court. Furthermore, the justice court erred in
ordering a competency evaluation and in failing to conduct a preliminary hear-
ing. The court reasoned that, under Nev. Rev. Stat. 171.196, the murder charge
is not triable in justice court.
The court granted Woemer's petition in part, issuing a writ of mandamus
directing the justice court to vacate its order for a competency evaluation and to
conduct a preliminary hearing. The court declined to direct the justice court to
dismiss the case, or to direct the district attorney to refrain from further
prosecution.
Hart v. Nevada
1 P.3d 969 (Nev. June 14, 2000)
Laches precludes consideration of appellant's post-sentence motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because the motion was filed six years after sentencing
and the state would suffer prejudice if forced to try the case now.
Hart pled guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced in July 1990.
Hart did not file a timely direct appeal, but in September 1996, filed a motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. The state asserted the proper procedure was to file
a writ of habeas corpus. The state also argued that laches barred a withdrawal
of the guilty plea. Hart insisted that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was not
subject to time restrictions.
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The court first analyzed whether a post-conviction motion to withdraw a
plea is subsumed by Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 34, governing a post-conviction peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held that Nev. Rev. Stat.
34.724(2)(a) exempts a post-conviction motion to withdraw a plea from the
requirements of Chapter 34 because the motion is "incident to the proceedings
in the trial court." The court emphasized that a motion to withdraw a plea
should be clearly labeled in order to prevent the motion from being considered
a writ of habeas corpus, which is subject todifferent procedural requirements.
The court then held that for a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea to
be considered, the defendant must show that the withdrawal would correct
manifest injustice. The court further held that the equitable doctrine of laches
must be considered in determining if the defendant has met this burden. The
court listed four factors to consider in applying laches: (1) whether there was
an inexcusable delay in seeking relief; (2) whether an implied waiver arose
from defendant's knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; (3) whether cir-
cumstances exist that prejudice the state; and (4) if the defendant previously
sought relief from the judgment, failure to include a motion to withdraw the
plea originally should weigh against the later motion. Here, Hart's unexplained
delay of over six years in filing the motion and the probability that the state
would suffer prejudice if now forced to try a 1989 murder led the court to hold
that laches precluded consideration of Hart's motion on the merits.
Speer v. Nevada
5 P.3d 1063 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2000)
Any prior felony DUI conviction can be used to enhance a subsequent
DUI conviction as long as the prior offense occurred within the seven years
immediately preceding the date of the principal offense or after the principal
offense.
Speer pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) and at sentencing
the state introduced evidence of a previous misdemeanor conviction from 1996
and a felony conviction from 1991. The 1991 offense had been enhanced to a
felony due to two DUI convictions prior to 1991. The 1996 offense was treated
as an un-enhanced "first offense," but as part of the plea agreement, the parties
agreed that despite the first offense treatment, a future offense could be treated
as a felony. The district court enhanced this new conviction to a felony and
sentenced accordingly.
Subsequently, Speer filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming the court erred using the prior felony conviction for enhance-
ment purposes. He argued that only misdemeanor convictions might be used to
enhance a subsequent offense to a felony.
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that any two prior offenses may be
used to enhance a subsequent DUI so long as they occurred within seven years
of the principal offense and are evidenced by a conviction. Whether a prior
offense was a misdemeanor or a felony is not relevant under the statute. The
court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by allowing defen-
dant's prior felony DUI conviction to be used for enhancement purposes.
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United States v. Lopez-Lopez
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22730 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2000)
Despite some evidence constituting probable cause that a search warrant
was tainted, the search warrant is still valid if untainted evidence alone would
have been sufficient.
Federico Lopez-Lopez was convicted for drug trafficking following an ini-
tial traffic stop, which led to a search of his vehicle and the discovery of illegal
narcotics. Lopez was detained while the officer awaited a Spanish-speaking
officer to talk to Lopez's passenger, who appeared nervous. While awaiting the
officer, the police noted several suspicious items, including a tampered-with
front gas tank, large amounts of cash, inconsistent statements, visible nervous-
ness of the passenger, and the strong odor of air freshener. This led to addi-
tional questioning and Lopez's arrest.
Lopez argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to sup-
press seized evidence and his motion for a new trial because the initial stop was
invalid. He asserted that the duration and scope of the stop was unreasonable,
evidence constituting probable cause for a search warrant was tainted, and a
government witness committed perjury.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484.305, which
states that a vehicle must be driven in one lane when practicably possible, is not
unconstitutionally vague. The court held that the duration and scope of the
officer's inquiry was reasonable for two reasons. Although the subject matter of
the officer's questioning deviated from the initial cause for the stop, officers
may broaden the scope of questioning if they notice additional suspicious cir-
cumstances. Further, because the passenger did not speak English it was not
inappropriate for the officer to request a Spanish-speaking officer. The court
held that while some of the evidence constituting probable cause was tainted,
there was still enough untainted evidence to constitute probable cause for a
search warrant. The court also invalidated held Lopez's argument that he was
entitled to a new trial because a government witness committed perjury. The
court held that not all trials in which perjured testimony is offered require a
new trial. In this case, the court held that there was ample evidence to corrobo-
rate the perjured testimony, making it within the district court's discretion to
deny the motion for a new trial.
Paschall v. Nevada
8 P.3d 851 (Nev. Sept. 19, 2000)
Justice courts have jurisdiction to suspend prior DUI convictions; DUI
ordinance did not have to be approved by the Nevada Department of
Transportation.
In 1997 and 1998, Paschall received two driving under the influence
(DUI) citations. Since Paschall had two prior DUI convictions within seven
years, the 1997 and 1998 charges were enhanced from misdemeanors to felo-
nies. Paschall's prior convictions resulted in a suspended sentence and he
moved for the prior convictions to be invalidated to avoid the effects of the
enhancement statute. All motions were denied and Paschall was found guilty
of both felony charges.
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Paschall argued on appeal that the justice courts exceeded their jurisdic-
tional power by suspending his sentences in his prior convictions and that his
prior conviction was invalid because the DUI ordinance had not been approved
by the Department of Transportation.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding the Nevada
Constitution gives the legislature authority to grant justice courts the power to
suspend sentences under Nev. Rev. Stat. 4.373. The court held that the justice
courts properly entered the prior convictions. The court also held the DUI ordi-
nance did not fall within Nev. Rev. Stat. 484.779(3), which deals with the use
and flow of traffic on state highways, or with the regulation of a specific high-
way. The court held the DUI ordinance was of public safety and therefore did
not need approval from the Department of Transportation.
Parsons v. Nevada
10 P.3d 836 (Nev. Oct. 23, 2000)
District court may not determine constitutional validity of prior DUI con-
victions in pre-trial hearing.
Appellant, Parsons, was accused of third offense driving under the influ-
ence (DUI). As a preliminary matter, the justice court undertook an examina-
tion of the facts concerning the two prior offences to determine whether his
third conviction should be enhanced to a felony. During this proceeding, Par-
sons challenged the constitutional validity of one of the convictions. Parsons
argued that he did not have sufficient knowledge of the DUI requirements to
enter a valid guilty plea. The justice court held that one of Parsons' convictions
was based on a deficient complaint and refused to hold him for trial.
The state then filed a criminal information by affidavit in the district court,
which the district court permitted on the grounds that the justice court made an
egregious error in considering the constitutionality of the convictions at prelim-
inary hearing. A trial was held and Parsons was convicted. On appeal, a three-
judge panel of the Nevada Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the
district court improperly allowed the state to file information by affidavit. The
court denied the state's petition for rehearing, but subsequently granted a peti-
tion for en banc reconsideration.
Upon reconsideration, the court determined that the constitutionality of
prior convictions is not the proper subject of preliminary factual examinations
for enhancement purposes. Nevertheless, the court reversed Parsons' convic-
tion because it held that the justice court had ruled based on language in a
previous Nevada Supreme Court case, and that the district court erred in con-
sidering the justice court's action egregious error and allowing the information
by affidavit.
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Loveland v. Hatcher
231 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 2000)
Federal courts may review the merits of a post-conviction relief petition
when it is unclear whether the state court dismissed the petition because of
state procedural default or on the merits of the petitioner's federal constitu-
tional claims.
After being found guilty of sexual assault, the petitioner believed his coun-
sel was filing an appeal on his behalf. Over a year after being convicted, peti-
tioner's counsel withdrew without ever filing a direct or post-conviction appeal.
Petitioner then filed a pro per habeas petition with the Nevada trial court.
When the trial court denied the petition on the merits, petitioner appealed to the
Nevada Supreme Court. Petitioner then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court asserting a violation of his due process rights when the
Nevada Supreme Court had not ruled on his pending petition appeal. Subse-
quently, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court ruling, stating that
the petitioner did not file his petition within the statutory one year time period
and he failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice to overcome the proce-
dural bar. The district court ultimately dismissed the petition on grounds that
Nevada law procedurally barred it.
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the state procedural bar rule is not
an adequate and independent ground for the state's denial of his post-convic-
tion relief petition. Loveland alleged the Nevada state courts did not consist-
ently apply the statutory time limit, and the Nevada Supreme Court at least
partially denied the petitions on the merits. He also alleged ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Nevada Supreme Court consistently
applied the state rule barring review of the merits of an untimely post-convic-
tion petition unless the petitioner demonstrates the existence of both good cause
and prejudice. The court held that had the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed
the petition solely on the basis of the state's procedural bar without examining
the merits of the petition's federal constitutional claims, the federal court would
have been precluded from considering petitioner's federal petition, but the
Nevada Supreme Court denied the petition independently by applying the state
procedural bar rule and did not rule separately on the merits.
Thus, the federal court had the duty to examine the petitioner's federal
petition to determine whether petitioner's constitutional claims were valid and
if he could demonstrate good cause and prejudice which excused his state pro-
cedural default. The court held that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to
determine if ineffective assistance of counsel caused the state procedural
default. The appeals court reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition
and remanded the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW
State Indus. Ins. Sys. v. Perez
994 P.2d 723 (Nev. Mar. 9, 2000)
A disability claim may be re-opened without presentation of new medical
evidence if other non-medical factors justify the re-opening.
Respondent Perez injured his back during his employment with Forrest
Concrete Company. Perez accepted a lump sum Permanent Partial Disability
(PPD) award of $14,721.51 and vocational rehabilitation training. The results
of an evaluation of Perez's vocational rehabilitation showed that he had low
vocational aptitude, a third grade education, and spoke little English. Addition-
ally, Perez had problems with his sight and hands. As a result of these
problems, the vocational rehabilitation specialists found Perez to be a poor can-
didate for vocational rehabilitation.
Perez, unsuccessful in his rehabilitation, claimed that the "odd-lot" doc-
trine entitled him to Permanent Total Disability (PTD). His lawyer wrote a
letter to a rehabilitation counselor with the Employers Insurance Company of
Nevada (EICON). EICON did not respond to the request and Perez appealed.
An appeals officer reversed EICON's denial of Perez's claim for total
disability.
EICON argued that the appeals officer did not have jurisdiction to con-
sider the Perez claim for permanent total disability because Perez failed to seek
reopening in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.495(2). EICON also
asserted that Perez's claim was insufficient because it did not refer to any medi-
cal evidence.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the letter to EICON from Perez's
attorney qualified as an application for re-opening the claim. EICON, in its
failure to respond, had constructively denied Perez's claim, allowing him the
right to appeal.
The court also held that total disability claims may include both medical
and non-medical components, and that factors other than physical impairment
may be considered in determining whether an injury qualifies a worker for PTD
benefits. The court never addressed the statute itself and instead focused on
Perez's non-medical condition. Since it was not new medical evidence which
made Perez eligible for PTD but his old disability plus newly discovered fac-
tors, the court found the statutory requirement of medical evidence in Nev.
Rev. Stat. 616C.390 inapplicable. The court further found this to be in accord
with legislative intent. It held that the legislature did not intend to deprive an
injured worker of PTD benefits if the worker is not amenable to vocational
rehabilitation.
Justice Maupin's concurrence distinguished between the reopening of a
PPD claim to effect an increase in benefits, and the reopening of a claim, like
Perez's, to seek a change from PPD rating to PTD rating. The latter, he stated,
unlike the former, may have either medical or non-medical components. How-
ever, other conditions do not require medical evidence. For example, a rehabil-
itation program may demonstrate the worker's inability to return to
employment because of non-medical conditions.
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Justice Maupin would reopen a PPD award to claim PTD status if the
claimant establishes: (1) an objective change in the worker's medical condition
stemming from the industrial injury which demonstrates a scheduled total disa-
bility under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.435(1); (2) a legitimate inability to rehabili-
tate the worker such that he or she qualifies for unscheduled disability; or (3)
changes in the worker's medical condition, which, in combination with non-
medical issues, would justify "odd-lot" status.
University of Nevada, Reno v. Stacey
997 P.2d 812 (Nev. Apr. 6, 2000)
University decision on granting tenure is totally discretionary rendering
the University immune from suit.
University of Nevada, Reno (UNR) professor Peter Stacey failed to
receive tenure after several tries and sued the university for breach of contract.
Stacey argued his excellent performance evaluations obligated the university to
grant him tenure under his contract. The trial court allowed the breach of con-
tract issue to go before a jury, which awarded Stacey damages and UNR
appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that UNR's motion for sum-
mary judgment should have been granted because the contract was clear and
unambiguous and subject "to only one interpretation" and therefore there was
no genuine issue of material fact to allow trial. The court held the contract
clearly stated that UNR's decision to grant tenure was completely discretion-
ary, citing numerous provisions that demonstrated the decision to grant tenure
is based on a multitude of subjective factors and is not guaranteed by excellent
performance evaluations.
The court also agreed with UNR's assertion that the university is statuto-
rily immune from suit. Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.032(2) provides state agencies with
immunity from suit for performance of discretionary acts. The court held that
granting tenure was an act requiring personal deliberation or judgment and
restated the court's reluctance to involve itself in such decisions.
Frantz v. Johnson
999 P.2d 351 (Nev. May 4, 2000)
The district court erred in calculating damages by pro-rating expert wit-
ness's five-year loss analysis when it had determined a loss of only eighteen
months.
A former sales manager for a plastic card company, Johnson Business
Machine (JBM), went to work for the direct manufacturer of the cards, Plastic
Graphics, Inc. (Plastic). JBM later claimed violations of the Nevada Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. 600A.090. Following a bench trial, the dis-
trict court awarded compensatory and punitive damages to JBM based upon a
pro-rata share of JBM's expert witness's calculation of loss. The loss analysis
was based on a five-year loss. The court determined that the actual period of
loss was eighteen months and simply pro-rated the five-year calculation to an
eighteen-month period.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the compensatory damage calcula-
tion due to the use of incorrect figures, along with the punitive damages calcu-
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
lation, but affirmed the rest. Since the district court utilized a pro-rated
calculation including damages used in the five-year calculation but outside the
established eighteen-month period of loss, the compensatory damage calcula-
tion was erroneous. When the court remanded for re-calculation on the com-
pensatory damages, the punitive damages were also vacated pursuant to Nev.
Rev. Stat. 600A.050(2) (punitive damages may be no more than two times the
compensatory damage award).
Lipps v. S. Nev. Paving
998 P.2d 1183 (Nev. May 4, 2000)
Nevada Industrial Insurance Act immunity provisions preclude recovery in
tort for the wrongful death of an employee injured by a construction company
operating pursuant to a construction agreement with a licensed principal
contractor.
Amzel Michael Lipps, Jr. was killed while servicing a construction truck
owned by Southern Nevada Paving. Southern Nevada Paving was acting as a
licensed subcontractor for Gilbert Western Construction, a licensed general
contractor hired by the Mohave Indian Tribe to build roads for a casino project.
Lipps was an employee of C&J Trucking, an independent contractor hired
directly by the tribe to service Southern Nevada Paving's equipment. Amzel
Lipps, Sr. filed suit against Southern Nevada Paving for his son's wrongful
death. Southern Nevada Paving was granted summary judgment under the
immunity provisions of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NHA) and Lipps
appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's summary judg-
ment. According to Nevada law, the exclusive remedy of injured employees
against their employers is the Nevada Workers' Compensation system. Under
Nev. Rev. Stat. 616A.210(l), all subcontractors, independent contractors, and
their employees are deemed employees of the principal contractor for the pur-
poses of the NIIA. Claims for tort damages may not be brought against statu-
tory employers or co-employees.
Even though C&J Trucking was retained directly by the tribe, the court
reasoned that NIIA immunity provisions apply because the tragedy arose in the
construction context in which Southern Nevada Paving was working pursuant
to a construction agreement with a licensed principal contractor. The court also
held that C&J was an independent contractor and was therefore a statutory co-
employee of Southern Nevada Paving, precluding recovery in tort under the
NIIA.
Barrick Goldstrike Mine v. Peterson
2 P.3d 850 (Nev. June 9, 2000)
Claimant must file both a notice of injury and a claim for compensation
within the statutorily prescribed time period in order to have a valid claim,
unless claimant can show a valid excuse for the delay.
Respondent Peterson injured his back while working as an electrician for
Barrick Goldstrike Mine. After immediately notifying his supervisor of his
injury, Peterson and the supervisor together filed an "Employee's Notice of
Injury or Occupational Disease" form. Peterson remained in pain for nearly
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three weeks. Shortly thereafter, Peterson's back pain subsided but he began
experiencing leg pains. One hundred and eleven days after the injury, Peterson
sought medical treatment. Although Peterson had not connected his leg pains
to his back injury, doctors found that the leg pain resulted from a herniated disk
in his back. Once the doctors discovered this connection, Peterson filed a
worker's compensation claim. Barrick's insurance administrator denied Peter-
son's claim on the grounds that he had not filed the claim within ninety days of
the injury. Peterson appealed. Peterson argued that the ninety-day deadline is
inapplicable here because the statute only applies if an employee seeks medical
treatment within ninety days of the accident.
The Nevada Department of Administration (NDA) reversed the insurance
administrator's decision, ruling that Peterson had given Barrick actual notice of
the injury. Barrick appealed the ruling, and an appeals officer of the NDA
affirmed the decision. The appeals officer agreed that Peterson had not filed an
untimely claim because he had given Barrick actual notice. The NDA ruled
that an employer could deny benefits only if the injured employee failed to both
file a notice of injury and to file a timely worker's compensation claim. The
appeals officer also noted that Peterson sought medical attention when the pain
worsened and filed a claim when medical evidence proved his injuries to be a
result of his work accident. Alternatively, the appeals officer concluded that
such a situation excuses Peterson's failure to file a timely. claim. Barrick
appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat.
616C.025(l) requires both a notice of injury and a timely claim for compensa-
tion, not just one or the other.
The court affirmed NDA's ruling. Although the court concluded that the
NDA erroneously interpreted the statute, it found substantial evidence in the
record to support the NDA's alternative finding that Peterson's failure to file a
timely claim for compensation was excused under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616C.025(2).
In making its decision, the court clarified its decision in Bally's Grand
Hotel & Casino v. Reeves, 948 P.2d 1200 (Nev. 1997). That case suggested
that the court must remand a case to the insurer for consideration of the
employee's excuse. However, the court in the present case stated that it did not
intend this result. Such a result would delay benefits, which the legislature
intended the insurer to pay quickly and efficiently, once the employee satisfies
the statute. Here, Barrick conceded that it would reject Peterson's excuse upon
remand. Thus, to remand this case to the insurer would just add a needless
level of litigation. Consequently, the court concluded that they need not
remand this case and that the appeals officer properly considered Peterson's
excuse.
The court did conclude that the NDA erroneously interpreted Nev. Rev.
Stat. 616C.025(1), holding that an employee must satisfy both requirements of
the statute, not just one step as the NDA ruled.
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Las Vegas Housing Authority v. Root
8 P.3d 143 (Nev. Aug. 30, 2000)
Under the last injurious exposure rule, an employee is not required to
prove responsibility of a former employer's worker's compensation claim if
there is a causal connection between the disability and the most recent injury.
Gerald Root suffered an injury to his right shoulder in 1981 while
employed by the Las Vegas Housing Authority (LVHA). After the injury, he
filed a workers compensation claim with State Industrial Insurance System
(SIIS), LVHA's insurance provider. He was treated and the claim closed in
1982. Seven years later, in 1989, he went to work for the City of Henderson
and again injured his right shoulder. CDS of Nevada, the claim administrator
for the city, ultimately accepted the claim, and surgery was performed in April
1995. However, prior to surgery and during recovery, Root's left shoulder was
injured as he favored the right shoulder. He sought treatment and requested his
original 1981 claim be reopened. Shortly thereafter, in early 1996, Root suf-
fered a rotator cuff tear in his left shoulder.
CDS rejected the claim stating it was a pre-existing injury, while SIIS
denied the reopening request on the original claim. Doctors had differing opin-
ions as to the cause of the injuries. However, the appeals officer ruled that
Root's disability was the primary cause of his pre-existing condition and
ordered SIIS to reopen the 1981 claim, thus affirming CDS's denial.
LVHA and SIIS filed for judicial review in the district court and appealed
when the motion for review was denied. The Nevada Supreme Court ulti-
mately held that the administrative officer erred in construing the law when the
officer failed to apply the last injurious exposure rule. The court, quoting 4 A.
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 95.20 (1984), reversed under the
last injurious exposure rule which provides that "in occupational disease, suc-
cessive-employer cases places full liability upon the carrier covering the risk at
the time of the most recent injury that bears a causal relation to the disability."
Therefore, the court reversed the administrative decision and directed the City
of Henderson to accept Root's 1996 claim.
Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc.
8 P.3d 837 (Nev. Sept. 15, 2000)
Simple allegation of intentional tort, without accompanying proof, will not
overcome the exclusive remedy feature of workman's compensation.
Circus Circus had its PBX office moved to the casino's basement in con-
junction with expansion efforts. The employees claimed that, after several
weeks of working in the basement, they began to notice noxious fumes that
gave them stomachaches, headaches, and dizziness.
The exclusive remedy provision of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act
(NIIA) provides that an employee's rights and remedies for an injury sustained
by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment come exclu-
sively from the NIAA. An employee may avoid the NIIA's exclusive remedy
provision only if the employer deliberately and specifically intends to injure the
employee. While exposure to noxious fumes would normally be classified as
an unexpected and unforeseen event, the employees alleged that exposure was
due to intentional conduct by Circus Circus and not an accident.
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The Nevada Supreme Court held the employees failed to include facts in
the complaint that showed a deliberate intent on the part of Circus Circus to
injure the plaintiffs. Because the employees failed to plead facts showing that
Circus Circus deliberately and specifically intended to injure them, the court
determined that the injuries sustained were accidents that arose during the nor-
mal course of business. The employees' bare allegations were not enough to
avoid being barred by the exclusive remedy provision.
Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Riley
14 P.3d 22 (Nev. Dec. 5, 2000)
Failure to provide at least fifteen days notice of an intention to dismiss a
post-probation employee or failure to inform the employee of his or her right to
a hearing results in no termination or loss of post-probationary status.
Respondent worked as a probationary teacher for Clark County School
District (CCSD) during the 1993-1994 school year and was rehired for the fol-
lowing year with post-probationary status. On November 17, 1995, CCSD
informed Riley in writing that his teaching license was invalid due to his failure
to renew his competency testing. Riley was given four days to rectify the issue.
He had been given a provisional teaching certificate when he moved from Cali-
fornia and qualified for an exemption from renewed competency testing in
Nevada. Until the respondent received the letter, he was unaware that the let-
ters from his California employers were insufficient because they were not on
proper Nevada Department of Education forms.
On November 21, 1995, Riley was released from his duties. He compiled
the appropriate documents and submitted them to the appellant on November
30, 1995, while also reapplying for his position. CCSD rehired Riley with
probationary status, although there was some argument as to the actual rehire
date. CCSD contends that the respondent was rehired on December 1, 1995,
requiring the respondent to adhere to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
by conducting any grievances through arbitration.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the termination date was irrelevant
due to the fact that the respondent was only given four days notice of the pend-
ing termination. Therefore, the court held that Riley, as a post-probationary
teacher, had not been terminated, an action that requires at least fifteen days
notice, and notice of the right to a hearing. The court held that this determina-
tion made Riley's rehiring a fiction, meaning that he never lost his post-proba-
tionary status in the first place.
The court also held that the appellant's argument concerning the CBA was
irrelevant. But, even if it was an issue, Riley's claims were based on his statu-
tory rights as a post-probationary teacher, rendering his claim within the court's
jurisdiction to determine questions of statutory law that may or may not fall




992 P.2d 260 (Nev. Jan. 26, 2000)
The state may prove prior convictions for use in sentencing enhancement
at some point prior to the sentencing hearing.
Ronning pled guilty to felony driving under the influence (DUI). The
appellant had two prior DUI convictions and the prosecution sought to use
those prior convictions for enhancement purposes in sentencing. Ronning
argued that since the state failed to prove his two prior DUI convictions at
sentencing, the case should be remanded for re-sentencing as a second-offense
DUI. The district court had previously conducted hearings regarding the con-
stitutionality of the prior convictions and had admitted them into evidence prior
to the sentencing hearing. The prosecution did not attempt to reintroduce proof
of the prior convictions during the sentencing hearing and the appellant argued
that the district court, therefore, erred in holding the prior convictions valid.
On appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, the court held that the convic-
tions had been entered into evidence prior to the sentencing hearing, and con-
cluded the use of the prior convictions was valid for sentencing enhancement.
Ronning appealed for rehearing, arguing that in the original case the
Nevada Supreme Court overlooked Robertson v. State, 903 P.2d 820 (Nev.
1995), and Nev. Rev. Stat. 484.3792(2), which Ronning contended required the
state to provide evidence of the former convictions at the sentencing hearing,
and only then. The court denied rehearing, and Ronning petitioned for en banc
consideration.
The court reconsidered en banc in order to clarify the law regarding when
the state could show evidence of prior convictions. The court held that Robert-
son allowed the state to show evidence of the convictions at the sentencing
hearing, but that it did not restrict the show of proof only to that time. The
court also held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484.3792(2) did not require that proof be
shown only at sentencing hearings.
Mazzan v. Warden, Ely State Prison
993 P.2d 25 (Nev. Jan. 27, 2000)
Prosecutors' oral communication of Brady material was inadequate, and
thus a violation of Brady, since only disclosure of the actual documents in
possession of the prosecution would have provided the full range and detail of
the information's value in defending the case.
Defendant, Mazzan, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence, as well
as affirming the denials of his subsequent petition for post-conviction relief and
his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Mazzan filed a second writ of
habeas corpus, which the district court also denied. Mazzan then appealed the
denial to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Before and during trial, prosecutors provided the defense only with a mini-
mal oral synopsis of information required to be disclosed under Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In some instances, prosecutors' statements that the
information was of no value to the defense accompanied these oral disclosures.
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This material included information on the victim's drug dealings, his associa-
tions with other drug dealers, police reports and other information regarding
other possible suspects, and information placing these suspects in the victim's
vicinity at the time of the murder. The prosecution also refused to turn over
this information to defendant's post-trial counsel.
The court explained that Brady requires the prosecution to disclose evi-
dence favorable to the defense when that evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment, and noted that failure to do so is a violation of due process regard-
less of the prosecutor's motive. The court further explained that even failure to
disclose evidence that the defense did not request violates due process if the
non-disclosed evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.
A Brady violation is material if there is a reasonable possibility that the omitted
evidence would have affected the outcome.
The court stated that the prosecution "is responsible for determining
whether evidence is material and should be disclosed," and in doing so must
consider the evidence collectively and should resolve doubtful situations in
favor of disclosure. The court held that Brady material includes not only excul-
patory evidence, but also evidence that gives the defense grounds "to attack the
reliability, thoroughness, and good faith of the police investigation, to impeach
the credibility of the state's witnesses or to bolster the defense case against
prosecutorial attacks." Further, evidence that must be disclosed under Brady
need not be independently admissible.
The court accordingly held that a Brady violation has occurred when: (1)
the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; (2) the evidence was withheld
by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence was
material. The court applied these elements to the case and held that oral disclo-
sure was inadequate, since only the documents and police reports themselves
would have given the defense a full understanding of how the information
could aid the defense.
Petty v. Nevada
997 P.3d 800 (Nev. Mar. 10, 2000)
Character evidence of a victim's violent and dangerous history is admissi-
ble to establish a self-defense claim.
Defendant, Petty, was found guilty of first-degree murder for the shooting
of an acquaintance. Petty argued self-defense and attempted to offer the testi-
mony of two probation officers as evidence of the victim's violent character as
well as copies of the victim's 1990 conviction for robbery and 1997 conviction
for aiming a deadly weapon at a person. The district court refused to allow the
testimony, and Petty appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Under Nev. Rev.
Stat. 48.045(l)(b) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.055, evidence of a victim's character
may be admissible to establish the state of mind of the accused for a self-
defense claim. The court held that opinion evidence such as the testimony of
the probation officers was an acceptable way of showing the victim's violent
tendencies.
The court also held that evidence of a specific act is admissible only if the
accused knew of the act at the time of the murder. Testimony showed that
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Petty knew of the 1990 conviction, but not of the 1997 conviction at the time of
the killing. The court held that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the
1990 conviction that Petty was aware of, but was correct to exclude the 1997
conviction, of which Petty had no demonstrated knowledge.
Jackson v. Nevada
997 P.2d 121 (Nev. Mar. 13, 2000)
A written stipulation signed by all parties is an indispensable element for
polygraph results to be considered reasonable, and thus admissible, in Nevada,
and any party may refuse the stipulation for any reason.
Defendant, Jackson, was charged with burglary and robbery. At trial, the
state declined to enter into a stipulation allowing the admission into evidence of
polygraph results. Jackson proceeded with the polygraph test without the stipu-
lation, and the district court subsequently denied a motion to allow the jury to
consider the results of the test. Jackson was convicted and appealed, contend-
ing that the district court erred in refusing to admit the results of a polygraph
test.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that for polygraph results to be consid-
ered admissible in Nevada, a written stipulation providing for defendant's sub-
mission to the test, signed by the prosecution, the defendant, and the
defendant's attorney, is required. Without this stipulation, polygraph evidence
may be properly excluded. Accordingly, the court held that the district court
properly excluded Jackson's polygraph test results because no written stipula-
tion was obtained from all parties. The court further held that any party may
refuse to make the stipulation for any reason, or no reason at all.
Walker v. Nevada
997 P.2d 803 (Nev. Apr. 6, 2000)
Prior bad acts irrelevant due to time passed and nature of threat posed.
Walker shot and killed her husband, Anthony, during an argument. At
trial, Anthony's son, Anthony, Jr., testified that Walker had twice before
threatened Anthony with a firearm. The first incident occurred ten years before
Anthony's death, at a picnic, where Walker pointed a pistol at Anthony and
threatened to kill him. The second incident occurred six years before
Anthony's death when Walker pointed a rifle at Anthony, telling him to come
no closer and that she wanted money for her children. Walker was convicted of
first-degree murder.
Walker appealed on the grounds that Anthony, Jr.'s testimony was
improperly admitted because it was improperly used to show criminal propen-
sity and action in conformity with that propensity. The state argued that these
acts were relevant to show Walker's "true intent" at the time she shot Anthony.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the passage of time, six and ten
years respectively, made the incidents less relevant to Walker's intent at the
moment she shot Anthony. Additionally, the court made a crucial distinction
between Walker's conduct in these two prior acts and the conduct at issue.
Since Walker's prior acts did not involve the actual firing or attempted firing of
a weapon at Anthony, the court determined that these incidents did not clearly
establish intent to kill, only intent to threaten.
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Therefore, the court concluded that the prior acts were only minimally
relevant to Walker's later intent to kill Anthony and the danger of prejudice
substantially outweighed the probative value of the prior bad acts. Conse-
quently, the court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new
trial.
Flores v. Nevada
5 P.3d 1066 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2000)
District court abused discretion in admitting evidence of gang member-
ship and prior murder committed by accomplice because probative value was
outweighed by prejudicial effect.
Flores and his friend, Escobar, were convicted of murder with a deadly
weapon. At trial, a gang unit officer testified that the two men were members
of a gang. The court also admitted evidence that Escobar had committed a
prior murder with the same weapon. Flores appealed his conviction, alleging
improper admission of this evidence.
The state argued that the evidence was admissible as motive and under the
complete story doctrine, which allows evidence of other bad acts to provide
necessary context. Flores argued that it was inadmissible because it was
improperly used to show character.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the prior murder
evidence was not proper to show motive, as gang membership was only specu-
lation as to motive, not legitimate evidence of motive to commit murder. The
court also held that, though the prior murder had some relevance to identifying
Flores, the prejudicial value of the evidence outweighed its probative nature.
Walker v. Nevada
6 P.3d 477 (Nev. Aug. 21, 2000)
In determining the admissibility of statements against penal interest at
trial, independent evidence is not required to establish credibility.
The defendant, Walker, shot a minor during a stolen property dispute. The
jury acquitted the defendant of attempted murder, but found him guilty of bat-
tery with the use of a deadly weapon. At trial, the district court refused to
allow into evidence a statement that a co-defendant made that could have cast
doubt on whether Walker performed the shooting. The court excluded it under
the hearsay exception, finding that the statement lacked trustworthiness.
Walker appealed, alleging the district court erred when it failed to admit
the statement, arguing that the statement should have been allowed as a state-
ment made against penal interest. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, although it found that the district court should have allowed the
statement. The court called the failure to admit the statement harmless error.
The court then used this opinion to clarify the statutory test for the admis-
sion of statements against penal interest during trial. The court noted that the
statute's use of the term "corroborating circumstances" gave an invalid impres-
sion that specific evidence was needed to ascertain the credibility of the
statement.
The court held that the statutory test to determine the admissibility of
statements against penal interest under Nev. Rev. Stat. 51.345 is whether the
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totality of the circumstances indicates that the statement is credible or cor-
roborates the notion that the statement was not fabricated to exonerate the
defendant. Therefore, corroboration by independent evidence is not required to
establish the credibility of the statement.
Garner v. Nevada
6 P.3d 1013 (Nev. Aug. 23, 2000)
Conduct after the occurrence of a crime may be used as circumstantial
evidence against defendant and failed plea negotiations may be used as evi-
dence of culpability at trial.
Defendant, Garner, was charged with conspiracy, burglary, kidnapping,
and first degree murder in the robbery of a bar and the murder of its bartender.
On appeal, he asserted there was insufficient evidence to convict, that the state
improperly commented at trial on his attempt to plea bargain, and that the jury
instructions were erroneous.
Garner argued that evidence of occurrences after the robbery used to prove
conspiracy could not be used to prove robbery. The Nevada Supreme Court
held that the trial court could consider conduct occurring after a crime to prove
the commission of a crime, and held the evidence sufficient to prove charges of
conspiracy and aiding and abetting against Garner. The court held that there is
no per se basis for holding an accomplice to one crime liable for a related crime
by the principal simply because the crime was foreseeable; where the relation-
ship between the defendant's acts and the charged crime is too attenuated, the
state must provide some showing of specific intent to aid in, or specific knowl-
edge of, the crime charged.
Garner also claimed that the state improperly used his attempts to negoti-
ate a plea agreement. In determining whether a discussion should be character-
ized as a plea negotiation, the court considers whether the accused had a
subjective but reasonable expectation of negotiating a plea at the time of the
discussion. A defendant that attempts to negotiate prior to confession but fails
in that attempt and confesses anyway has not subjectively manifested the
expectation that a plea has been entered into. The court found that Garner
made no substantive admissions in his attempts to negotiate a plea. All crucial
admissions came after negotiations ended. The court held that since Garner
was not prevented from testifying at trial, at which time he could give his own
account of the events, the prejudice of such evidence of plea bargaining was
negligible and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court also found that the trial court's jury instruction on voluntary
intoxication erroneously placed the burden of proof on Garner to prove he did
not have specific intent to commit the crimes charged. However, the court held
the error was harmless because Garner was not entitled to an instruction on
voluntary intoxication, because voluntary intoxication does not reduce the
criminality of an act.
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Harte v. Nevada
13 P.3d 420 (Nev. Dec. 4, 2000)
Court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress confession,
granting state's motion to exclude defendant's expert from testifying during
penalty phase, or permitting evidence of defendant's statements during penalty
phase to show future dangerousness.
Appellant, Harte, while being questioned in relation to an unrelated crime,
confessed to killing a cab driver during a robbery. Harte was convicted of the
crime, and argued that his conviction should be vacated because the district
court erred by: (1) denying Harte's motion to suppress his confession on the
grounds that it was obtained without a valid waiver of rights and in violation of
his right to counsel; (2) granting the state's motion to exclude Harte's expert
witnesses during the penalty phase; and (3) permitting the state to introduce
evidence during the penalty phase to show the defendant's dangerous nature.
The Nevada Supreme Court examined the record and found that while
there was some initial confusion on the defendant's part during questioning, he
was reminded of his right to counsel and showed sufficient understanding by
comments made during the questioning. The court also found that Harte's
ambiguous request for counsel during the interview did not invalidate his con-
fession under Sechrest v. Nevada, 705 P.2d 626 (Nev. 1985), which followed a
United States Supreme Court ruling in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981), that once an accused has expressed a desire to deal with police only
through counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been
made available to him. The court held that Sechrest had been overruled by
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), which held that the Edwards rule
applies only when the suspect has unambiguously requested counsel by articu-
lation. The court concluded that substantial evidence existed that Harte did not
invoke his right to counsel.
Harte also challenged the district court's ruling that excluded three expert
witnesses, a Lutheran Pastor, a Catholic Priest, and a Jewish Rabbi, during the
sentencing phase. None of these witnesses had any personal knowledge regard-
ing the defendant and testified only as to religious reasons for opposing the
death penalty. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a sentencer
must not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a
defendant's character, or any record of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence of less than death. Nev. Rev. Stat.
175.552(3) provides that during sentencing "evidence may be presented that
shows mitigating circumstances" which may not be ordinarily admissible. Nev.
Rev. Stat. 200.035(7) provides that any mitigating circumstances may be con-
sidered. The court agreed with other courts, which have rejected constitutional
challenges to exclusion of evidence relating only to the merits of capital pun-
ishment. In addition, the court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.552(3) and Nev.
Rev. Stat. 200.035(7) did not require evidence to be admitted pursuant to con-
stitutional dictates.
Harte's claim that the district court erred by admitting excerpts of a letter
written by him about inciting riots and escaping from prison during sentencing
was improper because they were unfairly prejudicial. The court disagreed,
holding that Harte's statements were sufficiently probative of his potential dan-
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gerousness. The court held that evidence of a defendant's character is admissi-
ble in the penalty phase where the evidence is relevant and the danger of unfair
prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rose wrote that while he did concur with the
majority's decision to affirm the district court's judgment, he disagreed with
the court's conclusion that Harte's request was equivocal. Chief Justice Rose
argued that the Nevada Supreme Court did not have to follow United States
Supreme Court precedent that restricted individual protections, and could con-
tinue to allow greater individual protections provided in the Nevada
Constitution.
Koerschner v. Nevada
13 P.3d 451 (Nev. Dec. 4, 2000)
In considering a defendant's request for a psychological examination of a
child-victim in a sexual assault case, the predominant question is whether a
compelling need for protection of the child exists.
Appellant, Koerschner, took his niece to the hospital with severe bleeding
in the area of her cervix. Initially, the girl said that the bleeding was caused by
falling down a flight of stairs; however, after examination she described a sex-
ual assault she claimed Koerschner perpetrated. Subsequent examination by a
doctor concluded that a fall did not cause the injury. The state charged
Koerschner with three counts of sexual assault on a minor, and the jury found
him guilty of two of the counts.
Koerschner contended the district court erred in denying his application
for a psychological examination of the victim. The court had previously ruled
in Keeney v. State, 850 P.2d 311 (Nev. 1993), that it would be error to preclude
a defendant from having an alleged child-victim examined by an expert if the
victim is not shown by compelling reasons to be in need of protection. This
requirement shifted the burden from the defendant, where previous precedent
placed the burden, to the state. To the extent that Keeney shifted the burden
from the defendant to the state, the court overturned it.
Additionally, the court held that the compelling need for protection of the
victim is the overriding judicial question that must be resolved. Therefore, to
show there is not a compelling need for the protection of the witness, the defen-
dant must show that: (1) the state used an expert; (2) the evidence is supported
by little or no corroboration beyond the victim's testimony; and (3) there is a
reasonable basis to believe the victim's mental state may affect the truthfulness
of their statements. The court is not necessarily required to give equal weight
to these factors.
Applying this to the Koerschner case, the court found that the defendant
failed to prove a compelling need for the examination, as the state did not use
an expert, there was medical evidence corroborating the sexual assault, and
there was no evidence that the victim's mental state would affect her
truthfulness.
Chief Justice Rose and Justice Shearing filed separate concurrences. Jus-
tice Rose agreed with the ruling, but did not agree with the majority opinion's
holding which overturned precedent that attempted to level the playing field
when the state prosecutes a child sexual assault case. Chief Justice Rose
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argued that the new rule is less equitable and makes it much more difficult for a
person accused of sexual assault on a child to get expert assistance that may be
required for the defense; and at times, this makes the trial of a child sexual
assault case less fair; and therefore, the final verdict less reliable. However,
Justice Shearing replied that the playing field is virtually always tipped heavily
against the child-victim, rather than against the defendant and that the defen-
dant should only be allowed to conduct a psychological examination of the
child-victim in the cases where there is a compelling reason for such
examination.
Nevada v. Lisenbee
13 P.3d 947 (Nev. Dec. 5, 2000)
Controlled substance discarded in flight from an illegal police seizure is
admissible as evidence.
Officers detained defendant, Lisenbee, in a search for a suspect matching
the defendant's description. He produced identification that demonstrated he
was not the suspect in question and showed the officers the legal pocketknife
and cellular phone under his shirt. The officers then attempted to seize
Lisenbee's knife and after a short struggle, the defendant fled. After Lisenbee
was apprehended, the officers retraced his path and found a controlled sub-
stance they claimed Lisenbee discarded during flight.
Lisenbee was charged with possession of a controlled substance. Lisenbee
moved to dismiss because he was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The district court held that the stop was improper and granted the
motion. The state appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The court agreed that the initial
seizure was improper, but held that once the defendant fled from police cus-
tody, the illegal seizure ended and any evidence subsequently discovered was
admissible. The court also held that items voluntarily discarded are not
afforded Fourth Amendment protection because the defendant loses the expec-
tation of privacy upon discarding the items. The controlled substance was held
admissible and the motion to dismiss reversed.
In dissent, Justice Young contends that the defendant's flight did not
effectively end the illegal seizure. The dissent argues that Lisenbee should
have the right to attempt to preserve his freedom and that any evidence discov-
ered as a result of the initial illegal seizure should be inadmissible.
Proferes v. Nevada
13 P.3d 955 (Nev. Dec. 5, 2000)
Inevitable discovery rule does not apply when police do not have a valid
reason for the original stop or search of the defendant.
Defendant, Proferes, knocked on the door of a house being searched by
the Elko SWAT team. The officers answered the door and told him to come
into the house. Once inside, he was detained for questioning. The officers
asked him if he had any weapons or drugs, and the defendant told them that he
did. The police then recovered amphetamines from Proferes' pocket. At a sup-
pression hearing, the state countered Proferes' argument that the detention and
search were illegal by invoking the inevitable discovery rule, which allows
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unconstitutionally seized evidence to be admitted if the state can show the evi-
dence would inevitably have been discovered by legal means. Proferes was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell.
Proferes appealed, claiming the detention and search violated the Fourth
Amendment and his Miranda rights. The court held that knocking on a door of
a house is not enough for reasonable suspicion, and the subsequent search was
a violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, since the
officers did not inform the defendant of his Miranda rights once he was
detained, everything the defendant said and everything the officers found was
inadmissible at trial.
Lay v. Nevada
14 P.3d 1256 (Nev. Dec. 19, 2000)
Failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense prior to trial violates
due process.
Appellant, Lay, was convicted of first-degree murder with use of a deadly
weapon and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. At trial, the
paramedic who treated the victim testified that the victim's dying declaration
named the defendant as his killer. However, three to five times prior to trial,
the paramedic claimed that the victim made no dying declaration. The
paramedic's report contained no information regarding a dying declaration.
When questioned by his law clerk as to whether the paramedic's prior state-
ments should be disclosed to the defense, the prosecutor replied that it was not
necessary, and that a summary of the paramedic's testimony was already filed
with the court.
Lay appealed, arguing that he was not provided with potentially exculpa-
tory evidence.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that the undisclosed prior
statements of the paramedic would have allowed the defense an opportunity to
impeach her trial testimony and that there is a reasonable probability that the
trial would have resulted differently given that opportunity. Thus, the undis-
closed evidence was material and failure to disclose was a violation of due
process.
FAMILY LAW
Carson City Dist. Attorney v. Ryder
998 P.2d 1186 (Nev. May 8, 2000)
Child support arrearages may only be satisfied by either paying all
arrearages, or paying twelve months of child support and arrearage payments.
The respondent, Stephen Ryder (Stephen), and the appellant, Mary Ann
Ryder (Mary Ann), were divorced in California in 1986. Stephen was ordered
to pay child support and to obtain medical insurance for his daughter. By mid-
1994, Stephen was in arrears. In 1994, the San Francisco Superior Court
ordered Stephen to pay the original child support and an additional $425 for
arrearages. The total owed for back support was approximately $20,000. By
1996, both parties were residents of Nevada. In February 1996, the Carson City
district attorney's office informed Stephen that Mary Ann had filed a complaint
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regarding his arrearages and that $625 would be withheld from his wages. A
child support master conducted a hearing and recommended Stephen pay
$5,625 within thirty days and continue paying $625 per month.
Stephen objected to the master's holding and requested a hearing in dis-
trict court. At the first hearing, the court held that Stephen had a continuing
order to pay. Prior to the second hearing, Stephen made a payment of $3,450.
At the second hearing, the district court held Stephen was current in the ongo-
ing child support obligations as a result of the payment. The district court fur-
ther held that despite his delinquency, suspension of his driver's license was
unjustified and counterproductive to the continued payment of child support.
The district attorney and Mary Ann appealed the district court's order rejecting
the master's findings and recommendations.
The Nevada Supreme Court held the district court's holding was errone-
ous. The court held the plain language of the statute clearly stated that both
past due payments and ongoing support payments must be considered when
determining whether a parent is in arrears.
The court held the respondent did not satisfy his child support arrearages
with the single payment for $3,450. The court also held the respondent's pay-
ment did not cover twelve months of ongoing support and court arrearages,
which would have also allowed respondent to satisfy his arrearages.
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J.
8 P.3d 126 (Nev. Aug. 24, 2000)
When making decisions to terminate parental rights, Nevada has aban-
doned the parental fault/best interests standard for the best interest/parental
fault standard.
Respondents, Hikmet and Raja J (the Js), had a child in Iraq in 1988. In
1990, they traveled to the United States and left the child with Raja's sister and
brother-in-law, Talia and Sam Z (the Zs). In 1996, the Zs, after caring for the
child for approximately six years, were granted guardianship of the child. They
then petitioned the court to terminate the Js parental rights in order to adopt the
child.
The parties told drastically different stories at the hearing, with the Zs
claiming that the Js gave them the child to raise. The Js denied this and argued
that they could not get back to the United States to see the child due to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. The evidence did show that the child's biological mother
only visited the child twice in seven years; the Js only spoke to the child once
over the telephone during this time. The district court denied the Zs petition to
terminate the respondents' parental rights, a decision that the Zs appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court's orders, denying
the Zs' petition to terminate the Js' parental rights and their motion for a new
trial. The main issue on appeal was whether the district court used the correct
standard for termination of parental rights. The standard used before this opin-
ion was the jurisdictional/dispositional standard set forth in Champagne v. Wel-
fare Division, 691 P.2d 849 (Nev. 1984), which established parental
misconduct as the threshold issue to be considered before taking the best inter-
ests of the child into account.
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The court overruled Champagne and other cases decided based on it, and
held that the standard to use is the child's best interest/parental fault standard.
The court held that this standard would better conform to the stated purpose of
the Nevada parental termination statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 128.105, that the pri-
mary concern in a parental rights termination case should be the welfare of the
child.
Kantor v. Kantor
8 P.3d 825 (Nev. Sept. 15, 2000)
Courts are under no independent duty to affirm validity of a prenuptial
agreement when parties have stipulated to its validity.
Gary and Janet Kantor entered into a pre-marital agreement that laid out
which assets were to be considered community property in the event that their
marriage failed. Gary filed for divorce. Janet's original answer denied the
validity and enforceability of the agreement. In her amended answer, she
admitted its validity. Seven weeks prior to trial, Janet requested leave of the
court to amend her amended answer to challenge the validity of the agreement.
The district court denied her request. Janet appealed the denial, contended
that the district court should not have applied the terms of the agreement, and
appealed the award of attorney's fees.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the request to amend because both parties had already
relied on the validity of the agreement and because allowing a validity chal-
lenge seven weeks before trial would have required an extensive delay. The
court also held that the district court was correct in applying the terms of the
agreement because it was under no obligation to determine the validity of the
agreement since Janet's amended answer admitted its validity. Furthermore,
the court affirmed the award of attorney's fees, because the agreement specifi-
cally had a provision for recovery of attorney's fees if one party attempted to
nullify the agreement.
Gepford v. Gepford
13 P.3d 67 (Nev. Nov. 30, 2000)
District court abused its discretion in reversing child custody
arrangement.
Mr. and Mrs. Gepford divorced under relatively amicable terms in 1991,
when their two children were quite young. At that time, the parents retained
dual custody, but shortly thereafter, Mr. Gepford decided to move to Idaho.
The parents reached a verbal agreement whereby Mr. Gepford would retain
primary legal custody while Mrs. Gepford's child support obligation would be
reduced. Mr. Gepford did not realize that written consent from Mrs. Gepford
was required by Nevada statute before relocating the children out of state.
Several years later, while one of the children was away with his step-
mother, the other child was home recovering from pneumonia. He also suf-
fered from asthma and attention deficit disorder, a condition for which he was
required to take medication three times daily. Mr. Gepford left the ten-year-old
alone to assist a friend, but gave him his pager number. During that time, Mrs.
Gepford happened to call and was greatly alarmed that the boy was alone. She
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phoned the police, who went to the home, but determined the boy was in no
danger.
After the incident, Mrs. Gepford sued to regain physical custody. The
district court found for Mrs. Gepford, citing Mr. Gepford's poor judgment in
leaving the boy alone and his failure to obtain written consent before moving
from the state with the children in making their determination. They also con-
cluded, based on evidence at trial, that Mrs. Gepford would be more likely than
Mr. Gepford to ensure the children would retain a relationship with both
parents.
The Nevada Supreme Court, however, found this evidence insufficient to
alter the custody arrangement. They reversed and remanded, citing Mr.
Gepford's good parental reputation and his long-standing physical custody.
They de-emphasized the sole incident of leaving the boy alone and discounted
the re-location of the boys without written consent as only one of many factors
used in making a determination such as this.
Justice Shearing dissented, with Justices Leavitt and Becker supporting the
dissent. Justice Shearing's opinion focused on the district court's role as the
fact-finder and objected to the court taking on that function. They concluded
that the evidence presented was wholly sufficient to support the district court's
finding.
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez
13 P.3d 415 (Nev. Nov. 30, 2000)
Marital misconduct may not be considered in determining an award of
alimony.
Glenda and Antonio Rodriguez had been married for twenty-one years
when they filed for divorce in 1994. At the time of trial, Antonio earned at
least $75,000 per year and Glenda earned approximately $14,000 per year. The
trial judge ignored Glenda's health problems and limited earning capacity, and
instead refused to award Glenda alimony because she had initiated the parties'
separation by leaving the family to pursue an extra-marital affair.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that a trial court may not consider either
party's misconduct or fault when considering an award of alimony. The court
analyzed the language of Nevada's alimony statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.150(1),
and its legislative history, concluding that the statute clearly articulates the leg-
islature's intent that as a no-fault divorce state, fault or bad conduct should not
be considered when deciding issues of alimony. The court found that alimony
is financial support paid from one spouse to the other whenever justice and
equity require it, and not a "sword to level the wrongdoer," or a "prize to
reward virtue."
The court endorsed the Buchanan factors, as set forth in Buchanan v.
Buchanan, 523 P.2d 1 (Nev. 1974), as sufficient in determining an equitable
alimony award. The Buchanan factors require the trial court to consider each
spouse's physical and mental condition when examining his or her financial
condition, health, and ability to work. Consideration of these factors incorpo-
rates any economic injury caused by a spouse's fault or misconduct, without
considering the conduct itself. The court held that the trial judge clearly abused
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his discretion when he considered Glenda's misconduct and ignored her finan-
cial condition, health, and ability to work when determining alimony.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In re Honorable Frances-Ann Fine
13 P.3d 400 (Nev. Nov. 30, 2000)
Ex parte communication between a judge and court appointed experts
must be limited to procedural or administrative matters; willful misconduct
does not require malice.
In 1998, a Las Vegas attorney filed a complaint charging Judge Frances-
Ann Fine with numerous violations of the Administrative and Procedural Rules
for the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline (ARJD) and the Nevada
Code of Judicial Conduct (Canons). The complaint alleged that Judge Fine
conducted ex parte communications in three pending cases, and appointed a
cousin as a mediator in a pending case without disclosing her relationship.
The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline (Commission) held evi-
dentiary hearings on the complaint. The Commission found that Judge Fine
engaged in ex parte communication with experts in a case pending before her,
McMonigle v. McMonigle, in violation of ARJD 11(3) and Canons 2A and
3B(7). The Commission also found that Judge Fine appointed her first cousin
as a mediator in another case she heard, Kinnard v. Kinnard, without revealing
the relationship to either party. Additionally, the Commission found that Fine
engaged in ex parte communication with the mediator and experts in this case,
and with experts in another case, Greisen v. Greisen.
Judge Fine argued that appointing her first cousin did not violate the canon
because her cousin did not fit within the canon's definition of family members.
Judge Fine also argued that some of the ex parte communications were author-
ized by EDCR 5.70, and some by Canon 3B(7)(c), which allows communica-
tion with "court personnel." She also argued that she could be removed only
for willful misconduct, which required an element of bad faith or malice that
was not present in her conduct.
The Commission disagreed and, citing its 1995 decision to discipline
Judge Fine for engaging in ex parte communications, held that Judge Fine
showed a continuing pattern of ex parte communications with parties regarding
issues on which she would ultimately decide. The Commission found that
Judge Fine had discarded her judicial capacity and become an advocate, and
ruled that it had no other choice but to remove her from office.
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the Commission's decision. The court
determined that whether or not a first cousin was listed under the canon's defi-
nition was immaterial to the ultimate question of nepotism. The court held that
there was clear and convincing evidence to support the Commission's finding
that Judge Fine was guilty of nepotism and favoritism because her selection of
her cousin as mediator in a pending case was based somewhat on their
relationship.
The court also held that EDCR 5.70 was not an exception to Canon 3B(7),
which expressly disallows ex parte communications. The court agreed with
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Judge Fine's contention that court-appointed experts were "court personnel,"
but held that ex parte communications with such personnel should be restricted
to procedural or administrative matters. The court held that Judge Fine's con-
tacts were on substantive issues, and, thus, not protected by Canon 3B(7)(c).
The court found that willful misconduct included an intentional or know-
ing violation of the judicial canons. Since Judge Fine had been previously
disciplined for similar conduct, the court held that Judge Fine's behavior was




In other professional responsibility cases, the Nevada Supreme Court
addressed attorney disciplinary issues in the 2000 session. Attorneys were dis-
barred or suspended for a variety of infractions, including filing false docu-
ments (1); misappropriation of client funds (2), (3), and (7); failure to pursue
client claims (2), (6), (7), and (8); failure to keep clients informed (2), (6), and
(7); failure to respond to disciplinary authority (1); and various other acts of
dishonesty (3) and (7). In one case, the court recommended permanent disbar-
ment on the grounds that the attorney posed a "serious threat of harm." (4)
Discipline was occasionally reduced due to mitigating factors including
length of practice without disciplinary problems (3); restitution (2) and (3);
cooperation with the disciplinary committee (2) and (3); willingness to face
addictions (2); and remorse (3). A lengthy disciplinary history and failure to
cooperate with disciplinary authority was cited as reasons to issue more serious
discipline (1), (2), (6), and (8). In addition, the Nevada Supreme Court rein-
stated an attorney from a five-year suspension on the condition that he remain
free from alcohol abuse (5).
1) In re Discipline of William C. Watters, Esq., 2000 Nev. LEXIS 80
(Nev. June 6, 2000)
2) In re Discipline of Ronald L. Cordes, Esq., 2000 Nev. LEXIS 153
(Nev. Nov. 30, 2000)
3) In re Discipline of Hamilton D. Moore, 2000 Nev. LEXIS 149 (Nev.
Nov. 30, 2000)
4) IN RE Discipline of Stone, 2000 Nev. LEXIS 152 (Nev. Nov. 30, 2000)
5) In re Reinstatement of Paul Fitzgerald, 2000 Nev. LEXIS 151 (Nev.
Oct. 23, 2000)
6) In re Discipline of Arnold Weinstock, Esq., 2000 Nev. LEXIS 154
(Nev. Oct. 23, 2000)
7) In re Discipline of Dwight E. Duncan, 2000 LEXIS 150 (Nev. Nov. 30,
2000)




Calloway v. City of Reno
993 P.2d 1259 (Nev. Feb. 29, 2000)
Plaintiffs cannot sue in tort for economic loss in construction defect cases.
Townhouse owners brought claims against the developer, contractor, city,
and subcontractors, alleging their homes contained construction defects causing
extensive water damage to their homes from rain and snow. The owners settled
their claims against the developers and contractors for considerably less than
their claims were worth, but continued to press their tort claims against the
subcontractors. The subcontractors defended by claiming that the homeowners
had suffered only economic loss, and that such damages could only be found
against those with whom the homeowners were in privity. The homeowners
alleged that the losses were not subject to the economic loss doctrine due to
their foreseeability.
The economic loss doctrine provides that when a defectively designed
product damages only itself and the loss is purely economic, liability only
exists for those parties with whom the damaged party is in privity. Only if the
product causes personal injury or damage to other property are tort remedies
allowed. The owners argued that the defective framing of the town homes
damaged other property, the homes themselves, when water damage occurred.
The court held that the homes were integrated products that damaged only
themselves, and denied the appellants request for relief. The court in this case
expressly overruled Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 797 P.2d 949
(Nev. 1990), with regard to its holding on the role of foreseeability of damages
and economic loss doctrine.
Olivero v. Lowe
995 P.2d 1023 (Nev. Mar. 24, 2000)
A $55,000 compensatory and punitive damages award was not excessive
in light of homeowner's outrageous conduct.
Olivero appeared at the construction site of his new home where Lowe, a
laborer, was working. Olivero confronted Lowe regarding delays in the con-
struction schedule and, without apparent provocation, brandished a handgun
and punched Lowe. Olivero then allegedly pointed the weapon at Lowe's head,
threatened to take his life, and forced him to dismantle a portion of the com-
pleted work. Lowe filed suit against Olivero alleging assault, battery, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court awarded Lowe
compensatory damages of $10,000 and imposed punitive damages of $45,000.
Olivero appealed on several grounds: (1) failure of predicate proof to sub-
stantiate any award of compensatory damages; (2) improper review by the
court of companion criminal proceedings; (3) refusal by the court to allow clos-
ing argument; (4) Lowe's late service of a trial memo submitted to the trial
judge; and (5) improper imposition of punitive damages.
The Nevada Supreme Court held that in cases where emotional distress
damages are not secondary to physical injuries, but rather precipitate physical
symptoms, either a physical impact must have occurred or proof of serious
emotional distress causing physical injury or illness must be presented. Here,
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there was a physical impact that provided for personal injury and emotional
distress recovery. Lowe testified that he still experienced terror and was unable
to continue working as a result. Consequently, the court concluded the com-
pensatory award was not excessive.
The court also concluded that Olivero was not harmed by the district
court's review of another criminal proceeding against him, because it was
Olivero's attorney who first raised the issue and, after review, the district court
struck all evidence in regard to the criminal case.
Further, the district court did not err in refusing Olivero's request for clos-
ing argument because the decision to allow a closing argument during a bench
trial is entirely within the discretion of the district court. Lowe's late service of
the "blind" trial brief to the court was held harmless, because this error would
not have affected the outcome of the trial.
Finally, the court concluded that Olivero failed to demonstrate the punitive
damages were awarded under the influence of passion or prejudice. Indeed, the
court found the totality of the evidence showed that Olivero demonstrated an
outrageous exercise of physical domination over Lowe. Consequently, the
court affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of Lowe and upheld the award
of both compensatory and punitive damages.
Cramer v. Peavy
3 P.3d 665 (Nev. July 14, 2000)
Jury instructions contained in Nev. Rev. Stat. 616.215(10) create a narrow
exception to the collateral source rule and do not violate the separation of
powers doctrine.
Appellant, Cramer, was a cab driver who sustained injuries in an accident
with another cab. Cramer had been involved in two other accidents, one two
years prior to the accident at issue, and the other a year later. Cramer sued
Checker Cab for injuries, and Checker responded by questioning the severity of
the injuries received in the collision with its cab. A jury returned a verdict for
Checker and Cramer appealed.
Cramer claimed the district court abused its discretion by not granting a
mistrial when the jury was made aware that he had received compensation from
the State Industrial Insurance System (SIIS). Cramer further alleged that Nev.
Rev. Stat. 616.215(10) was unconstitutional because mandatory jury instruc-
tions superseded the collateral source rule, violating the separation of powers
doctrine.
While noting the impropriety of the respondent's comments concerning
the appellant's SIIS compensation, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the dis-
trict court's ruling because the references were neither so egregious or numer-
ous as to affect the verdict. The court noted that the function of Nev. Rev. Stat.
616.215(10) was to address the jury's assumption that plaintiffs were not
required to repay SIIS from their damage award. Consequently, juries would
try to guess how much the plaintiff had received from SIIS and reduce the
damages award accordingly. It was the legislature's intent to curb this jury
practice. Therefore, the court held that the statute did not violate the separation
of powers doctrine and created a narrow exception to the collateral source rule.
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Shafer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 26004 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000)
An award of zero damages for pain and suffering is clearly erroneous
where plaintiff is severely disabled or suffers loss of consortium, and victims
may recover the full cost of necessary attendant care, including that provided
by a family member.
Plaintiff was seriously injured while in a Wal-Mart store, and he and his
wife subsequently brought suit for damages and loss of consortium. The trial
court computed damages of over $2,000,000 for future medical and attendant
care, and just less than $1,000,000 for loss of future earnings. The court did
not compensate for attendant care provided gratuitously by the plaintiff's fam-
ily members.
The Ninth Circuit found that the federal district court improperly com-
puted the future cost of attendant care necessitated by plaintiffs injuries.
Nevada law holds that victims are entitled to recover the full cost of whatever
attendant care is necessary, including that provided gratuitously by a family
member, as measured by the reasonable value of the services.
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the trial court's computation of damages
awarded the plaintiffs zero recovery for pain and suffering and loss of consor-
tium. Nevada case law on additur requires that, where there is a severe disabil-
ity or loss of consortium, an award of zero damages for pain and suffering is
inadequate and constitutes a clearly erroneous decision in the trial court that
may be reviewed. The Ninth Circuit remanded for trial court review.
Flowers v. Carville
112 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D. Nev. Aug. 24, 2000)
A publicfigure cannot recover for defamatory statements made if the stat-
ute of limitations has expired in the state where the defendant resides, or if
those statements are made without actual malice.
Plaintiff, Gennifer Flowers, brought action for allegedly defamatory state-
ments made by the defendants in books and during television interviews.
Flowers brought the action within Nevada's statute of limitations of two years,
but outside New York's (the residence of the defendants) one-year limitation.
Under Nevada's borrowing statute, a cause of action arising in another state
may not be maintained in Nevada if the statute of limitations of that state would
bar a claim. The trial court found for defendants, holding that defamation
actions generally arise at the place the defendant resides when the tortious con-
duct occurs. Flowers appealed.
The United States District Court applied New York law to the statute of
limitations claims because it found defamatory statements made outside
Nevada insufficient to satisfy the overwhelming interest standard. The action
was held to accrue from the time the original statement was made, prohibiting
Flowers from applying a continuing tort theory if the statements were reprinted
at later times. The court also found First Amendment protection, as the dis-
puted assertions were entirely comprised of opinion, and devoid of any factual
assertion.
Finally, the court found Flowers to be a limited purpose public figure,
drawn into the public eye by her involvement in a public controversy. In
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defamatory speech actions, public figures must show that the statements were
made with actual malice, a standard the court found Flowers did not fulfill.
Quintero v. McDonald
14 P.3d 522 (Nev. Dec. 19, 2000)
Juries may assign fault for an accident to the defendant, but not award
damages to the plaintiff.
Quintero was a passenger in a vehicle driven by McKennery when it was
involved in a minor accident with a vehicle driven by McDonald. The accident
occurred as both vehicles were backing out of parking spaces. Quintero filed
an action against both parties claiming neck and back injuries, but settled with
McKennery before trial. At trial, Quintero presented evidence of severe neck
and back pain, while McDonald presented evidence that indicated that Quintero
continued to perform housekeeping and babysitting chores, had several lapses
in her chiropractic treatment, and was involved in an accident the previous year
in which she sustained similar injuries. The jury found McDonald sixty-five
percent liable, McKennery thirty-five percent liable and Quintero not liable, but
did not award any damages to Quintero.
Quintero moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alter-
native, a new trial. Quintero's basis for the motions was the jury's allocation of
fault, not its failure to award damages. The court denied the motion and Quin-
tero appealed.
The Nevada Supreme Court found that a jury is permitted wide latitude in
awarding damages, and courts uphold a jury's findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence. The court held that substantial evidence supported the
jury's verdict; and, that the jury was within its discretion to assign fault for the
accident to the defendant, but award no damages to the plaintiff.

